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Three Essays on the Political Economy of Corporate Bailouts
Michael Graham Smith
This dissertation is comprised of three papers exploring the causes of the likelihood and
distribution of corporate bailouts. The first paper explores why some distressed firms receive
bailouts while others do not. It argues that political partisanship plays a key role: left-wing
governments are more likely to authorize bailouts on average, and are particularly more
likely to save employee-rich firms. The theory is tested using a new dataset comprised of
financially distressed firms, a subset of which receive bailouts. The second paper examines
why bailouts are concentrated in a particular subset of industrial sectors. The primary
argument is again political partisanship: left-wing governments seek to protect firms in
sectors that have the most employees. Alternative explanations, including the impact of
globalization and alternative forms of social protection, are also considered. The theory
is shown to hold using a new dataset comprised of comprehensive counts of bailouts by
sector across the European Economic Area. The final paper examines the nature of public
opinion regarding bailouts. The paper undermines the standing assumption that bailouts are
largely unpopular by instead showing that public support varies by context and is in some
instances supportive. Using observational data in conjunction with survey experiments,
individual characteristics, including partisanship and material self-interest, as well as firm-
specific characteristics, including the relevance of the firm to the national economy, are shown
to drive public support for bailouts.
Chapter 1: Who Gets a Lifeline? The Political Economy of Corporate Bailouts
Why do some governments provide some firms that face bankruptcy a bailout while allowing
others to fail? Despite the notoriety of bailouts in the aftermath of the Great Recession, their
continuing occurrence in the still-unfolding Eurozone crisis, and an enduring public debate
about their virtues, little systematic theory or evidence exists to explain the variation in
their use. I develop three explanations of bailout provision grounded in the literature: one
that focusses on the systemic risk posed by the failure of large financial firms, another that
examines the conditions under which policymakers are most likely to acquiesce to demands
made by the special interests that are directly harmed by the failure of the firm, and a
third that highlights the role of the partisan orientation of policymakers in impacting the
likelihood of a bailout being given as well as the kinds of firms that receive bailouts. To
test these three explanations, I construct a new dataset of 631 financially distressed firms, a
portion of which receive bailouts, that are located in 50 countries are operate in a wide array
of industries by means of media keyword searches. I find evidence in support of the systemic
risk and partisanship explanations of bailout provision. Larger firms and firms operating
in the financial sector are shown to be more likely to receive bailouts. Further, left-wing
governments are 11.5 percentage points more likely to provide a bailout than other kinds of
governments, and their positive impact on bailouts is increasing in the number of employees
in a firm.
Chapter 2: Picking Winners by Saving Losers: Partisanship and the Sectoral
Allocation of Corporate Bailouts
Why do firms operating in some industries receive more bailouts than those operating in
others? I argue that the partisanship of elected officials plays a critical but overlooked role
in the distribution of corporate bailouts across economic sectors. Out of concern for the
livelihood of their core electoral constituency, labor, left-wing governments are hypothesized
as seeking to prevent the bankruptcy of firms operating in employee-rich sectors through the
issuance of bailouts. Right-wing governments instead seek to shield capital from the costs
associated with bankruptcy by issuing more bailouts to firms operating in sectors of the
economy that are capital intense. To test these hypotheses, I construct a new comprehensive
dataset of bailout counts by sector-year across the European Economic Area, 1999-2011.
While left-wing governments are shown to provide relatively labor-intensive sectors with 1.6
times as many bailouts as do non-left-wing governments, right-wing governments as shown
to provide relatively capital-intensive sectors 2.5 times as many bailouts as do non-right-
wing governments. Further, alternative explanations of the sectoral distribution of bailouts,
including the dislocation caused by global integration and the presence of other forms of
social protection, are not supported by the data. The results enrich our understanding of
which industries governments favor with targeted forms of protection, and why.
Chapter 3: Predicting Public Support for Corporate Bailouts
To what extent does the public support corporate bailouts, and why? Existing analyses of the
causes and distribution of corporate bailouts assume that, as a transfer to a narrow group of
recipient-firm beneficiaries, bailouts are vastly unpopular with the public. This paper instead
finds across a number of American and German surveys that public opposition is by no means
universal. Further, ideologically liberal voters, as well as those with a material stake in the
fate of the distressed firm, are shown to be more supportive of bailouts. Using two new survey
experiments, the paper also finds that bailouts that minimize economic dislocation at the
national level are more popular than those with a regional scope. Surprisingly, respondents
express no greater sympathy for firms with many employees. The results suggest that the
politics of bailouts may be populist in some cases, and that re-election seeking politicians
would be wise to take their constituents’ opinions in to account when weighing whether or
not to save a distressed firm.
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Preface: Partisanship and the
Provision of Bailouts
Some are Saved; Others Fail
During the Great Recession, governments across the globe opted to provide various forms
of support to save domestic automakers from bankruptcy. For example, while the US and
Canadian governments provided loans and financing to assist GM and Chrysler through
bankruptcy and restructuring, France, Italy, Germany, and the UK employed a variety of
fiscal tools to protect their domestic auto industries (Stanford, 2010). Despite this apparently
global impulse to bail out ailing auto firms, the Swedish government refused to do the
same. After repeated attempts by GM to sell Saab failed, the Swedish government decline
to provide assurances that it would bail out the firm and waited for the sale of Saab’s
technology to Beijing Automotive Industry Holding and the brand to Spyker Cars after GM
began to cease operations.1 Similarly, the South Korean government allowed Ssangyong, a
domestic automaker, to liquidate, rather than providing it with a lifeline. Disgruntled former
employees subsequently occupied the company’s shuttered plant for 77 days until they were
forcibly removed in a dramatic and violent police action.2
1See Lyall (2009); Schwartz (2009); Chang (2010).
2See Si-Soo (2009).
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A similar story occurred during a period of financial tumult for the airline industry be-
tween 9/11 and the outbreak of SARS in 2003. While governments in New Zealand, Japan,
Belgium, the US, and Switzerland, to name a few, bailed out ailing national carriers and, in
some cases, entire airline industries,3 other governments resisted these demands. For exam-
ple, in September 2001 the Australian government allowed Ansett to go bankrupt, ignoring
demands by the Opposition for assistance and prompting protesting Ansett employees to
block flights in Melbourne and Perth.4 Later, in 2003, the French government resisted calls
to save Air Lib and instead left it to suffer liquidation in the midst of attempts by its
employees to disrupt flights out of Paris’ Orly Airport.5
This variation also exists within national contexts. In mid-2009 Arcandor, a large German
retailer, sought €650 million in credit guarantees from Berlin in order to avoid its collapse.
The company, which owned the Karstadt department store chain and Thomas Cook, a travel
group, employed roughly 50,000. The German government opted to pass on the opportunity
to help, and Arcandor filed for insolvency on June 10, 2009.6 At the same time, the German
government decided to provide Opel, a large car maker owned by GM facing insolvency, a
bridge loan in order to secure its sale to a Canadian-Russian conglomerate led by Magna
International.7 Further, in one of the most notorious series of events in the Great Recession,
the US government in 2008 opted to bail out Bear Stearns by facilitating its sale to JP
Morgan and to save American International Group through a combination of loans and
asset and equity purchases, while it allowed Lehman Brothers to enter bankruptcy (Sorkin,
3See The Irish Examiner (4 October, 2001); Takashi and Tudor (2009); Facts on File World News Digest
(11 September, 2001); Alvarez and Labaton (2001); Massey and Arends (2001).
4See Holloway (2001); Coleman (2001).
5See Agence France-Presse (13 January, 2003); BBC News World Edition (10 February, 2003).
6See Bryant and Wiesmann (2009a,b); Betts (2009).
7See Walker (2009); Gartzke (2009).
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2009).
These anecdotes raise several related questions that this project attempts to answer. The
first is as to why governments opt to save ailing firms in some cases with a bailout, while in
other cases they allow distressed firms to fail. Why, for example, did so many governments
intervene in order to save their domestic auto producers, while other refused to do so?
Second, why are bailouts concentrated in a few select sectors? As these anecdotes show,
and as the new datasets collected as part of this project confirm, bailouts are concentrated
almost exclusively in finance, manufacturing and transportation. Why are firms saved so
frequently in these sectors, and so rarely in others? A final question is as to what extent is
the choice to save one firm over another driven by public opinion. Could this variation be
the result of the fact that some bailouts are more popular than others?
The answer to the these questions that I develop in the manuscript is, in brief, that
political partisanship plays a key and heretofore overlooked role in determining the frequency
and the distribution of corporate bailouts. I argue that left-wing governments are more likely
to authorize any bailout, on average, than right-wing governments. Further, I argue that
while left-wing governments are likely to assist firms that, if they were to fail, would cause
the greatest damage to labor markets, right-wing governments instead seek to help firms
that would cause the greatest harm to capital markets in the event of their bankruptcy.
The different motivations of left- and right-wing governments come from their links to
core electoral constituencies: while left-wing governments rely on the support of labor in or-
der to win at the ballot box, right-wing governments instead rely support of capital (Hibbs,
1987, 1992; Tufte, 1978). In order to protect the material interest of these core constituen-
cies, left-wing governments therefore seek to increase government spending as a means of
spurring growth, smoothing the business cycle, and minimizing unemployment. Right-wing
governments instead lower spending, balance budgets, and minimize inflation(Alesina and
Rosenthal, 1989; Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997; Boix, 1998, 2000; Cameron, 1984; Gar-
xiii
rett, 1998; Garrett and Lange, 1991, 1995). As the bankruptcy of a firm is likely to cause
medium-term dislocation and adjustment costs, the brunt of which are likely to fall upon
lower income groups, it is in left-wing governments’ interests for electoral reasons to provide
bailouts to protect their constituents. Thus they are expected to provide more bailouts,
on average, than right-wing governments. Right-wing governments instead avoid this costly
intervention in the market.
Further, the differential impact of particular bailouts on the interests of labor and capital
is a function of their distributional consequences. The primary goal of a bailout is to prevent
the target firm from going bankrupt, implying that the winners from bailouts are the losers
from bankruptcy. Bankruptcy imposes immediate costs, including the destruction of wealth
and the loss of jobs, upon firm stakeholders (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006; Branch, 2002) and
upon the stakeholders of counterparty firms that are driven to bankruptcy through contagion
effects (Ayotte and Skeel, 2010; Gup, 2004; Levitin, 2011). The losers from bailouts are those
who have to fund them, namely diffuse taxpayers (Keefer, 2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009). For
the case at hand, left-wing governments, concerned with labor-market outcomes, will seek to
provide bailouts that prevent bankruptcies that would cause the most unemployment, while
right-wing governments will instead seek to provide bailouts that prevent bankruptcies that
would cause the greatest destruction of wealth.
A corollary of this theory is that public opinion on the matter of bailouts should also
be split along these lines. If partisan politicians are responding to their constituents when
deciding whether or not to authorize a given bailout, voters on the left should be more
supportive of bailouts, on average, than voters on the right. Further, this split should be
more pronounced in the case of bailouts that are particularly beneficial to holders of labor
versus holders of capital. Thus some bailouts are likely to be more popular than others, at
least amongst a meaningful plurality of the voting public, and politicians whose electoral
constituencies include this plurality will therefore be more likely to authorize them.
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Partisanship plays a role in many of the previously described cases as the governments
that refused to provide assistance to distressed firms were universally right-wing coalitions.
For example, the Swedish governing coalition overseeing the Saab and Volvo crises was
elected in 2006, displacing the Social Democrats after 12 consecutive years of rule. Led by
Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of the Moderate Party, the new government took a decisive
turn to the right, adopting a series market-conforming policies. Facing the auto crisis, the
government maintained this position, allowing Saab to fail. In the words of the Swedish
Enterprise Minister Maud Olofsson, “the Swedish state is not prepared to own car factories”
(Lyall, 2009). The conservative Grand National Party, in power in South Korea in 2009,
refused to provide assistance to Ssangyong. In the case of airlines, Prime Minister John
Howard of the center-right Liberal Party refused to bail out ailing Australian air carrier
Ansett, while the center-right French government of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin,
elected on a platform that broke with the interventionist policies of the previous left-wing
government, refused to provide state funding to Air Lib.
This partisan split also appears within governing coalitions. In the case of the German
bailout of Opel, while Chanellor Merkel and her center-right Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) adopted a middle-of-the-road position by supporting the use of government funds
to broker the sale of the firm to a foreign conglomerate, the more conservative Christian
Social Union (CSU) instead developed a bankruptcy-based restructuring plan. The left-
leaning Social Democrats (SPD), however, pushed for the government to buy a stake in the
company to keep it alive. In the case of Arcandor, the CDU signaled strong resistance to the
company’s plea for aid, while the SPD expressed a desire to save the firm in order to protect
jobs. As this anecdotal evidence shows, right-wing governments certainly seem disinclined
to provide bailouts, and left-wing parties a more sympathetic, particularly in so far as they
save jobs.
The manuscript provides robust empirical evidence supporting this argument. As more
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detailed summaries of the three papers that comprise the project are provided below, it
suffices to say here that in a sample of 631 distressed firms operating in 50 countries over 24
years, left-wing governments are found to be 11.5 percentage points more likely to provide
a bailout than are governments of other partisan orientations, and this effect is increasing
in the number of employees in the firm. Further, using comprehensive counts of bailouts
in the European Economic Area between 1999 and 2011, left-wing governments are shown
to provide 1.6 times as many lifelines to firms operating in industries that are relatively
labor-intensive, while right-wing governments instead provide 2.5 times as many to firms
operating in industries that are relatively capital-intensive. Public opinion is also shown to
follow a similar split, at least in the United States, where Democrats prove to be consistently
more supportive of bailouts across a variety of surveys. While a left-right split also exists in
German public opinion, it is less substantial.
By developing a new supply-side theory of the role of partisanship in determining when
and where politicians issue bailouts and by exploring the contours of the demand side in
terms of public support for lifelines, the project enriches the study of bailouts through a
political economy lens. I describe below how the three papers that comprise the project
combine to expand our ability to model this phenomenon.
Why Should We Care?
Answering the questions motivating this project is important for at least three reasons:
first, bailouts are a topic of a sizable public debate that is lacking in systematic theory
and evidence. Second, the questions speak to a longstanding line of inquiry in political
economy over the nature and use of targeted policies. Third, the extant academic research
that attempts to explain the political sources of the distribution of bailouts has many serious
theoretical and empirical shortcomings that this project overcomes.
xvi
Given the widespread controversy of bailouts, both within the US and abroad, they are a
topic of much debate in the media and in the popular press. A number of recent books, for
example, have attempted to explain why the US governments opted to bail out Detroit8 and
the financial industry.9 As financial crises continue to elicit banking rescues in the Eurozone,
bailouts are a phenomenon likely to experience continued debate. The findings of this project
add a valuable contribution to the public discourse on the causes and consequences of bailouts
by developing theoretical expectations for why some governments favor some bailouts over
others. Moreover, the project provides a bevy of new data that can be used to systematically
analyze the distribution of bailouts across time, industries, and countries.
These questions also speak to a broader literature in political economy that seeks to
understand why particular firms and industries are favored with targeted policies, while
others are not. A longstanding line of inquiry in trade politics, for example, attempts
to identify the characteristics common to heavily protected sectors10 and to explain these
patterns;11 similar efforts have been made with regards to industries that are protected from
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).12 Thus by exploring why governments favor some
firms and industries over others by providing them with bailouts rather than allowing for
bankruptcy, the manuscript expands this enterprise by incorporating a new form of targeted
policy. This is of particular relevance given the insight that the removal of one form of
protection often leads to the introduction of another, what Bhagwati (1988: 53) famously
calls the “Law of Constant Protection.” If we are to fully understand which industries
8See, for example, Rattner (2010)
9See, for example, Sorkin (2009) and Barofsky (2012).
10See Trefler (1993) and Rodrik (1995) for overviews.
11See Gawande and Krishna (2003) for an overview.
12See, for example, Pinto and Pinto (2008); Pandya (2014).
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governments favor and why, we need to study all the tools at their disposal.
Finally, the nascent academic literature that has examined the causes of bailouts suffers
from several major shortcomings that this manuscript seeks to overcome. First, while extant
work that explores the politics of bailouts in the United States has considered the role
of ideology on bailout provision, partisanship is totally ignored in cross-national analyses.
Policymakers’ preferences in general, and partisanship in specific, are critical elements of
any fully specified political economy model that incorporates both demand and supply side
elements (Rodrik, 1995), a point I return to below.
In the US case, previous analyses of Congressional voting on bailout bills show that the
ideology of members of Congress impacts their likelihood of voting for or against a bailout,
with more conservative members being less likely to vote in favor, both in the case of finance
(Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010) and the auto industry (Nunnari, 2011). In cross-national
analyses, however, partisanship is ignored. Keefer (2002, 2007) and Rosas (2006, 2009),
for example, envision bailouts as transfers from the median taxpayer to a narrow group of
beneficiaries. The special interests who benefit from a bailout therefore push policymakers
to act in their favor. Policymakers will do so if they place less weight on how the bailout
impacts the average voter and more weight on the interests of the bailout’s beneficiaries.
While Keefer (2002, 2007) focusses on how increasing numbers of veto players limit the ability
of governments to provide a narrow transfer in the form of a bailout, Rosas (2006, 2009)
instead explores how democratic institutions favor the median voter over special interests,
therefore making bailouts less likely. Neither account considers that policymakers themselves
may have an interest in providing bailouts that benefit key electoral groups. Further, Faccio,
Masulis and McConnell (2006) explore the role of political connections in placing distressed
firms in a better position when they lobby for a lifeline. Their analysis, however, ignores
how other political factors, including institutional constraints and partisanship, can make
bailouts more or less likely to occur in a cross-national setting.
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Second, this literature has looked almost exclusively at financial industry bailouts in
the context of banking crises (Dorsch, 2013; Keefer, 2002, 2007; Mian, Sufi and Trebbi,
2010; Rosas, 2006, 2009).13 As the anecdotal evidence above shows, and as my own data
collection efforts in Chapters 1 and 2 confirm, bailouts occur with a high degree of frequency
in other sectors, including manufacturing and transportation, and though bailouts are more
likely to occur in the context of economic crises, a sizable number also occur during good
times, rather than bad. By examining why bailouts occur, regardless of the sector and the
underlying economic climate, this project is able to provide a more complete understanding
of the phenomena. Further, it is possible that prior analyses are subject to selection bias as
their bailouts samples are limited in temporal and sectoral scope. Again, by collecting more
comprehensive bailout counts, this manuscript does not suffer from this form of bias.
Third, the extant literature employs the incorrect assumption that bailouts are universally
unpopular. Rosas’ (2006, 2009) position that the median tax payer is opposed to bailouts
depends upon the idea that only the narrow group of firm-specific beneficiaries actually
support a given bailout. As Chapter 3 outlines in detail, this assumption is also frequently
repeated in media accounts of the public’s perception of bailouts. As my analysis of American
and German public opinion across a number of notable bailouts shows, however, opposition
is not, in fact, universal, and a plurality of the public support bailouts in some cases.
Finally, the project represents the first systematic attempt to empirically analyze the
causes of all bailouts and employs a sizable array of newly collected datasets. The vast
majority of prior research considers only the financial industry in times of crisis, and no
work to this date has attempted to empirically explore public opinion on the topic. The two
new datasets of bailout counts, though imperfect, are at this point the state of the art in
so far as they span countries, industries, and time. Further, the collection of bailout counts
13The two exceptions are Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) who explore all industries across time
and Nunnari (2011) who looks at the US auto industry in the midst of the Great Recession.
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in the European Economic Area employed in Chapter 2 represents the first comprehensive
count of bailouts constructed for more than a single industry. These two new datasets, the
result of a herculean, multi-year effort of the author and several research assistants, provide
rich descriptive details about the distribution of bailouts that would have previously been
impossible to report. The collection of an array of public opinion polls in both the United
States and Germany about numerous notable bailouts is again the first of its kind and again
allows for a previously impossible description of how the public views these bailouts.
Outline of the Manuscript
This manuscript is comprised of three separate papers. Chapter 1, titled “Who Gets a
Lifeline? The Political Economy of Corporate Bailouts,” explores the question of why gov-
ernments allow some firms to fail, while they opt to save others. The chapter develops
three potential explanations for the variation in the use of bailouts. First, out of concern
for aggregate welfare costs, governments might be more likely to provide bailouts to firms
that pose the threat of systemic risk to the broader economy. Second, the probability that
a governments authorizes a bailout might be a function of political characteristics that mit-
igate the effectiveness of the narrow interests lobbying in favor of one. Third, the partisan
orientation of policymakers might inform whether or not they are sympathetic to the use of
bailouts: left-wing governments may not only be more willing to provide them, on average,
than right-wing governments, but they might also be more willing to assist firms with the
most employees in order to minimize the damage to the labor market that would ensue if
these firms were to go bankrupt.
To test these explanations, the chapter presents a new dataset comprised of a sample of
631 financially distressed firms, 155 of which receive a bailout. The dataset, which spans
50 countries, 17 industries, and 24 years, is constructed through media keyword searches.
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Newspapers are searched using a set of distress keywords, and the resulting set of firms
are matched with a number of financial databases. By combining this new dataset with
extant cross-national databases of country political information, I am able to test how the
characteristics of the firms themselves and the political contexts in which they are embedded
impact their fate. Support is found for both the systemic risk and the political partisanship
explanations: large, financial firms are found to be more likely to receive a bailout. Further,
firms in distress under left-wing governments are more likely to be bailed out than those
operating under governments of different partisan orientations, and this effect increases with
the number of employees in the firm.
Chapter 2, “Picking Winners by Saving Losers: Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation
of Corporate Bailouts,” next explores the question of why bailouts are clustered in particular
industries. The paper again explores the role of partisanship, but further tests whether
the distribution of bailouts by sector is impacted by right-wing, in addition to left-wing,
governance. While left-wing governments are hypothesized as being more likely to issue
bailouts to sectors that are labor-intensive, right-wing governments are hypothesized as being
more likely to issue bailouts to sectors that more capital-intensive. Two other, alternative
explanations are considered, including the role of globalization and alternative forms of social
protection in determining the distribution of bailouts by sector.
The chapter presents a second new dataset, this time comprised of comprehensive counts
of bailouts by sector in the European Economic Area (EEA)14 between 1999 and 2011. The
counts come from publicly reported decisions made by the European Commission and the
European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority over the legitimacy of particular
instances of state aid. As state aid is generally prohibited by the EEA agreement member
states have to report any issuance above a low monetary threshold to the relevant authorities
14The EEA Agreement includes European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members Iceland, Liechten-
stein, and Norway and all EU members, and allows these EFTA members to take part in the EU’s Internal
Market.
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who then decide on its legitimacy. I consider three forms of state aid to be bailouts: rescue
aid, which is aid given to distressed firms that face bankruptcy, restructuring aid, which is
long-term assistance used to restore a firm to financial viability, and then state aid authorized
under the EEA’s temporary rules regarding the financial crisis that is explicitly aimed at
preventing the failure of firms. Using this second new dataset, I again find strong support
for the partisan hypotheses and limited support for the role of globalization in impacting
the distribution of bailouts by sector.
Finally, Chapter 3, “Predicting Public Support for Corporate Bailouts” explores public
opinion over corporate bailouts. In addition to critically examining the assumption that
bailouts are universally unpopular, the chapter also attempts to explain why some bailouts
might be more popular than others, and why certain voters might view bailouts more fa-
vorably than others. The chapter develops four explanations for variation in support for
bailouts: firms that are culpable for their own distress, as well as firms that elicit the so-
ciotropic sympathies of voters, are hypothesized as being more favorable targets for bailouts.
Voters who have a material stake in the fate of the distressed firm, as well as voters who
have ideological and partisan rationales for protecting the firm, are hypothesized as being
more likely to support bailing it out.
I test the strength of the explanations in two ways. First I use a panoply of existing
surveys of US opinion over the auto and financial bailouts and German opinion over the
bailouts of Opel and Arcandor. Notably, aggregate public opinion is shown to vary con-
siderably from case to case and, in some circumstances, is found to be outright supportive.
Thus the prevailing assumption that bailouts are universally unpopular is upended. Next, I
find mixed support for the role of partisanship: left-wing respondents in the US are much
more supportive of bailouts in general, but the partisan split in Germany, though present,
is much less stark. Finally, I describe two new survey experiments that expose respondents
to vignettes about hypothetical distressed firms that have a number of characteristics that
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vary as experimental conditions. I find that when the bankruptcy of the distressed firm is
described as having a national, rather than regional, impact, support increases, suggesting
that sociotropic preferences are at play. Surprisingly, when the number of employees at the
distressed firm is increased, there is no difference in the support the firm receives.
The Political Economy of Corporate Bailouts
These three papers combined greatly expand our ability to develop a political economy model
of the distribution of corporate bailouts. A fully theorized political economy explanation of
why some governments opt to assist ailing firms while others do not would involve four factors
(Rodrik, 1995): on the demand side, the sources of domestic preferences over this policy as
well as how these interests are aggregated to form interest groups; and on the supply side, the
preferences of political officials themselves and the institutional context under which these
forces interact to produce the final policy outcome. While the extant literature has provided
some insight in to the supply side of the provision of bailouts, this dissertation expands this
enterprise while also taking a first stab at the demand side.
On the supply side, prior work by Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) has shown
that policymakers’ preferences are a relevant factor in the determination of which firms get
bailouts: when policymakers are directly connected to a particular firm, they are shown to
be more likely to give it a bailout. Chapter 1 incorporates and extends this insight by usings
Faccio, Masulis and McConnell’s (2006) data of connected firms and as well as an extended
time-series version. While I find that politically connected firms are more likely to get a
bailout, implying that policymakers who have a direct stake in the fate of a particular firm
are more willing to save it, the impact of this connection is relatively limited when all other
factors are combined in an empirical model.
The dissertation expands this aspect of the supply side by taking in to account the
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partisanship of elected officials. Some prior work has explored this aspect of policymakers’
preferences, but only in the context of the United States (Dorsch, 2013; Mian, Sufi and
Trebbi, 2010; Nunnari, 2011). I find in both Chapters 1 and 2 that left-wing governments
are more willing to assist labor-rich firms and that right-wing governments are more willing
to assist capital-rich firms. The theory behind these findings is that elected officials of
particular partisan orientations prefer to enact policies that benefit their electoral bases.
Thus in so far as saving a labor-rich firm minimizes unemployment and maximizes wages,
it benefits laborers and is therefore preferred by left-wing governments who rely upon the
support of labor to win at the ballot box. A fully-specified model of bailout provision should
therefore take in to account this aspect of policymakers’ preferences.
Much of the extant literature on bailouts highlights the role of the second element of the
supply side, the institutional setting. The project finds that many of the institutional char-
acteristics previously identified in the literature as being a relevant factor in the likelihood of
bailouts occurring drive the distribution of bailouts in the newly developed datasets, though
not necessarily in the same direction as in prior research. Rosas’ (2006, 2009) focus on the
role of democratic institutions in limiting bailouts is supported in both Chapters 1 and 2:
higher scores on the commonly-used Polity IV metric of the degree of democracy (Mar-
shall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2011) are associated with fewer bailouts. The role of veto players,
however, appears to operate in the opposite direction in this project compared to previous
work. Keefer (2002, 2007), for example, argues that greater numbers of veto players limit
the ability of the government to act in favor of the special interests who seek a bailout. More
veto players, and veto players with more disparate interests will therefore make bailouts less
likely to occur and less generous when they are authorized. In both of this project’s new
datasets, however, higher numbers of veto players, measured using Henisz’s (2000) Polcon
data, are associated with more bailouts. Though this might be because increasing numbers
of veto players allow special interest greater access to policymaking (Ehrlich, 2007), further
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research is required to sort out this discrepancy. Finally, the project considers for the first
time the role of the supranational institutional context, though the two international institu-
tions considered, namely the WTO and the EU, appear to have a limited impact on bailout
provision.
On the demand side of the political economy model of corporate bailouts, the preferences
of the public over this policy have been heretofore unexplored. Most prior work employs
the assumption that the diffuse public, who fund bailouts but do no benefit from them, are
staunchly opposed to their use. The narrow beneficiaries of a bailout, namely the firms facing
bankruptcy, are assumed to strongly favor the policy. Chapter 3 of the dissertation therefore
makes a vital contribution to the model by actually theorizing why the public might actually
prefer some bailouts over others and by collecting a large amount of data to explore whether
these theories hold water. This effort is akin to that undertaken by a burgeoning literature
in trade politics15 that has sought to empirically verify the previously assumed nature of
public opinion over tariff policies. As the chapter shows, publics are sometimes in favor
of particular bailouts, on average, upending the assumption that they are always opposed.
Further, the extent to which individuals are exposed to the costs of a potential bankruptcy
informs whether or not they support avoiding it. Partisanship and ideology are shown again
to play a strong role here, with left-of-center voters being more supportive of any bailouts,
particular in the United States, and with this effect being larger in the case of the auto
bailouts than in the case of the financial ones undertaken during the Great Recession.
The fact that voters of particular partisan orientations are more likely to support bailouts
plays in to the second aspect of the demand side of the model, namely how these preferences
over the policy are aggregated. It is here that we see the constituency link that is a core
element of the partisan theory of bailouts at play: voters are able to act on their preferences
15See, for example, Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto (2013); Hiscox (2006); O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001);
Scheve and Slaughter (2001).
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over this particular policy by expressing support at the ballot box for parties that share their
position. Thus public opinion can at least partially overcome the free-rider problem that
often prevents it from actually impacting policy here in so far as political parties allow for
an organized expression of cleavages within the public over the issue of bailouts.
The other key aspect of preference aggregation, however, is not considered in this project.
The narrow interest groups who favor a bailout are often willing and able to organize them-
selves in to lobby groups who then attempt to gain access to policy making. This link has
been explored in the literature that explains the distribution of bailouts in the United States:
several authors have shown that the extent to which particular members of Congress receive
campaign contributions from relevant industry groups drives their likelihood of voting in
favor of providing a bailout (Blau, Brough and Thomas, 2013; Nunnari, 2011). The extent
to which lobbying for organized industry groups (or even individual, distressed firms) drives
bailouts in a cross-national setting is an open question that is ripe for future research.
The project therefore serves to expand and solidify several key elements of the political
economy model of corporate bailouts. By highlighting the role of partisanship, the project
expands our understanding of how policymakers’ preferences impact the likelihood and dis-
tribution of bailouts as well as how, on the demand side, preferences of impacted voters
can be effectively aggregated. Further, the project reiterates that several aspects of the
institutional setting, including the degree of democracy and the number of veto gates, are
important parts of this model.
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Chapter 1
Who Gets a Lifeline? The Political
Economy of Corporate Bailouts
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, rapidly eroding consumer confidence and
access to credit led to a dramatic deterioration in the finances of automakers around the
globe. Concerned with the possible economic spillovers of a collapsing industry, the major-
ity of governments in auto-producing nations implemented measures to support ailing auto
producers. For example, while the US and Canadian governments provided loans and fi-
nancing to assist GM and Chrysler through bankruptcy and restructuring, France and Italy
provided emergency financing and Germany, the UK, Spain and Portugal provided loans and
loan guarantees to their respective auto industries (Stanford, 2010). Despite this apparently
global impulse to bail out ailing auto firms, the Swedish government remained steadfast in
its unwillingness to do the same. After repeated attempts by GM to sell Saab, an automaker
concentrated in the Swedish city of Trollhattan, failed, the Swedish government refused to
provide assurances that it would bail out the firm and waited for the sale of Saab’s technol-
ogy to Beijing Automotive Industry Holding and the brand to Spyker Cars after GM began
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to cease operations.1
A similar pattern can be seen in the airline industry, which suffered a lengthy downturn
in demand roughly from the 9/11 attacks to the SARS outbreak in 2003. While many
countries undertook bailouts ranging in scope from a single carrier2 to an entire industry,3
others resisted demands for airline bailouts. For example, in September 2001 the Australian
government allowed Ansett to go bankrupt, ignoring opposition demands to allow for a
bailout, and in 2003 the French government resisted calls to save Air Lib and instead left it
suffer liquidation.4
A clear puzzle emerges from these anecdotes: why are ailing firms bailed out in some
cases but not in others? Why do governments sometimes allow for firms to fail and other
times directly intervene in order to avoid this potentially costly outcome? Despite the no-
toriety of bailouts in the aftermath of the Great Recession, their continuing occurrence in
the still-unfolding Eurozone crisis, and an enduring public debate about their virtues, lit-
tle systematic theory or evidence exists to explain the variation in their use. Moreover,
though a great deal of research exists to explain patterns in the employment of other tar-
geted policies, such as barriers to trade or subsidies, bailouts, a conceptually similar but
distinct phenomenon, are not as well understood. This chapter attempts to address these
shortcomings: by drawing upon existing literatures on the impact of bankruptcy and the
politics of economic management, it develops explanations of the patterns in the distribution
of bailouts. Moreover, by assembling a dataset of bailouts that spans countries, industries,
1See Lyall (2009); Schwartz (2009); Chang (2010).
2Examples include Air New Zealand, Japan Airlines, Swiss Airlines and Belgium’s Sabena in 2001. See
(The Irish Examiner (4 October, 2001)), (Takashi and Tudor, 2009) and (Facts on File World News Digest
(11 September, 2001)).
3Example include the US and the UK in 2001 (Alvarez and Labaton, 2001; Massey and Arends, 2001).
4See Holloway (2001) and Agence France-Presse (13 January, 2003).
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and years, it makes an original effort to foster the empirical evidence that has been lacking.
The chapter considers three separate explanations for the varying use of bailouts. First,
out of concern for aggregate welfare costs, governments might be more likely to provide
bailouts to firms that pose the threat of systemic risk to the broader economy. Second,
as bailouts are a transfer of wealth from the median taxpayer to firm and industry specific
beneficiaries, the willingness of governments to authorize them might be a function of political
characteristics that either mitigate or reinforce the effectiveness lobbying by this narrow set
of beneficiaries. Third, the partisan orientation of policymakers might inform whether or
not they are sympathetic to the use of bailouts: left-wing governments may not only be
more willing to provide them, on average, than right-wing governments, due to their greater
willingness to intervene in free market operations, but they might also be more willing to
assist firms with the most employees in order to minimize the damage to the labor market
that would ensue if these firms were to go bankrupt.
Given that neither an extant repository of bailouts nor a census of distressed firms eligible
for one exists, the data required to answer these pressing questions is currently lacking.
Further, there exists no sampling frame from which a subset of distressed firms could be
drawn at random. I overcome these daunting methodological problems by constructing
a new dataset of financially distressed firms, a portion of which receive a bailout. The
dataset, constructed by media keyword searches, is comprised of 631 firms that approached
bankruptcy between the years of 1987 and 2011 and that span 17 industries and 50 countries.
I find, in support of the systemic risk explanation, that the largest firms and firms operating
in the financial industry are more likely to receive a bailout. Further, in support of the
partisanship answer, left-wing governments are found to be 11.5 percentage points more
likely to perform bailouts than governments of other partisan orientation, and the likelihood
of a left-wing government authorizing a bailout is increasing in firm employment. Limitations
on the influence of special interests seem to have no impact, however. The findings hold when
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subject to a battery of robustness and specification checks.
The chapter contributes not only to debates over the causes of bailouts, but also to
debates over the role of government in economic policy making. Research on bailouts to
present in political science has solely considered policy responses to financial crises and
generally only considers how different institutional settings impact the nature and likelihood
of bank bailouts (Grossman and Woll, 2014; Keefer, 2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009). The
original dataset employed in this chapter shows, however, that bailouts occur across a wide
array of industries, and that focusing only on a subset of bailouts may therefore bias results.
Further, by exploring for the first time the role of partisanship in bailout provision in a
cross-national context, this chapter builds upon prior work that has shown that partisan
cleavages continue to create persistent differences in economic policymaking, despite the
pressures of globalization (Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, 1991; Boix, 1998; Garrett, 1998), and
that the partisan orientation of the government impacts the structure of domestic industrial
protection (Dutt and Mitra, 2005; Milner and Judkins, 2004; Pinto, 2013a). Finally, by
exploring the conditions under which governments opt to intervene in free market operations
in such a large-scale and controversial manner, the chapter speaks to a broader puzzle of the
apparently inexorable growth of the role of the government in the economy (Lindert, 2004;
Tanzi, 2011).
The remainder of the chapter takes the following form: first, I provide a working definition
of bailouts and outline their distributional consequences. Next, I develop the three answers
described above, drawing heavily upon existing research. I then outline my research design
strategy and describe the resulting universe of cases: a set of distressed firms, a portion of
which receive a bailout. I subsequently estimate a series of multilevel logit models to assess
the strength of the different answers in the face of the data, and then subject the resulting
findings to a battery of robustness checks. Finally, I provide some concluding remarks.
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1.2 Bailouts and their Consequences
1.2.1 What is a Bailout?
Corporate bailouts are variously defined as “any government action on behalf of a distressed
company or industry” (Wright, 2010: 20); the reception of a “transfer payment or capital”
from the “home government” of “financially troubled firms. . .so as to avoid failure or dissolu-
tion” (Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006: 2603); or “government-sponsored delays in the
exit of insolvent [firms] that are explicitly or implicitly funded by public resources (Rosas,
2009: 6; italics in original). In order to address the fact that bailouts are not limited in
nature to cash transfers, bailouts will be defined as government actions, explicitly or implic-
itly funded by public resources, that seek to avoid the failure or dissolution of a distressed
company or industry. By explicitly focussing on government actions, this definition excludes
private bailouts, for example the infusion of capital by domestic or foreign banks or investors,
and acquisition, either by a domestic or foreign firm. It is important to note that these gov-
ernment actions need not be successful in order to be classified as a bailout as the recipient
firm or industry may still fail despite the intervention (Block, 1991-1992). Bailouts come in
numerous forms, including cash grants, loans or loan guarantees, the acquisition of troubled
assets, equity investment, temporary acquisition or conservatorship, and full nationalization
(Wright, 2010).
How is a bailout distinct from a subsidy? While both bailouts and subsidies belong to
the same conceptual family of government interventions that assist an enterprise or industry,
there are some critical distinctions (Block, 1991-1992). First, bailouts tend to benefit fewer
actors than do general government subsidies, as bailouts are frequently targeted at specific
firms in order to avoid their insolvency, while subsidies are generally targeted to groups
of actors such as businesses of a certain size, or in a certain region or industry. Second,
subsidies are often geared towards providing recipients with incentives to perform certain
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activities, such as job creation, often in order to achieve a goal such as the maintenance of
competition through supporting small enterprises or through market regulation in the case
of price supports. Bailouts, on the other hand, are specifically designed to prevent the failure
of distressed enterprises.
The number of bailouts that occur in particular countries and industries varies signifi-
cantly. For example, in a sample of 35 countries over a 5 year period, out of 71 corporate
bailouts, none occurred in a number of European countries while 8, 15, and 20 occurred in
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia respectively (Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006). An
alternative 18 year study reports 104 bailouts, with Japan, the US, and Korea witnessing
28, 16, and 11 respectively, while a number of European countries experienced only 1 bailout
(Jiang, Kim and Zhang, 2010).5 In terms of industry, one analysis finds 24 sectors containing
bailed out firms, 5 of which contain 5 or more cases (Jiang, Kim and Zhang, 2010).6 My own
dataset, discussed in greater detail below in Section 1.4.6, similarly shows that the number
of bailouts witnessed varies significantly across countries, industries, and years.
1.2.2 Distributional Impact of Bailouts
In order to identify the winners and losers from a bailout, the impact of its main alternative,
bankruptcy, must be understood. This is because those who seek a bailout do so in order
to avoid the costs of firm failure. In a general sense, bankruptcy occurs when a firm lacks
sufficient cash to service debt outflows as they become due, and the value of the firm is too
low to allow the firm to acquire further financing (Mossman et al., 1998). Though there
exists no universal model of bankruptcy prediction, surveys of the literature conclude that
5This analysis includes both government and private bailouts.
6The banking sector is shown as the largest single recipient with 20 out of 104 bailouts.
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more specific predictors, such as financial ratio variables that measure the solvency7 or the
profitability8 of firms, tend to be the strongest predictors (Dimitras, Zanakis and Zopounidis,
1996; Kumar and Ravi, 2007).
Four sets of costs are associated with bankruptcy: first, the real costs born by the firm
itself; second, the real costs borne by claimants; third, the losses to the firm that are offset
by gains to others; and fourth, the real costs borne by parties other than the firm and its
claimants (Branch, 2002). The real costs firms face are comprised of direct costs, including
professional fees and the time management spends in administering bankruptcy, and indirect
costs, including unobservable opportunity costs such as lost sales, market share, and profits
(Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006; Warner, 1977). Notably, a significant indirect cost is the
increased frequency of the turnover of top executives and directors for firms in Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings (Gilson, 1990; Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1994). Further, a loss in sales
and market share negatively impacts the firm’s employees through its contraction. Losses
to firm interest holders include direct costs in addition to a sharp decline in the value and
marketability of the bonds, debt, or equity they hold (Branch, 2002). While direct costs place
a burden on firms that is inversely proportional to their size, indirect costs are estimated as
being significant for firms of all sizes (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006).
The bankruptcy of a given firm can impact other firms in the economy through two
mechanisms: counterparty contagion and informational contagion (Levitin, 2011). Coun-
terpaty contagion occurs when the failure of a given firm causes other firms that are its
counterparties to fail either because the counterparties are owed payments by the failed firm
that are subsequently not made (obligor contagion) or because the counterparties’ contin-
ued operation depends upon future business, now cancelled, with the failed firm (supplier
7For example, measuring working capital divided by total assets, or total debt divided by total assets.
8For example, measuring profitability in relation to investment or to sales.
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contagion). Informational contagion occurs when the failure of a given firm causes market
actors to (negatively) update their beliefs regarding the health and financial viability of
other, similar firms. This can make it more difficult for these other firms to secure financing
or to conduct transactions, potentially causing them to contract or fail as well. In addition
to this negative effect, other, similar firms can experience a positive informational compe-
tition effect whereby they gain business from the bankrupt firm as consumers distrust the
bankrupt firm’s offerings and as the bankrupt firm faces higher prices for inputs and credit
(Ferris, Jayaraman and Makhija, 1997; Lawless et al., 1996). Empirical work shows that
though both informational effects exist, the contagion effect dominates.9 For example, in
an examination of the impact of what was at the time the world’s largest bankruptcy, that
of WorldCom in 2002, Akhigbea, Martinb and Whytec (2005) find that while institutional
investors and creditors were largely spared the fallout, the share price of both WorldCom
itself and its large, important competitors fell significantly, indicating the predominance of
contagion effects.
The economy-wide impacts of bankruptcies aren’t as well understood, but they appear
to be both significant and diffuse. For example, a Brookings Institute study of the collapse
of Enron estimated that the impact on US stock markets in the aggregate was a decrease of
between 10 and 24 percent. The decrease was large enough to potentially cause significant
declines in domestic consumption and investment due to reductions in household wealth and
the pool of available capital (Graham, Litan and Sukhtankar, 2002). Thus larger bankrupt-
cies can be seen as having a negative impact on stockholders and on investment and growth,
though no empirical work has sought to determine the exact impact.
Bailouts themselves also imply distributional consequences. In so far as a bailout suc-
cessfully staves off a bankruptcy, its beneficiaries are those actors who would be harmed by
9The bankruptcy of a firm has been shown to have a negative impact on the stock prices of other firms
in the same industry (Ferris, Jayaraman and Makhija, 1997) and on the cost of financing for other industry
participants (Bergman and Benmelech, 2011).
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the alternative. Regardless of the counterfactual, recipient firm employees, managers, and
shareholders gain from most forms of government financing.10 While these benefits fall on a
narrowly defined group, the costs of a bailout are diffuse: it is all taxpayers who share the
financial burden of whatever form of bailout the government opts to employ (Rosas, 2006,
2009). Further, research on the impact of bank bailouts finds that larger bailouts lead to
prolonged and deeper macroeconomic shocks (Rosas and Jensen, 2010). Thus bailouts can
be seem as a redistributive transfer from the median taxpayer to firm stakeholders.
1.3 Why Do Some Firms Get Bailed Out and Not Oth-
ers?
The consequences of bailouts and bankruptcies can be combined with existing literatures
on bailout provision, lobbying, institutions, and partisan policymaking to identify three
different answers to this chapter’s primary motivating question of why some firms get a bail
out and others do not. These answers, outlined in this section, focus first on the threat of
systemic risk; second on political variables that make policymakers more or less susceptible
to the demands of special interests; and third on the differing motivations of partisan actors.
The answers, however, are not mutually exclusive, as governments might be motivated by
a variety of reasons to save some firms rather than others. Thus this section presents a
series of explanations that can be independently tested using empirical evidence rather than
competing hypotheses that could be tested to determine whether one answer dominates the
other two.
10Bailouts are not necessarily the ideal means of bankruptcy avoidance for recipient firms as they often
fare worse than firms that are aided instead by private sources (Jiang, Kim and Zhang, 2010); however, firms




In deciding whether or not to provide a bailout, a welfare-maximizing social planner would
place primacy concern on avoiding bankruptcies that would cause harm not only to firm
stakeholders, but also to a broader section of society. The determination of whether the
failure of a particular firm is of concern is based on whether or not this microeconomic
failure has macroeconomic consequences – whether or not the failure of a particular firm
poses systemic risk. Systemic risk can be considered to exist if there is a risk of “a single
firm’s failure having substantial negative effects on the broader economy” (Levitin, 2011:
444). Unfortunately, what exactly constitutes a substantial effect is not defined in the
literature.11
It is possible, however, to identify some firm-specific characteristics that at least increase
the degree of systemic risk they pose that are grounded in the consequences of bankruptcy
discussed above. The first is its size. This idea is encapsulated in the “too-big-to-fail”
doctrine that holds when the cost of failure of particular, very large firm is so great that it
must be bailed out. Whether this threat exists is not measured by the direct costs imposed
by the failure on itself or on its stakeholders, as it’s unclear that saving a single firm would
maintain more value than would putting it through bankruptcy proceedings (Ayotte and
Skeel, 2010). Further, the threat isn’t measured using the economy-wide costs of a given
bankruptcy, as even very large firms may have competitors that can pick up the slack if
the firm contracts or ceases operations. Instead, systemic risk is a function of the risk of
counterparty contagion, and this risk is increasing in firm size (Ayotte and Skeel, 2010;
Levitin, 2011). The largest firms are likely to have the most counterparties, and given the
size discrepancy, the smaller counterparties are likely to have very high levels of exposure to
these large, distressed firms. Thus concerns over a cascade effect where the failure of a single
11Levitin (2011) identifies 17 definitions of systemic risk, none of which delineate the threshold at which
the consequences of the failure of a particular firm can be considered substantial.
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firm will cause failures across the industry increases in the size of the initially distressed firm.
The second characteristic that increases systemic risk is operation in the financial sector.
Systemic risk is of particular concern in this industry for a number reasons. First, as banks
tend to be highly leveraged, even small losses can cause insolvency. The implication is that
the failure of a single bank that causes it to interrupt its payments to other banks (obliger
contagion, to use the language above) is much more likely to cause their failure than would
a failure in an industry with lower levels of leverage (Levitin, 2011). Second, banks provide
vital services to the economy, and banking failures can translate into macroeconomic shocks
more easily than non-bank failures. Banking failures can limit credit availability, raising the
costs of intermediation and lowering aggregate demand. Further, banks are essential to the
payments, clearance, and settlements systems that are crucial to the smooth operation of
businesses (Gup, 2004). Though systemic risk concerns are highest in the finance industry,
they are still present in other segments of the economy (Gup, 2004; Levitin, 2011). Both
the obligor and supplier forms of counterparty contagion exist in non-financial industries as
suppliers may fail if they rely on very large firms that face bankruptcy for future business,
or if they are owed sizable sums by these firms.
The findings of prior work that examines the determinants of bailouts shows these sys-
temic risk concerns to be relevant. Early case studies of notable bailouts, including Chrysler,
Lockheed, British Leyland and AEG-Telefunken, for example, highlight the fact that recipi-
ent firms are large and highly leveraged (Adams and Brock, 1987; Reich, 1985). More recent,
large-n work also shows that financial firms receive the largest share of bailouts across indus-
tries (Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006; Jiang, Kim and Zhang, 2010) and that bailed
out firms are systematically larger than similar firms that do no receive a bailout (Faccio,
Masulis and McConnell, 2006).
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1.3.2 Limits on the Influence of Special Interests
The special interests explanation of bailout provision is comprised of two factors: on the
one hand, firm-specific interests that are harmed by bankruptcy have incentives to lobby
the government for a bailout. One the other hand, varying institutional constellations either
insulate the governments from these particular interests, or make them more susceptible
to their demands. This explanation therefore sees bailout provision as a function of the
interaction of firms lobbying for help, and the institutional setting that makes policymakers
more or less beholden to these efforts.
On the lobbying side of the answer, firm and firm-specific stakeholders are likely to lobby
the government for a bailout in order to avoid suffering the costs of bankruptcy. These
stakeholders, including management, stockholders, and employees, stand to suffer the most
harm from the direct costs of failure, such as job loss, executive turnover, or the destruction
of stock value. The direct link between lobbying and bailout provision and generosity has
been demonstrated in a number of studies of Congressional roll call voting on bailout bills.
Nunnari (2011), for example, finds that higher campaign contributions by the Big Three
automakers made House representatives more likely to vote in favor of the 2008 auto bailout
bill. Further, Couch et al. (2011) and Dorsch (2013) find that campaign contributions from
the financial sector had a positive impact on the likelihood of members of Congress voting in
favor of TARP, and Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010) find that campaign contributions played the
same roll in the vote on Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). In addition,
Blau, Brough and Thomas (2013) show that for every dollar spent by a firm on lobbying in
the five years prior to the enactment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008,
the firm received between $485.77 and $585.65 in support.
Efforts by firm stakeholders to lobby for a lifeline are likely to be most effective when
firm management is connected to the government. Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006)
examine the impact of the political connections of firms on bailouts. They define a firm as
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being politically connected if “at least one of its top officers. . . or a large shareholder. . . was
head of state. . . a government minister. . . or a member of the national parliament” (Faccio,
Masulis and McConnell, 2006: 2600). As firms that have a political connection by this
definition should be the ones best positioned to lobby the government for assistance in so
far as they have a direct link to government decision making, the authors argue that they
should be more likely to receive a bailout than unconnected firms. They find that connected
firms have a higher bailout propensity than a set of matched firms over a five-year panel that
spans 35 countries.
Lobbying and political connections are not the whole story, however. Other authors
have shown that the effectiveness of special interest lobbying for bailouts is a function of
particular institutional and political characteristics that impact how receptive policymakers
are to these interests’ demands. Rosas (2006, 2009), for example, argues that democracies
provide less generous and stricter financial bailouts because the extension of the franchise
shifts policymaking towards the interests of the median voter, lowering the capacity for
collusion between financial interests and policymakers. Further, Keefer (2002, 2007) claims
that low voter information, a higher number of political veto players, and minimal electoral
competitiveness make bailouts more costly and forbearance12 more likely as each of these
characteristics limits the influence of financial special interests on policy outcomes. Thus
democratic institutions and a high number of veto players should limit the likelihood that
governments opt to provide a bailout.
Brown and Dinç (2005) further highlight the role of the temporal proximity of elections in
lowering the likelihood of a bailouts by shifting the focus of policymaking away from special
interests. They argue that politicians face incentives to produce economically beneficial
outcomes in the lead-up to elections in order to highlight their competence. Thus impending
elections cause policymakers to delay costly bank bailouts until the post-election period,
12Forbearance occurs when government regulators allow insolvent banks to remain in operation.
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while distant elections allow politicians to discount the public costs of current-day policies.
They find that in 21 developing countries between 1994 and 2000, politicians largely avoided
costly interventions in the face of bank failures in the lead-up to a popular vote.
1.3.3 Partisan Preferences
A fully theorized political economy explanation of why some governments opt to assist ail-
ing firms while others do not would involve four factors (Rodrik, 1995): on the demand
side, the sources of domestic preferences over economic policy as well as how these interests
are aggregated to form interest groups; and on the supply side, the preferences of polit-
ical officials themselves and the institutional context under which these forces interact to
produce the final policy outcome. The previously discussed argument that firms lobby for
bailouts and particular characteristics provide them with more or less influence over policy
outcomes ignores the preferences that political officials themselves have. The third argument
for explaining bailouts, described in this section, focusses on how the partisan orientation
of policymakers may make them more or less sympathetic towards bailouts on average, and
may also inform the kinds of firms they prefer to provide with assistance.
Policymakers’ preferences as expressed by their partisan orientation are likely to impact
their support for bailouts on average for ideological reasons and for reasons that are linked to
the material interests of their core electoral of constituencies. Bailouts, a costly government
intervention in free market operations, are a policy that is more in line with the preferences of
left-leaning, interventionist policymakers than with the more laissez-faire approach adopted
by right-wing governments. This assertion finds support in previous analyses of Congres-
sional voting on bailout bills that show that the ideology of Congress members (generally
measured using their DW-Nominate score) impacts their likelihood of voting for or against
a bailout, with more conservative members being less likely to vote in favor. These results
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generally hold even while controlling for the impact of constituent interests.13
Further, policymakers’ partisan preferences over bailouts come from their internalization
of the material interests of their core electoral constituencies, namely labor for the left and
capital for the right (Hibbs, 1987, 1992; Tufte, 1978). Research in political economy has
shown that governments of differing partisan orientations employ different sets of economic
policies and pursue different policy goals given common economic shocks and global economic
constraints in order to serve the interests of these groups. While left-wing governments favor
higher levels of government spending as a means of spurring growth, smoothing the busi-
ness cycle, and minimizing unemployment, right-wing governments seek to lower spending,
balance budgets, and minimize inflation (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Alesina, Roubini and
Cohen, 1997; Boix, 1998, 2000; Cameron, 1984; Garrett, 1998; Garrett and Lange, 1991,
1995). As bankruptcy is likely to cause medium-term dislocation and adjustment costs, the
brunt of which are likely to fall upon lower income groups, it is in left-wing governments’
interests for electoral reasons to provide bailouts as a form of protection.
Partisanship certainly seems to play a role in the airline and automobile cases discussed in
the introduction as the countries that refused to provide assistance were universally governed
by right-wing coalitions. For example, the Swedish governing coalition overseeing the Saab
and Volvo crises was elected in 2006, displacing the Social Democrats after 12 consecutive
years of rule. Led by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of the Moderate Party, the new
government took a decisive turn to the right, adopting a series market-conforming policies.
Facing the auto crisis, the government maintained this position, allowing Saab to fail. The
conservative Grand National Party, in power in South Korea in 2009, refused to assist in
13In the case of the auto industry, Nunnari (2011) shows that more conservative members of Congress
and the Senate were more likely to vote against the 2008 bailout bills even while controlling for constituent-
level auto industry employment and district electoral competitiveness. Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010) report
similar results in their analysis of roll call votes on the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
Further, Broz (2005, 2011) finds that legislators with a conservative ideological predisposition are less likely
to support financing international bailouts and the IMF.
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the case of Ssangyong. In the case of airlines, Prime Minister John Howard of the center-
right Liberal Party refused to bail out ailing Australian carrier Ansett, while the center-right
government of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, elected on a platform of breaking with
the interventionist policies of the previous left-wing government, refused to provide state
funding to Air Lib. At face value, right-wing governments certainly seem disinclined to
provide bailouts.
Partisanship not only impacts the likelihood that policymakers support bailouts on av-
erage, but also impacts the kinds of firms that they prefer to assist. Partisanship has been
shown to be relevant in the distribution of other targeted economic policies. Left and right-
wing governments adopt differing policy platforms with regards to trade (Milner and Judkins,
2004) and set different tariff levels (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1996; Dutt and Mitra, 2005)
that reflect that interests of labor and capital in relation to their home country’s position
in the international economy. Moreover, in so far as inward flows of foreign direct invest-
ment favor labor over capital, left-wing governments attract these flows (Pinto, 2013a; Pinto
and Pinto, 2008). In the case of bailouts, left-wing governments will be more interested in
providing assistance to those firms that, if they were to go bankrupt, would cause the the
most harm to labor through increases in unemployment and decreases in wages. Employee-
rich firms are therefore more likely to receive assistance from left-wing governments for two
reasons: first, as job loss and contraction are direct costs of bankruptcy, firms with many
employees in an absolute sense will have the greatest impact on the labor market if they fail.
Second, if we assume that firms with the most employees operate in labor-intensive sectors,
the greater potential for contagion associated with larger firms implies that the failure of a
single, large, employee-rich firm could cause failures in other, similarly labor-intensive firms
throughout the industry, exacerbating the negative impact on employment and wages.14
14This assumption finds support in the dataset described below. Of the 20 largest firms by employees,
13 operate in the manufacturing sector, 5 in finance, 1 in telecommunications, and 1 in wholesale and retail
trade.
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This assumption is motivated by the idea that large manufacturers, such as automakers, are
likely to have similarly employee-intensive counterparties, such as auto parts manufacturers.
Thus according to this argument, the preference for left-wing governments towards providing
bailouts will be increasing in the distressed firms’ number of employees.
1.4 Methodology and Operationalization
In order to compare firms that are ripe for a bailout and get one with similar firms that are
instead left to their own devices, I first construct a sample of financially distressed firms by
media keyword searches. Next I run keyword searches using the identified, distressed firms
and a set of bailout-related words and locate the portion of these distressed firms that receive
bailouts. Having constructed this set of distressed firms, I then append firm and country-
specific data identified as relevant in the prior theoretical part of the chapter. Empirical
analysis is performed by means of multilevel logistic regressions.
1.4.1 Sample Construction
To examine why some firms receive bailouts while others do not, the ideal universe of cases
would be a complete census of distressed firms spanning countries, industries, and years. By
combining data on the characteristics of the distressed firms, their industry of operation and
the country in which they are located, the census could be used to examine which of the
covariates relevant to the three explanations are the strongest predictors of a firm receiving
a bailout. The choice of defining the universe of cases as all distressed firms, as opposed
to all firms, regardless of their financial health, is justified by the fact that bailouts are by
definition given as a substitute to bankruptcy to distressed firms that are likely to fail. Valid
comparisons could not be made between firms that receive a bailout and those that do not
in a census of all businesses as the subset of firms in the census that do not receive bailouts
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would include healthy firms that are never eligible for this form of assistance.
This approach, however, raises one significant issue related to selection bias. If firms
that expect bailouts are more likely to enter a distressed state than firms that do not expect
assistance, choosing to only observe distressed firms in order to study the correlates of
bailouts may be a selection rule that is correlated with the dependent variable. Fortunately,
if this bias is present, it operates in a predictable manner: it will reduce estimates of causal
effects, and the degree of attenuation is a function of the strength of the correlation (King,
Keohane and Verba, 1994: 130). Thus the potential that firms that expect bailouts are
more likely to become distressed will bias my estimates downwards, implying that that the
estimated results are an understatement of the true effect.
The reason why bailout expectations might induce distress is moral hazard. Firms that
anticipate a bailout in the case of distress might make riskier financial bets in the immediate
term since they believe that the government will insulate them from the costs if the bets turn
out negatively in the future. Empirical work that investigates this possibility by looking at
whether banks take greater risks in light of explicit or perceived guarantees in the case of
failure finds mixed results,15 and so this possibility can not be ruled out.
Unfortunately, no cross-country, cross-industry census of distressed firms exists. Hand
collecting this data for individual industries with few firms might be possible, but collecting
the data for all industries across countries is not. As a second-best approach, I instead
opt to construct a sample of distressed firms using media keyword searches in a manner
similar to Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) and Jiang, Kim and Zhang (2010). This
15For example, Karels and McClatchey (1999) find that the institution of deposit insurance, an implicit
state guarantee in the case of failure, in the credit union industry did not lead to increased risk-taking in
the industry. Gropp and Vesala (2004) similarly find that the introduction of deposit insurance in the EU
reduced risk-taking in the European banking industry and had no impact on the risk-taking of very large
banks that might expect bailouts in the case of failure. Dam and Koetter (2012), however, find in a sample
of German banks that those that were most likely to expect a bailout, where expectations are a function of
political variables previously identified as making bailouts more likely, were more likely to become financially
distressed, the measure the authors use for risk-taking behavior.
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tactic involves searching newspaper using keywords that are related to distress in order to
identify particular firms that have been identified as such. Once the sample of distressed
firms is constructed, a secondary search is performed to determine whether the firms failed
or received bailouts.
While the use of distressed firms as a universe creates the potential for bias arising from
selection on the dependent variable, a sampling strategy based on media searches instead
creates another set of selection issues due its nonrandom nature. As the distressed firms
that newspapers report about are unlikely to be a representative sample of all distressed
firms, the sample constructed through this procedure may also be subject to selection bias.
Larger firms, for example, may be more likely to be deemed newsworthy than smaller ones.
Fortunately, however, if this nonrandom selection of firms by the media is a function of
observable characteristics, bias can be mitigated by controlling for them. A number of the
independent control variables described below are explicitly included in order to control for
some of the factors that make some kinds of firms more likely to appear in the sample than
others.
The keyword searches are limited in scope to stories from the The New York Times, The
Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal in order to work with a manageable number of
hits. Using Factiva, an online database of various news media sources, I search between the
years of 1987 and 2011 inclusive using the keywords “fac* bankruptcy,” “near* bankrupt*,”
“avoid* bankrupt*,” “verge of bankruptcy,” “fac* insolvency,” “near* insolven*,” “avoid*
insolvency,” “verge of insolvency,” “go bankrupt,” “going bankrupt,” “brink of insolvency,”
or “financial* distress*.” The asterisks act as wildcards so the search finds news articles that
contain words that match any of these phrases exactly plus phrases that match versions of
these phrases that are identical but also contain any set of additional characters in place of
the asterisk. For example, searching for “near* bankrupt*” would identify articles containing
the phrases “nearing bankruptcy,” “nears bankruptcy,” or “near bankrupt.” This strategy
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finds 11,439 news articles.
Of course, only a portion of these articles actually identifies firms as being in financial
distress, and as the search was performed over time and across a number of publications,
most distressed firms are covered by numerous news pieces. In order to determine whether
or not a given article identifies a firm to be included in the sample, the article must conform
to three rules. First, the article must directly describe a private firm as being in distress,
where distress is described by any of the keyword adjectives discussed above. For example,
a New York Times piece from December 1, 2001 identifies “LTU, a German charter airline”
as “near bankruptcy,” leading LTU to be included in the sample (Andrews, 2001). The
piece, a general story on job losses in Europe, also discusses a number of other firms that
are contracting, but as these firms are not directly linked with any of the distress keywords,
they are not considered to be nearing bankruptcy and so are not included. Second, the
link between the distress keywords and the firm can not be speculative. Thus firms that
are identified as facing bankruptcy only if certain events occur, such as a downturn in the
economy or a negative court ruling, are excluded. Third, firms that are described in a
historical sense as having been in financial distress, having gone bankrupt or having received
a bailout are included as long as a year is clearly specified in which the event occurred, and
the year is within the period covered by the analysis (1987-2011). By applying these rules,
747 instances of ailing firms are identified.
1.4.2 Dependent Variable: Bailouts
As the motivating question of this chapter is why some firms get bailouts while others do
not, the dependent variable is whether or not a given firm in the sample does in fact receive
a bailout. Firms are identified as having received a bailout if one of the news pieces found
using the prior search strategy in which the firm is discussed explicitly describes the firm as
receiving government assistance that matches the definition provided in section 1.2.1. The
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fate of the majority of firms found using the initial media search strategy, which is to say
whether they go bankrupt, resolve their financial problems through some private means such
as restructuring or a cash infusion, or receive a bailout, is made clear through the text of
associated news pieces. The initial determination of whether or not a firm received a bailout
was therefore made by reading the articles associated with a particular firm. When the firm
was described as having received a government-sponsored bailout or lifeline, it was coded
as 1 in the dataset. If the firm is instead described as having gone bankrupt, having been
acquired, or having resolved its financial situation either on its own or through a private
lifeline, it is coded as 0.
For the 149 cases where no clear outcome is identified, however, a second search strategy
is used in order to probe whether or not these firms were bailed out. This strategy involves
using Factiva in the manner described above but searching for the firm name in addition to
the keywords “bail out,” “bailout,” “bail-out,” “bailed out,” “rescue package,” “rescue plan,”
and “rescue aid” in a manner pioneered by Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) and also
employed by Jiang, Kim and Zhang (2010). Using the same set of rules as before, firms that
are positively identified in the resulting set of articles as receiving a bailout are then coded as
such while those that are not are coded as 0. By limiting the search to these specific phrases,
however, it is possible that some kinds of bailouts are missed, for example loan guarantees
that are only described as such and not as a bailout. As widening the search strategy would
produce a potentially unmanageable number of hits, I choose to accept working with a more
tractable number of news pieces in exchange for potentially missing some bailouts that are
not directly labelled as such by the news media. Further, bailouts performed by actors other
than governments, such as banks, are coded as a 0.
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1.4.3 Firm Record Matching
This set of distressed firms is then linked with records in Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database,
CapitalIQ’s Compustat database, and Disclosure’s WorldScope database. Firm records were
first collected from Orbis, next from Compustat, and finally from WorldScope; where values
were missing from the Orbis dataset, they were filled wherever possible with values from the
Compustat dataset, and next with values from WorldScope. As the databases do not use
the same set of firm identifiers, locating a firm’s records required searching the databases’
master lists of firms to locate the relevant match. Unfortunately records are only available
for 631 of the 747 distressed firms.
1.4.4 Independent Variables
As measures for the systemic risk arguments for bailout provisions, three variables are em-
ployed: Assets, Employees, and Finance. Assets is constructed by calculating the three-year
moving average of a firm’s total assets and then dividing this value by the GDP of the country
in which the firm is located. Finally, these values are transformed in to a natural logarithm
as the variable is left-skewed. The values for total assets come from the Compustat, Orbis
and WorldScope databases while GDP comes from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2013). The rationale behind using total assets normalized by GDP
is that the relative size of a firm in proportion to a national economy is a more meaningful
measure of the risk the failure of the firm poses to that economy than its absolute size. Firms
that are insignificant on the global scale may be of great relevance to their home economy
(Kellermann, 2011). The second measure, Employees, is further used to measure the size
of firms and is constructed by first diving the three year moving average of a firm’s total
employees by a country’s population, again to make the variable relative. As the resulting
values are again left-skewed, they are transformed in to a natural logarithm. Note that
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as larger firms are more likely to be newsworthy, controlling for both the firm’s assets and
employees partially addresses the issue of selection in to the sample discussed above. The
third measure, Finance, is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm is identified as operating
in the finance or insurance sector, using the NAICS 2007 3-digit classification system.
As measures for the special interest lobbying argument, a number of firm and country-
level variables are employed. First, to measure veto players, Henisz’s (2000) Polcon III is
used. The measures is constructed by first counting the number of independent branches
of government with veto power and then by adjusting this value for partisan misalignment
across branches and for the degree of party coherence within each branch. The resulting
variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values implying greater degrees of constraint.
The degree of electoral competition is measured using Polity taken from Marshall, Gurr
and Jaggers (2011). This variable, the sum of the authors’ Autoc and Democ variables,
ranges from -10 to 10. Higher values are indicative of countries that possess more demo-
cratic attributes, such as competitive elections and constraints and the chief executive, and
fewer autocratic attributes, such as closed executive recruitment and restricted regulation of
political participation. Given that more democratic countries also have greater press free-
doms, and therefore newspaper reports of distressed firms are likely to disproportionately
address firms in these conditions, controlling for the level of democracy again addresses some
of the issues related to selection on observables.
Electoral timing comes from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al.,
2001), which includes the variables LEGELEC, a dummy indicating whether there is an
election for the legislature in a given year, and EXECELEC, a similar dummy for executive
elections, both of which are directly employed. The variable Election, t+1 is constructed
from the data as a dummy that is equal to 1 if there is a legislature election for Parliamentary
or Assembly-Elected Presidential systems or if there is an executive election for Presidential
systems in the following year.
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In order to measure whether or not a firm is politically connected, two variables, Con-
nected and Connected (Panel), are employed. Connected, from Faccio (2006), is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is on Faccio’s connected firm list and 0 otherwise. Faccio
allows for political connections to exist through three channels: first, through Members of
Parliament; second, through a Minister or Head of State, and third, through close relations
to a top official. Connections through MPs exist when at least one of a firm’s top officers or
at least one of a firm’s large shareholders is an MP. Top officers include a company’s CEO,
president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary; large shareholder are defined as anyone who
directly or indirectly controls at least 10% of total shareholder value. To identify whether
these individuals sit in Parliament, Faccio assembled lists of MPs for 42 countries for the year
2001 and for 5 countries for the year 2003. Faccio then cross-references the two lists to see
whether there is any overlap between MPs, top officers, and large shareholders. A political
connection through a Minister or Head of State exists when one of these officials, or one
of their relatives (spouse, child, sibling, or parent), is also one of the top officers or a large
shareholder of a given firm using. Finally, Faccio (2006: 371) deems firms to be politically
connected through close relations to a top official when “a person who was a head of state
or Prime Minister between 1997 and 2001 (or one of their relatives) was also a top executive
or a large shareholder of the company during 1997 or 2001,” excluding cases that fall in to
the second channel, “when a government minister or a member of parliament as of 2001 was
a top executive or large shareholder of the company during 1997; when a large shareholder
or a top officer is a friend of a minister or MP; when a large shareholder or a top officer is
a politician in another country; or when a large shareholder or a top officer is known to be
associated with a political party.” These links are found largely through extensive media
searches and secondary literature.
This measure is highly problematic, however, in so far as the determination of whether or
not a firm is politically connected is generally only made based on information from a single
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year. Firms are connected through Members of Parliament, for example, if a top officer or
large shareholder of the firms is an MP in 2001 or 2003. It is unclear the extent to which this
connection remains relevant in other years, either because the individual through which the
connection is made may not have been in Parliament, or because she may not have been a top
officer or large shareholder. This is particularly problematic for my purposes given that my
dataset is a panel that extends to 2011. Furthermore, Faccio admits that the identification
of political connections through close relationships is less precise than the identification of
connections through the two other channels. The publicly available list16 of the 542 firms
Faccio deems to be politically connected, however, fails to specify the channel by which the
firms are deemed to be connected.
In order to address some of these problems, I construct a new variable, Connected (Panel).
The new variable identifies firms that are politically connected in a given year using the first
two of Faccio’s channels (through MPs and through Ministers or Heads of State). To do so,
information regarding the top officers of ailing firms are extracted from WorldScope from
1987 until 2004. From 2005 onwards, information regarding both the top officers and large
shareholders of ailing firms is taken from Orbis. Further, lists of MPs, Ministers, and Heads
of State are constructed for as many country-years that contains at least one ailing firm as
possible. The lists are then cross-referenced, and any matches by surname are noted. When
the surnames do match, first names are then checked for correspondence. In the case where
only the first initials are provided, further research is performed by searching Factiva and
Lexis Nexis by company name and surname to identify the full name of the shareholder or
top official. Unfortunately, given the high degree of missing firm-level data, and the fact
that no prior database of elected officials by country-year exists, this variable is very limited
16The data are available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.96.1. Accessed
on July 16, 2013.
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in scope as well, covering 177 firms in 16 countries and 20 years.17 A list of country-specific
resources where the data were collected from is shown in Table A.10, Appendix A.
Finally, government partisanship is coded using the DPI. The EXECRLC variable which
measures the partisanship of the executive is used for countries with directly-elected or
assembly-elected Presidents, and the GOV1RLC variable, which measures the partisanship
of the largest government party, is used for purely Parliamentary countries. Three dummy
variables are constructed in this manner, Left, Right, and Center, that are equal to 1 if the
relevant part of the government is of left, right, or center partisan orientation. In order to
capture the hypothesized partisan interaction between left-wing governance and the number
of employees in a firm, an interaction term, L x Employees, is constructed.
1.4.5 Control Variables
I control for the degree of distress firms experience as well as macroeconomic conditions and
international constraints that may impact the willingness and capacity of governments to
authorize bailouts.
The degree of distress that a firm experiences may inform the decision of the government
to provide it with a bailout. The simple hypothesis here is that firms that are in the
most dire financial situation will be the ones that are least able to protect themselves from
bankruptcy without the assistance of the government. Altman (1968)’s Z-score, a commonly
used, empirically robust18 metric of bankruptcy risk, is therefore employed to control for the
17The country-years with observations are Argentina 2002, Australia 1992, 2004, and 2008, Belgium 1996,
2000, 2001, and 2009, Brazil 2001, 2003, and 2004, Canada 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2001, France 1994, 1995,
1996, and 2001 – 2004, Germany 1992 – 1994, 1996 – 1999, 2001 – 2004, and 2009, India 2011, Ireland 2009,
Italy 1994, 1996, 1997, 2002 – 2004, 2009, and 2010, Netherlands 1996, and 2002 – 2004, South Korea 1997,
1999 – 2004, 2007, and 2009, Spain 1994, Switzerland 2001, UK 1991 – 1993, 1999 – 2006, 2008, 2009, and
2011, and USA 1991 – 1997, 2000 – 2004, and 2007 – 2011.
18See Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) for an overview of the model’s empirical accuracy. Although other
robust bankruptcy measures exist, including Moody’s KVM Index, the Z-score is commonly used and has
the advantage of being comprised of data that is publicly accessible.
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severity of distress. This measure is constructed for firm i as Zi = 1.2X1i +1.4X2i +3.3X3i +
0.6X4i + 1.0X5i where X1i is the firm’s working capital over total assets, X2i is retained
earnings over total assets, X3i is earnings before interests and taxes over total assets, X4i is
market value of equity over book value of total liabilities, and X5i is sales over total assets.
The measure is bounded by 0 as the various ratios are measured in absolute terms. Firms
with a Z-score value of less than 1.81 are considered as being at the highest risk of failure.
As data coverage for most of the composite variables is spotty, 3 year moving averages are
used to construct the final variable. The variable is constructed using the firm-level data
from WorldScope, Orbis and Compustat.
Macroeconomic performance may impact the likelihood that governments provide bailouts
to firms. In situations where the labor market is deteriorating, for example, or where the
economy is contracting, allowing a firm to fail would not only be disastrous for the employ-
ees that are directly forced into a hostile job market, it may exacerbate the already poor
situation faced by other workers in the same economy. To capture the economic climate at
the time that the bailout decision is being weighed, two economic variables, Unemp. Change
and GDP pc Growth are constructed using data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2013). Unemp. Change measures the annual percentage change in
the share of the total labor force in a country-year that is without work but is available and
searching for it, and GDP pc Growth measures the annual percentage change of GDP per
capita based on the local currency in a country-year.
Second, membership in international organizations that govern domestic economic ac-
tivity may also constrain policymakers from initiating a bailout. For example, under the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, member states may raise a
trade complaint against a subsidy enacted by other members that meets three requirements:
first, it must be a financial contribution made by or at the direction of a government or
public body; second, the subsidy must confer a benefit to the receiving party; and third, it
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must be specific, meaning that the contribution must confer a benefit to a firm, an industry,
or a group of firms or industry, but not to a wide array of firms or industries (Brunel and
Hufbauer, 2009). Thus if a bailout undertaken by a WTO member state meets these three
requirements other member states could take action against them. Most bailouts would ap-
pear to meet all three criteria.19 As a result, WTO membership could limit the willingness
of policymakers to authorize a bailout out of fear of legally sanctioned retaliation. WTO
Member, a dummy indicator for WTO membership by country-year, is therefore employed
as a control.
Further, EU membership may also constrain policymakers’ autonomy to undertake bailouts.
The EU Treaty prohibits the implementation of state aid, or “any transfer of state resource
that conveys an economic advantage on selected firms, and affects trade between Member
States and distorts competition, or has the potential to do so” (Office of Fair Trading, 2005:
9), with some exceptions. As rescue and restructuring aid, a subset of state aid, is often
employed by member states to prevent bankruptcy, this prohibition is likely to constrain EU
member states from undertaking bailouts. While the restriction on state aid was “ambiguous
and controversial because it was not codified in a single document” (Zahariadis, 2010: 954)
in the early years of the EU, member states “finally accepted their obligation not to grant
state aid without prior Commission consent and acknowledged the Commission’s competence
to order recovery of illegal aid” (Blauberger, 2009: 721) by adopting Procedural Regulation
659/1999 in 1999. Thus the limitation on the use of state aid only became viable from 1999
onwards. I therefore also employ EU Member, a dummy indicator that is equal to 1 for all
EU member country-years after 1999 onwards, as an additional control variable.
19First, all of their potential forms (cash grants, loans or loan guarantees, the acquisition of troubled
assets, equity investment, temporary acquisition or conservatorship, and full nationalization) meet the first
criterion of being a financial contribution made by the government. Second, by delaying bankruptcy, bailouts
meet the second criterion of conferring a benefit to the bailout recipient. Third, as bailouts are given to
specific firms or industries, they meet the third criterion.
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1.4.6 Summary Statistics
Once the financially distressed firms identified using the media keyword searches were matched
with observations in the two firm-level databases, 631 instances of ailing firms remained, 579
of which represent unique firms.20 Individual firms that experienced multiple spells of fi-
nancial distress were kept in the database as separate observations as firm financial and
country-level data was collected annually. Of these remaining cases of distress, 155, or
24.56%, included a bailout. Lists of bailouts by country, year, and industry are reported as
Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.
Figure 1.1 presents a plot of the natural logarithm of the number of distressed firms by
country, on the x-axis, by the percentage share of firms that receive a bailout by country
on the y-axis. As we see, the single largest source of distressed firms in the dataset is the
US, providing 207, 30 of which receive bailouts. The number of firms by country seems to
roughly follow the size of countries’ economies with the exception of China which holds only
6 distressed firms, 3 of which receive a bailout, likely due to its semi-socialist economy and
limits on press freedoms. Bailout counts seem also to follow this pattern, and no single large
economy holds a disproportionate number based on the ratios provided in Table A.1.
Figure 1.2 shows some interesting patterns in the distribution of distressed firms and
bailouts by industry. While the sector with the most distressed firms is manufacturing
(159), the financial and insurance industries see the highest raw number of bailouts (52),
as well as the highest ratio of bailouts to distressed firms (0.46). The difficulties faced by
manufacturing firms seems to correspond to the lengthy process of deindustrialization the
countries that are most represented in the sample are experiencing, while the tendency of
governments to save financial firms corresponds to the earlier assertion that systemic risk
is highest for firms in this sector that may fail. Further, the high number of firms in the
20Unique firms are those which are only in the dataset once.
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Figure 1.1: Plot of Distressed Firms on Percentage Bailed Out by Country
information sector (60) and the low ratio of bailouts to distressed firms (0.08) is likely a
result of the large number of failures of high tech firms during the dot-com bust of the early
2000s.
Figure 1.3 shows that while the total number of distressed firms follows global business
cycles, with large numbers of ailing firms entering the dataset during the dot-com crash and
the post-9/11 recession as well as the more recent global recession, the ratio of bailouts to
distressed firms appears less tied to this cycle. Though the two years with the highest number
of bailouts (20) are 2008 and 2009, the ratios for these years, 0.38 and 0.36 respectively, are
quite close to those seen in 1996, 1997, and 1998 (0.34, 0.38, and 0.37), despite the fact that

















Educational Services Distressed Firms
Bailout Share
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
Distressed Firms and Bailouts by Industry
Figure 1.2: Distressed Firms and Bailouts by Industry
A list of summary statistics for all independent and control variables is shown in Ta-
ble C.2. The most noteworthy and distressing feature of this table is the fact that the
number of observations for firm-specific variables, such as Employees, Z-score, and Con-
nected (Panel), is much lower than the total number of observations in the dataset. This
issue of missing data becomes much more acute and much more obvious in the data analysis
below, as in fully-specified models that include all relevant covariates21 the total number of
cases with observations on variables is only 308. The cause of the missing data appears to
be that the WorldScope, Orbis and Compustat databases are incomplete in their coverage
























Figure 1.3: Distressed Firms and Bailouts by Year
over time. In order to assess whether this missingness is biasing results, multiply imputed
versions of the dataset are generated and the models are re-estimated using these infilled
data as a robustness check.
1.5 Data Analysis
As a first cut at the raw data, Table 1.2 reports differences in means test performed between
firms that received a bailout and those that did not across all independent and control vari-
ables. The table provides some support for the three arguments regarding bailout provision:
firms that receive bailouts appear to be larger, in term of assets and employees, than those
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bailout 0.24 0.43 0 1 631
Assets 0.4 0.63 0 3.14 448
Center 0.09 0.28 0 1 609
Connected 0.03 0.17 0 1 631
Connected (Panel) 0.01 0.11 0 1 175
Election, t+1 0.28 0.45 0 1 630
Employees 0.03 0.09 0 0.94 368
EU Member 0.16 0.37 0 1 631
Finance 0.17 0.38 0 1 631
GDP pc Growth 1.55 3.28 -13.13 18.33 630
Left 0.35 0.48 0 1 609
Polcon III 0.41 0.12 0 0.72 628
Polity 8.97 2.72 -8 10 600
Right 0.53 0.5 0 1 609
Unemp. Growth 8.30 25.09 -30.56 277.78 614
WTO Member 0.8 0.4 0 1 631
Z-score 0.54 1.29 0 15.3 431
that do not, and a disproportionate number of financial firms are bailed out compared to
non-financial firms (34% as opposed to 13%), supporting systemic risk arguments. Moving
on to the special interest lobbying argument, we see that the proportion of firms that are
bailed out is lower in years prior to an election than in all other years, while there appears
to be no meaningful difference in the Polcon III between country-years with and without
bailouts. Bailed-out firms reside in country-years with a significantly lower Polity score.
Further, the proportion of bailed out firms that are politically connected is higher than than
the proportion that are not, both by the Connected (0.05 versus 0.02) and Connected (Panel)
(0.02 versus 0.01) measures, though these differences are statistically insignificant. Finally,
regarding partisanship, we see that the proportion of bailed out firms that exist in country-
years under right governance is lower than the proportion under non-right governments (0.45
versus 0.56), a statistically significant result. A larger share of bailed out firms exist in years
governed by the left versus years governed by the non-left, but this finding is insignificant.
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Table 1.2: Differences in Means Tests by Firm Status
Variable Bailed Out Not Difference P. Value
Assets 0.83 0.28 0.55 0.00
Employees 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04
Finance 0.33 0.13 0.2 0.00
Election t+1 0.20 0.30 -0.1 0.01
Polcon III 0.41 0.41 0 0.84
Polity 8.30 9.20 -0.9 0.01
Connected 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.10
Connected (Panel) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.51
Left 0.38 0.35 0.03 0.44
Right 0.44 0.56 -0.12 0.02
Z-score 0.31 0.61 -0.3 0.00
GDP pc Growth 1.03 1.71 -0.68 0.05
Unempp Growth 10.90 7.50 3.4 0.19
WTO Member 0.77 0.81 -0.04 0.35
EU Member 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.46
Number of Observations 155 476 - -
The table shows some mixed results for our expectations regarding alternative expla-
nations of bailouts. Bailed out firms have lower Z-scores, implying that they are closer to
bankruptcy than non-bailed out firms, and country-year GDP growth is lower for bailed out
firms than for those that do not get a lifeline. The differences for unemployment growth,
WTO membership, and EU membership are not statistically significant.
In order to analyze the determinants of bailouts in a multivariate setting, a series of
multilevel logit models are estimated. As we are interested in the impact of country-level
variables on firm-level outcomes, failure to adjust the estimation of the standard errors of
a logit model accordingly would lead to a downward bias (Primo, Jacobsmeier and Milyo,
2007). While one common approach to dealing with this problem is to estimate cluster-
robust standard errors, these errors also tend to be biased downwards, especially given few
clusters (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008) and multilevel interaction terms (Leoni, 2009;
Erikson, Pinto and Rader, 2010).
The data possess a mixed-level, non-nested structure with firms clustered in both coun-
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tries and in years. In order to addresses the problems associated with having firm-level
outcomes and country-level covariates and to control for unmeasured country-specific char-
acteristics and cross-country, temporal shocks, I estimate non-nested multilevel logit models
with random intercepts varying by country and by year. These models control for the lack of
independence of firm-level outcomes within countries and years and allow for the inclusion
of country and firm-specific variables that impact the likelihood of a bailout occurring. The
models take the following form:
Pr(yi = 1) = logit






γt = εt (1.3)
In these equations, firms are indexed by i, and the countries and years in which they are
clustered j and t. The inclusion of αj[i] and γt[i] in Equation 1 indicates that the multilevel
models are of the non-nested random intercept type, with intercepts varying by country and
year. The dependent variable, yi, is a dummy indicator for whether or not firm i receives
a bailout in the year in which it is observed as being distressed. X[i] represents a vector of
firm-level independent and control variables and β a vector of the associated coefficients.
Equations 2 and 3 show how the country and year intercepts are modeled, respectively.
In Equation 2, Zj represents a vector of country-level independent and control variables and
φ a vector of coefficients. εj and εt represent country and year level error terms that are
assumed to be normally distributed as εj ∼ N(0, σ2country) and εt ∼ N(0, σ2year) respectively.
As an overview, the main results from what follows are that the systemic risk and parti-
sanship arguments of bailout provision find reasonably strong support, while special interest
lobbying arguments do not. Firm size and operation in the financial sector are consistently
found to increase the likelihood of a firm receiving a bailout across specifications and es-
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timation techniques. Right wing governments appear, on average, to lower the probability
of firms receiving bailouts, while left-wing governments increase the probability. Further,
the positive impact of left-wing governance is higher for firms with the most employees.
Regarding the special interest variables, the results are quite inconsistent, with many being
statistically insignificant or incorrectly signed.
One aspect of how these models are specified is noteworthy: Connected and Connected
(Panel) are not included, due to the very high proportion of zeros in both measures (only 18
firms are connected by Faccio’s measure, and only 2 are connected by the panel version) and
the paucity of observations in the case of Connected (Panel) (177). While Connected can be
included in most specifications, it is never statistically significant, and has virtually no impact
on the other covariates.22 In some specifications, however, the variable can not be included
because it always predicts failure – none of the connected firms by this measure receive
bailouts in the subset of cases that have values on all covariates included in the specification.
In the case of Connected (Panel), both of these issues are amplified, due to the limited
total number of observations and the even more limited number of positive observations.
Of the two firms that are connected by this measure, one of them receives a bailout. Thus
while some connected firms do receive bailouts, the very small number of firms that are
politically connected by either measure, and the fact that the overlap between connected
firms and complete observations on all other covariates is extremely limited, implies that
political connections are not a sufficiently strong predictors of bailouts so as to wash out the
impact of the covariates on bailout likelihood.
As a first cut at examining the validity of the three bailout arguments, Table 1.3 rep-
resents a set of multilevel logit models that include their explanatory variables iteratively,
but exclude the control variables. Model 1 includes the three systemic risk variables, Assets,
Employees and Finance. We see here that, as hypothesized, larger firms in terms of assets
22Results are available upon request from the author.
36
are more likely to receives bailouts, while the number of employees and operation in the
financial industry, conditional upon asset size, do not appear to have an impact. Thus the
results initially partially confirm the idea that firms that pose the greatest systemic risk are
more likely to receive a bailout.
Model 2 additionally incorporates the special interest argument variables. Polity and
Election, t+1 both have significant and negative impacts on bailouts, consistent with the
expectation that special interests will have less sway in democratic settings and when elec-
tions are looming. Polcon III, however, has a significant but positive impact, contradictory
to the expectation that political constraints should make bailouts less likely by maintaining
policy stability. A Wald test with the null hypothesis that the three variables are jointly
equal to 0 can be rejected, implying that their inclusion adds predictive power to the model.
It appears, at least a first cut, that the special interest lobbying argument is confirmed, with
the exception of the number of veto players.
This contradictory finding regarding veto players holds throughout the analysis. One
potential explanation is that veto players in this setting are serving more as access points in
Ehrlich’s (2007) terminology. Ehrlich (2007: 577) defines an access point as “any relevant
policymaker who is also either independent or serves a distinct political constituency.” From
this perspective, the more access points there are in a political setting, the better able are
groups with a collective action advantage to push policy in their favor. As many political
and institutional characteristics, such as party discipline, the number of parties in power,
and bicameralism act as both veto players and as access point, it is possible that countries
with higher values on Polcon III also have more access points. Further, as firm-specific
stakeholders who stand to lose from bankruptcy have a stronger incentive to act collectively
in lobbying the government to provide them with a lifeline, in these high-veto player, high-
access points settings, it’s possible that bailouts will be more likely to occur.
Model 3 subsequently includes the Left dummy to test for the impact of partisanship.
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Here we see that the results from the prior model remain largely intact, with the exception of
Election, t+1, which becomes statistically insignificant. Left has a positive and statistically
significant relationship with a firm receiving a bailout, consistent with the theoretical asso-
ciation between left governments and bailouts. The fourth model repeats this exercise but
uses Right in place of Left and further shows that right-wing governments are less likely to
authorize bailouts than left or center governments. The fifth model explores whether Center
governments have an impact, and the coefficient on the variable is insignificant. Finally, the
sixth model includes an interaction term between Employees and Left. We see here that the
term has a positive coefficient, though it is only statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level,
implying that the impact of Left may be increasing in Employees. As is shown below in
the left-hand panel of Figure 1.4, however, when the marginal effect of this interaction term
is examined across all values of Employees, it appears to have a robust impact on bailout
probabilities.
The second set of models shown in Table 1.4 replicates the prior results but includes
the various controls. The control variables themselves appear to have minimal impact.
While Z-score has a negative impact on bailout probability as expected (remember that
lower Z-scores imply a higher risk of failure), the result is never significant. GDP growth
is generally significant, and holds a negative relationship with bailouts, implying that their
use is countercyclical. Unemployment growth appears to have no impact. WTO and EU
membership appear to have inconsistent impacts across models, though they never have
statistically significant coefficients, implying that they have little, if any, impact on bailout
probability.
In terms of assessing the validity of the three explanatory arguments, the results are
broadly consistent with those from the models that excluded controls. The coefficients on the
systemic risk variables are unchanged, with Assets maintaining its positive and statistically
significant impact on bailout probability. Again, the results for the special interest variables
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Table 1.3: Multilevel Logit Models Estimating Bailout Probability Without Controls
1 2 3 4 5 6
Assets 1.06∗ 0.98∗ 1.38∗ 1.34∗ 1.27∗ 1.22∗
(0.31) (0.30) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37)
Employees -1.39 -1.60 -2.03 -1.93 -1.76 -4.02
(1.91) (1.76) (1.84) (1.83) (1.77) (3.00)
Finance 0.02 0.20 -0.12 -0.09 -0.03 0.02
(0.53) (0.55) (0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.60)
Election, t+1 -0.72+ -0.62 -0.59 -0.54 -0.72+
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39)
Polity -0.20∗ -0.23∗ -0.22∗ -0.23∗ -0.26∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Polcon III 4.22∗ 5.35∗ 5.21∗ 4.39∗ 5.73∗







L x Employees 11.72+
(6.05)
Constant -1.73∗ -1.42∗ -1.99∗ -1.33∗ -1.27+ -1.81∗
(0.32) (0.63) (0.75) (0.67) (0.66) (0.76)
Observations 342 325 318 318 318 318
Countries 32 31 26 26 26 26
AIC 333.01 322.77 306.53 306.71 312.29 303.45
BIC 356.02 356.82 344.16 344.33 349.91 344.83
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multilevel logit models. Random intercepts vary by country and year. Standard
errors reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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are inconsistent, with Election, t+1 and Polity operating in the expected manner, and Polcon
III again increasing the likelihood of bailouts occurring in contradiction with expectations.
Partisanship, however, seems to maintain its relevance. Both Left and Right maintain
a statistically significant relationship with the probability of a bailout occurring and in the
hypothesized direction, while Center has no impact. The interaction of left-wing governance
and employee remains positive and is now statistically significant at conventional values.
Thus the models that include controls appear to also partially confirm all three arguments.
1.5.1 Substantive Effects
To understand the substantive effects of these findings, marginal effects were calculated using
the fixed effects from Model 3 of Table 1.4 holding all variables at their means if they are
continuous or medians if they are dichotomous. This exercise shows that a one-unit increase
in Assets is associated with an 15.6 percent increase in the likelihood of a bailout occurring.
Further, an impending election is associated with an 7.3 percent decrease in the likelihood of
a bailout occurring, while a one-unit shift on Polity decrease the probability by 4.3 percent.
Moving Polcon III by one unit increasing the probability of a bailout occurring by 63.0
percent, by far the largest effect substantively. Of course, given that this variable ranges
from 0 to 1, a one-unit shift here is the equivalent of a movement from its minimum to
its maximum, a much greater shift than for the other variables. Finally, the presence of a
left-wing government is associated with a 11.5 percent increase in the likelihood of bailouts
occurring. Repeating this exercise but for Model 4 shows right-wing governments being
associated with a 10.5 percent decrease in the likelihood of a bailout.
To further probe at the interactive effect of employees and left-wing governance, the
marginal effect of Left was calculated across the range of Employees in steps of 0.1 using
the estimates produced both with and without the control variables (Model 6 in Tables 1.3
and 1.4). Again, all control variables are held either at their mean or median values. The
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Table 1.4: Multilevel Logit Models Estimating Bailout Probability With Controls
1 2 3 4 5 6
Assets 1.18∗ 1.11∗ 1.24∗ 1.18∗ 1.13∗ 1.09∗
(0.37) (0.35) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.42)
Employees -2.13 -2.43 -2.13 -2.01 -1.95 -5.48
(2.08) (1.92) (1.97) (1.96) (1.89) (4.52)
Finance 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.23
(0.60) (0.57) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.61)
Election, t+1 -0.84∗ -0.82+ -0.80+ -0.72+ -0.93∗
(0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.43)
Polity -0.31∗ -0.32∗ -0.31∗ -0.32∗ -0.35∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Polcon III 4.48∗ 4.97∗ 4.66∗ 4.05∗ 5.31∗







L x Employees 13.22∗
(6.57)
Z-score -0.19 -0.26 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.20
(0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23)
GDP pc Growth -0.02 -0.13+ -0.16∗ -0.16∗ -0.15∗ -0.16∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Unemp. Growth 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
WTO Member -0.06 -0.15 -0.06 0.09 0.15 -0.07
(0.56) (0.54) (0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60)
EU Member -0.01 0.56 0.29 0.28 0.49 0.37
(0.59) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.41)
Constant -1.55∗ -0.21 -0.59 0.00 -0.14 -0.28
(0.60) (0.88) (0.98) (0.98) (0.97) (1.01)
Observations 328 312 306 306 306 306
Countries 30 29 25 25 25 25
AIC 316.58 302.39 290.86 291.46 295.68 287.08
BIC 358.31 354.79 346.72 347.31 351.54 346.66
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multilevel logit models. Random intercepts vary by country and year. Standard
























































Figure 1.4: Marginal Effects of Left-Wing Governance by Employees
results are shown in Figure 1.4.
Panel a), which plots the marginal effects estimated using the model that excludes control
variables, shows that the interaction term has a statistically significant impact for many
values of Employees. We see that the marginal effect of Left is significant at the p < 0.05
between values Employees values of 0.03 and and 1.5, where it implies that the predicted
probability of a bailout occurring is 0.35 higher for left governments than for equivalent
non-left governments. This range represents 22% of the values of Employees. The marginal
effect of the interaction term is also significant at the p < 0.05 for all values of Employees
greater than 0.3, a much smaller portion of the overall sample (1.6%). At the maximum
value of Employees, 0.94, moving to a left government implies that the predicted probability
of a bailout occurring increased by 0.99.
Panel b), which plots the marginal effects estimated using the model that includes the
control variables, provides virtually identical results. The marginal effect of the interaction
term is significant at conventional values for the ranges of Employees between 0.04 and 1.4
and above 3.3. A firm with a value of 1.3 on Employees, with all other values at their mean
of mode, has a predicted probability of receiving a bailout that is 0.30 higher than the same
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firm under a non-left government. Thus we see that the impact of left-wing governance is
in fact increasing in the number of employees in the firm, giving support to the assertion in
the partisanship argument that left governments will be more likely to provide assistance to
employee-rich companies.
1.5.2 Robustness Checks
I subject the data to several sets of robustness checks that are reported in the Appendix.
First, in Appendix A.2.1, I explore whether the finding that left-wing governments are re-
luctant to authorize bailouts is a spurious one. A possible alternative explanation is that the
broader macroeconomic conditions that result from previous policy decisions made by right-
wing governments have both pushed the left-wing party in to power and created the condition
that require bailouts. According to Broz (2013) and Pinto (2013b), economic shocks in the
current period are likely to be a function of policy choices made during a prior period and
at a different point along the business cycle. Further, the partisan character of prior govern-
ments may not only cause this trend, they may also lead to the changes in partisanship that
occur during the subsequent crisis. Right-wing governments deregulate finance and eliminate
capital controls, leading to asset bubbles fueled by foreign lending. When the bubble sub-
sequently bursts, voters respond to the poor economic climate by replacing the government
with an alternative, left-wing one (Broz, 2013). From this perspective, the economic crises
that push firms to the brink of bankruptcy, forcing the (left-wing) government to bail them
out, may be a result of prior right-wing governance. Thus the relationship found between
left governance and bailouts could be a result of endogeneity in so far as an alternative force
drives both the partisan character of the government and the macroeconomic climate that
requires bailouts. I find, however, that left-wing governments in the sample preside over
better economic times than non-left-wing governments.
Next, in Appendix A.2.2, I estimate a series of models that employ alternative measures
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of partisanship and include additional control variables. The results hold when partisanship
is measured as the percentage of seats in the legislature that are held by left-wing parties
rather than as a dummy variable. Including dummy variables for the countries that are the
four largest contributors of firms to the sample also has no impact on the results. Further,
controlling for media freedom has no impact.
Third, I re-estimate both sets of models, those with and without controls, using bootstrap
clustered standard errors (BCSE) as a specification check in Appendix A.2.3. The multilevel
modeling approach used above is not without its problems in that it requires a strong set of
assumptions regarding the models’ constituent error terms and due to the intensive use of
data required to estimate many parameters, nonconvergence can occur (Primo, Jacobsmeier
and Milyo, 2007). I therefore also estimate logit models with BCSEs, as doing so relies on
fewer assumptions and is computationally simpler (Harden, 2011). In brief, this approach
draws a sample of clusters of observations from the data at hand with replacement, calculates
an estimate of the statistic of interest for this sample and stores it in a vector, and then
repeats this process a sufficient number of times such that the standard deviation of the
storage vector can be used as the standard error of the estimated statistic of interest in order
to construct confidence intervals for the estimate.23 The results found using this estimation
technique are consistent with those found using multilevel modeling.
Fourth, in order to account for the possibility that the high degree of missing data
could have biased the results, I generate fifty separate versions of the dataset via multiple
imputation and then reestimate the multilevel logit models across these imputed datasets in
Appendix A.2.4. The reported results are again consistent with those found above.
Fifth, to explore whether industry-specific characteristics that are not controlled for are
driving the results, I estimate an additional set of non-nested mutilevel models that have an
additional random intercept that varies by industry in Appendix A.2.5. The results remain




This chapter has attempted to answer the question of why some ailing firms are provided
with a lifeline while others have been allowed to go bankrupt. Bailouts, one of the more
dramatic features of the Great Recession and cause of great public debate and outrage, are a
fundamentally political decision over whether certain societal actors will be subject to the full
brunt of market forces, or whether the broader public will instead finance a lifeline. Despite
the prominence of bailouts, and the explosive politics around their use, little scholarly work
has sought to explore why politicians employ them in some causes but not others. This
chapter has attempted to fill this gap, both from a theoretical and empirical vantage point,
by developing potential arguments explaining their use and by collecting data in a novel
manner that overcomes the extant lack of a census of distressed firm and a comprehensive
list of bailouts.
The chapter developed three arguments to explain the variation in the provision of
bailouts. First, as large firms, particularly those operating in the financial industry, pose
the greatest threat of systemic risk in the case of bankruptcy, they are a likely target of
governments seeking to minimize aggregate damage to the economy. Second, the likelihood
of bailouts occurring could be a function of the interaction of the lobbying by ailing firms’
stakeholders for assistance and the political characteristics of countries that make them more
or less susceptible to these efforts. Third, left-wing governments may be more likely to autho-
rize bailouts on average, and employee-rich firms in specific, out of ideological and electoral
concerns.
The strength of the arguments was tested using a new dataset of financially distressed
firms, a portion of which receive bailouts. The list of firms was collected by searching news-
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paper articles using distress-related keywords. Whether firms on this list received bailouts
was then determined by a secondary search employing bailout-related terms instead. The re-
sults show that the systemic risk and partisanship arguments are persuasive: large firms, and
firms in the financial industry, are more likely to receive bailouts. Left-wing governments are
roughly 10% more likely to provide bailouts on average than governments of other partisan
orientations, and this effect is increasing in the number of employees in the target firm. The
results found regarding lobbying and institutional constraints are weak and inconsistent.
These findings are an important contribution to existing research on bailouts which has
focussed only on government responses to banking crises, ignoring bailouts in non-crisis years
and in non-financial industries (Grossman and Woll, 2014; Keefer, 2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006,
2009). The data collected for this project shows that bailouts occur across economies, and
that ignoring sectors other than finance could therefore introduce significant bias to any
empirical evaluation of the causes of bailouts. Further, by integrating work on partisan
strategies over macroeconomic management (Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, 1991; Boix, 1998;
Garrett, 1998) and industrial protection (Dutt and Mitra, 2005; Milner and Judkins, 2004;
Pinto, 2013a), the chapter introduces a persuasive argument that can explain patterns in
bailouts across firms. Finally, the findings are consistent with analyses of the determinants
of industrial subsidies that show a strong role for left-wing governments (Blais, 1986; Verdier,
1995; Zahariadis, 1997). In so far as bailouts are narrowly targeted subsidies put in place
in the particular circumstance of a firm approaching failure, it is unsurprising that the two
policy instruments are often caused by the same forces.
Finally, the finding that governments of different partisan orientations respond differently
to firms in distress calls in to question the assumption held by earlier work that bailouts
are universally unpopular. If left-wing governments are responding to pressure by labor
groups, or at least are operating in a way that they believe labor will prefer, in providing
bailouts to firms that would cause a significant negative impact on labor market if they
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were to fail, then a larger portion of the public supports bailouts than simply direct firm
stakeholders. The potential that public opinion over bailouts falls along partisan lines, and
may vary by the sector of the ailing firm, or its size, is worthy of further exploration. To
this point, no academic work has rigorously examined the contours of public opinion over
bailouts. A fruitful avenue for further research would be to explore how voters view bailouts,




Picking Winners by Saving Losers:
Partisanship and the Sectoral
Allocation of Corporate Bailouts
2.1 Introduction
Corporate bailouts are one of the most notorious aspects of the Great Recession. Facing
frozen credit markets and unprecedented declines in demand, governments committed vast
resources to propping up ailing domestic businesses, including banks,1 automakers,2 and
airlines.3 Though the impulse to save ailing firms appears universal at first glance, the
1France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States provided their financial sectors
with support totaling 17.8%, 20.8%, 49.6%, 58.4% and 16.2% of their 2008 GDPs, respectively. See Pontusson
and Raess (2012).
2While the US and Canadian governments eased GM and Chrysler through bankruptcy with roughly
$100 billion USD in loans, guarantees, and equity investment, Opel received €3 billion in emergency loans
and restructuring assistance from the German, English, Spanish, Polish, and Austrian governments and
France provided Peugeot and Renault with €7 billion. See Stanford (2010).
3For example, the Austrian government provided Austrian Airlines Group with €200 million in assis-
tance (Austria Today, 19 January, 2009), the Maltese government provided Air Malta with a €52 million
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clustering of bailouts in these three sectors belies the fact that innumerable businesses failed
across industries during the downturn, and that bailouts themselves are not a new aspect
of economic policymaking. Why do governments provide so many firms operating in some
sectors with bailouts, while they allow so many firms operating in other sectors to fail?
This question speaks to a broader literature in political economy that seeks to under-
stand why particular industries are favored with targeted policies, while others are not. A
longstanding line of inquiry in trade politics attempts to identify the characteristics com-
mon to heavily protected sectors4 and to explain these patterns;5 similar efforts have been
made with regards to industries that are protected from inflows of foreign direct investment
(FDI).6 Thus by exploring why governments favor some firms and industries over others by
providing them with bailouts rather than allowing for bankruptcy, the chapter expands this
enterprise by incorporating a new form of targeted policy. This is of particular relevance
given the insight that the removal of one form of protection often leads to the introduction
of another, a process that Bhagwati (1988: 53) calls the “Law of Constant Protection.” For
loan guarantee (European Commission, 2011), and the Czech government €100 million to Czech Airlines
(European Commission, 2013).
4Industries that are heavily shielded with barriers to trade tend to be labor-intensive, low-skilled and
low-wage; they are subject to high import penetration; they are declining; and they tend to be characterized
by regionally concentrated production but regionally diffuse consumption. See Trefler (1993) and Rodrik
(1995) for overviews.
5Early work on endogenous protection identified a host of explanations for the varying success of indus-
tries in obtaining protection from trade, including on the demand side lobbying capacity and voting strength,
and on the supply side, the government’s preference to maintain the status quo by minimizing adjustment
costs and to achieve social justice goals by insulating the poorest members of society from risk. See Gawande
and Krishna (2003) for an overview in which they argue that identifying which of these explanations is best
fit by the data is virtually impossible. The contemporary benchmark “Protection for Sale” model, developed
by Grossman and Helpman (1994), predicts that policymakers will trade off the demands of industry and
consumers such that protection will be highest for industries with organized lobbying capacities and lowest
for industries with high import elasticities. These predictions have been shown to hold in countries including
the US (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Goldberg and Maggi, 1999), Turkey (Mitra, Thomakos and
Ulubaşoğlu, 2002) and India (Bown and Tovar, 2011).
6See, for example, Pinto and Pinto (2008); Pandya (2014).
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example, recent work by UNCTAD (2013: 13) finds that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are often
used “to reinforce tariffs in order to continue protecting key economic sectors in spite of tariff
liberalization taking place.” Thus if we are to fully understand which industries governments
favor and why, we need to study all the tools at their disposal.
The anecdotally divergent trends in bailouts outlined above are empirically demonstrated
by Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the number of bailouts by country-year amongst European Economic
Area (EEA)7 member states between 1999 and 2011 and Figure 2.3, the annual number of
bailouts by sector amongst the same sample.8 The country-year bailout trends in Figure 2.1
and 2.2 show that while some countries, such as France, Italy, and Poland, experience bailouts
on an annual basis, others, such as the Czech Republic and Portugal, experience virtually
none, while others still, such as Iceland and the Netherlands, appear to have sharp, counter-
cyclical spikes centered around the Great Recession. Furthermore, while the largest cluster
of bailouts occurs in the finance industry during the Great Recession, bailouts consistently
occur in other sectors, including manufacturing and transportation, across time.
I argue that the partisan preferences of governments informs which kinds of sectors they
deem more deserving of this form of public support. Left-wing governments are commonly
thought to shield labor from unemployment and the the business cycle, as it tends to bear the
distributional brunt of these phenomena, while right-wing governments prefer to maintain the
stable economic environment sought by capital by balancing budgets and limiting inflation
(Hibbs, 1987, 1992; Tufte, 1978). In the realm of targeted forms of protection, partisanship
has proven to be a relevant factor in explaining variation in barriers to trade, capital flows,
7The EEA Agreement, signed by all EU member states plus EFTA member states Iceland, Liechtenstein,
and Norway, allows signatory EFTA members to take part in the EU common market without becoming EU
member states.
8The bailout counts come from the EU Commission’s State Aid Register and the EFTA Surveillance
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Figure 2.1: Number of Bailouts by Country and Year. The figures plot the count of bailouts
per year across EEA member states. Section 2.4 describes how the data on bailouts was
collected.
and FDI.9
As left- and right-wing governments’ varying preferences over economic policies come
from the internalization of the interests of their core electoral constituencies, they will seek
to authorize bailouts that protect these constituencies’ material interests. The impact of
bailouts on the interests of labor and capital is a function of their distributional consequences.
The primary goal of a bailout is to prevent the target firm from going bankrupt, implying that
the winners from bailouts are the losers from bankruptcy. Bankruptcy imposes immediate
costs, including the destruction of wealth and the loss of jobs, upon firm stakeholders and
upon the stakeholders of counterparty firms that are driven to bankruptcy through contagion
9See Dutt and Mitra (2005); Epstein and O’Halloran (1996); Milner and Judkins (2004) on trade, Quinn
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Figure 2.2: Number of Bailouts by Country and Year, Continued.
effects. The failure of a large automaker, for example, can cause suppliers to also fail, while
the failure of a large bank can have the same effect on other financial institutions. The
losers from bailouts are those who have to fund them, namely diffuse taxpayers (Keefer,
2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009). For the case at hand, left-wing governments, concerned with
labor-market outcomes, will seek to provide bailouts that prevent bankruptcies that would
cause the most unemployment. I hypothesize that they will therefore seek to prevent the
bankruptcy of firms that operate in the most labor-intensive sectors. Right-wing governments
will instead seek to provide bailouts that prevent bankruptcies that would cause the greatest
destruction of wealth. They will therefore target firms in sectors that are the most capital-
intensive.
I further explore two alternative explanations of the variation of bailouts across sectors.
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Figure 2.3: Number of Bailouts by Sector and Year. The figures plot the count of bailouts
per sector-year across EEA member states. Section 2.4 describes how the data on bailouts
was collected.
tegration. International financial financial flows can spark banking crises, while increased
import penetration accelerates the rate of failure of industries, potentially increasing the
demand for bailouts in sectors that are most subject to these flows. FDI, on the other hand,
can act as a substitute for a bailout if ailing domestic firms are acquired using foreign capital
prior to going bankrupt. Second, alternative forms of social protection may render bailouts
less necessary. Unemployment insurance, for example, can make job loss less disastrous,
weakening the incentives governments face to keep domestic firms afloat. Further, industrial
subsidization may prevent recipient firms from reaching such a precarious financial situation
that a bailout is required.
I test these hypotheses with a new dataset of annual bailout counts by sector across
the EEA, spanning the period from 1999 to 2011. The results of this chapter show that
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governments of differing partisan orientations choose to favor some sectors over others in
the economy by providing them with more lifelines. Left-wing governments are shown to
provide sectors with sufficiently low capital-to-employee ratios roughly 1.6 times as many
bailouts as do non-left-wing governments. Right-wing governments, on the other hand, pro-
vide sectors with a sufficiently high degree of capital intensity 2.5 times as many bailouts as
do non-right-wing governments. Prior research, however, has overlooked partisanship, focus-
ing exclusively on ideology in the American context (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010; Nunnari,
2011) and institutional constraints cross-nationally (Keefer, 2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009).
As my findings show that partisanship clearly plays a role in the distribution of bailouts, its
omission in the extant literature is problematic. Further, while I find some extremely limited
evidence in support of the hypothesis that countries employ bailouts to protect sectors sub-
ject to greater foreign competition, the partisan preferences of governments regarding bailout
targeting holds while controlling for this alternative explanation. Again, these variables have
been ignored in prior work.
These findings are consistent with those in Chapter 1, though they are not identical.
In that chapter I show that left-wing governments are more likely to provide bailouts to
distressed firms, on average, than non-left governments, and that this effect increases with the
number of employees in the firm. In this chapter I again find a role for left-wing governance,
though it is not quite as strong. Here left-wing governments are shown to provide more
bailouts to firms operating in sectors that are labor-intensive in some model specifications. I
do not find, however, that left-wing governments are more likely to authorize all bailouts, on
average. This difference may be due to the different sample of countries employed: here only
European countries are analyzed, while in Chapter 1 the sample of countries includes North
American countries, as well as a number of developing countries. Thus by only examining
the impact of partisanship within Europe, the degree to which it varies may be more limited
in this sample. Further, the strong role of right-wing governments in picking key sectors
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to assist with bailouts found in this chapter is not considered in Chapter 1. Once again,
however, right-wing governments are not found in this chapter to have an impact on average,
aggregate bailout counts. This chapter also explores a number of new hypotheses excluded
from the previous one, including the impact of globalization and social protection on the
distribution and frequency of bailouts.
As members of the EEA are obligated to report all issuance of state aid, a portion of
which constitutes bailouts, above a certain monetary threshold, the new dataset employed
here represents a comprehensive set of bailouts for the sample. By analyzing the full set of
bailouts across economic sectors and over time undertaken by these countries, this chapter
adds further valuable insights to the nascent scholarly study of bailouts. Previous studies
that examine the determinants (Brown and Dinç, 2005; Couch et al., 2011; Dorsch, 2013;
Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010; Rosas, 2006, 2009) and generosity (Grossman and Woll, 2014;
Keefer, 2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009) of bailouts only consider financial sector bailouts in
the context of banking crises.10 As we see bailouts occurring in a variety of sectors in times of
prosperity as well as in times of hardship, a unified explanation of bailout provisions can’t be
adequately tested using such a limited number of cases. At worst, by limiting the sample of
distressed firms to banks operating in times of crisis, the findings of these prior studies may
be subject to selection biases. By expanding the scope of the inquiry beyond this limited
subset of bailouts, this chapter tries to resolve these problems.
Further, the use of this new dataset addresses some of the shortcomings of the method-
ological approach in Chapter 1. The process by which distressed firms are drawn in to the
sample in that chapter is host to selection effects that may bias the findings, despite my best
efforts at addressing them. By employing a sample comprised of comprehensive counts of
bailouts, the results in this chapter are not subject to these selection issues. However, as the
10Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006), who examine the firm-level determinants of bailouts across
sectors, and Nunnari (2011), who examines Congressional roll call voting on the (failed) auto bailout bills of
2008, are exceptions.
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scope of countries is limited to those in the EEA, the sample may not be as globally repre-
sentative as the one previously constructed. The fact that left-wing governments are shown
to assist the firms that would have the most impact on labor markets if they were to fail
holds in both samples, despite their different shortcomings, should increase our confidence
that partisanship plays a key role in the bailout decision.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, bailouts are defined, and their distributional
consequences are discussed. Second, the chapter outlines the partisan and alternative ex-
planations of why governments provide more bailouts to some industries rather than others.
Third, the method for collecting annual counts of bailouts by country-sector across the EEA
is described as is the nature of the other data used in the empirical investigation. Fourth, the
statistical approach used to test the theories previously outlined is delineated and the results
of the tests are described. The final section of the chapter provides concluding remarks.
2.2 What is a Bailout?
Bailouts are in essence a targeted policy the government can employ to protect particular
firms and industries from bankruptcies. They are defined as government actions, explicitly
or implicitly funded by public resources, that seek to avoid the failure or dissolution of a
distressed company.11 By explicitly focussing on government actions, this definition of a
bailout excludes private bailouts, for example the infusion of capital by domestic or foreign
banks or investors, and acquisition, either by a domestic or foreign firm. It is important to
note that actions taken by the government in an effort to save an ailing firm need not be
successful in order for them to be classified as a bailout as the recipient firm may still fail
despite the intervention (Block, 1991-1992). They are delivered in myriad forms, including as
cash grants, loans or loan guarantees, the acquisition of troubled assets, equity investment,
11See Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006), Rosas (2009), and Wright (2010) for similar definitions.
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temporary acquisition or conservatorship, and full nationalization (Wright, 2010).
How is a bailout distinct from a subsidy? While both bailouts and subsidies belong to
the same conceptual family of government interventions that assist an enterprise or industry,
there are some critical distinctions (Block, 1991-1992). First, bailouts tend to benefit fewer
actors than do general government subsidies, as bailouts are frequently targeted at specific
firms in order to avoid their insolvency, while subsidies are generally targeted to groups
of actors such as businesses of a certain size, or in a certain region or industry. Second,
subsidies are often geared towards providing recipients with incentives to perform certain
activities, such as job creation, often in order to achieve a goal such as the maintenance of
competition through supporting small enterprises or through market regulation in the case
of price supports. Bailouts, on the other hand, are specifically designed to prevent the failure
of distressed enterprises.
This distinction is critical to the research design of the chapter as outlined in Section 2.4.
The European Commission, in conjunction with the EFTA Surveillance Authority, have
mandates to monitor and control the distribution of state aid amongst member EEA states.
While these authorities consider state aid to be any government transfer to a business that
provides it with economic advantages or that distorts trade or competition, they separate out
types of state aid by their motivation, including rescue and restructuring aid that is explicitly
used to prevent firms from failing and to support their subsequent restructuring. Thus
the distinction between subsidies in general and bailouts in specific observed by European
authorities allows me to study these two phenomena independently.
2.2.1 The Costs and Benefits of Bailouts
As bailouts seek to avoid firm failure, their main benefit comes from shielding those who
would suffer the costs associated with bankruptcy. There are three sets of costs associated
with the firm becoming bankrupt: first, the firm and its stakeholders experiences direct costs,
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such as professional fees and the time management spends in administering bankruptcy,
and indirect costs, including the unobservable opportunity costs of lost sales, market share,
and profits (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006; Warner, 1977) that negatively impact the firm’s
employees through the contraction of the firm and its interest holders through a sharp decline
in the value and marketability of the bonds, debt, or equity they hold (Branch, 2002). Second,
other firms can be harmed through counterparty or informational contagion. Counterparty
contagion occurs when the failure of a given firm impacts other firms either because they
are owed payments by the failed firm or because they depend upon future business, now
cancelled, with the failed firm. Informational contagion occurs when a firm’s failure causes
market actors to update their beliefs regarding the health and financial viability of other,
similar firms, making it more costly for these other firms to secure financing or to conduct
transactions (Levitin, 2011). Third, larger bankruptcies can have a negative economy-wide
impact by the destruction of stock market value, potentially causing significant declines in
domestic consumption and investment due to reductions in household wealth and the pool
of available capital (Graham, Litan and Sukhtankar, 2002).
The main cost of a bailout, the burden placed upon taxpayers, varies with the nature
of the lifeline. When bailouts are delivered as loan guarantees the cost is the risk placed
upon taxpayers that they will have to honor the loan in the case that the recipient defaults.
When they come as direct grants, acquisitions, or nationalizations, they involve immediate
fiscal costs that are spread across the general tax-paying public (Block, 1991-1992). Frydl
and Quintyn (2000) also highlight the importance of the timing of the bailout: bailouts
authorized at the earliest stages of a crisis are likely to be less expensive both because the
direct fiscal costs are lower prior to the total deterioration of the financial position of the
ailing firms and because the costs associated with the disruption of payments systems and
credit flows are likely to be less severe.
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2.3 Why Bail Out Firms in Some Sectors and not Oth-
ers?
In this section I consider a number of reasons why governments provide bailouts to firms some
sectors and not in others. I first consider the possibility that a welfare-maximizing social
planner could simply authorize bailouts that entail larger benefits than costs, but ultimately
conclude that the high degree of uncertainty associated with any given bailout makes this
approach virtually impossible. As I will discuss in greater detail below, efforts at estimating
the costs of bailouts, both a priori and ex post, are generally unsuccessful, undermining cost-
benefit calculations. Next I consider my primary explanation for the variation in bailouts that
focusses on the partisan preferences of governments: left-wing governments are more likely to
assist employee-rich sectors, and right-wing governments capital-rich sectors, with bailouts,
in order to protect their core electoral constituencies, labor and capital. I also consider two
other potential political explanations that highlight the role of global integration in making
particular sectors more or less likely to receive bailouts, as well as the role of alternative
forms of protection, including protection against the risks of unemployment and industrial
subsidies, in making bailouts more or less common.
2.3.1 The Social Planner
One might argue that governments, if they were able to undertake the role of a social planner,
could simply choose to authorize bailouts when the benefits, as described above, outweigh
the costs. This enterprise is not so simple, however, as measuring the cost of a bailout, both
prior to its initiation and after its completion, is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Frydl
and Quintyn (2000: 15–23), for example, identify a host of reasons that ex-ante estimates of
the cost of a bailout are inaccurate including the speed with which a bailout is undertaken,
the measures employed, the impact of the broader macroeconomic climate and the market’s
59
reaction to the government’s measures. To support their assertion, the authors report large
differences between the initial estimates of aggregate bailout costs as a percentage of GDP
and later estimated costs undertaken during or after the bailout process.12
This difficulty is equally present when analysts attempt to measure bailout costs ex-post.
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009: 163), “estimates of bailout costs vary markedly
across studies, depending on the methodology, and vary even more across time, depending
on the length of the horizon used to calculate the fiscal impact of the crisis. . . ” Using data
from Frydl (1999) and Moe and Vale (2004), they show that the differences in estimated
bailout costs as a percentage of GDP for notable major banking crises in the latter half of
the 20th century across studies is as high as 51.3% and is generally in the 10% range.13 Thus
estimating a bailout’s cost, ex-post or ex-ante, is nowhere near an exact science.
An alternative rationale a social planner could use to justify a bailout would be if the
failure of the target firm poses systemic risk to the economy. As Levitin (2011) forcefully
argues, however, there is no clear definition of this term and there are no objective criteria
by which to judge whether the failure of any given firms poses it.14 Systemic risk is therefore
better understood in political terms as “the risk of socially unbearable macroeconomic con-
sequences of microeconomic failures” (Levitin, 2011: 446). Further, identifying systemic risk
is not so much about measuring actual macroeconomic outcomes of firm failure, but instead
is about determining whether or not society is willing to bear the costs of failure.
The implication is that policymakers faced with the choice of saving an ailing firm operate
12See Table 1 on page 18 of Frydl and Quintyn (2000). The differences are both positive and negative,
depending upon the crisis, implying that initial estimates can both either under- or over-estimate final bailout
costs.
13See Table 10.9 on page 164 of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
14Levitin (2011: 443–444, fn. 20) reviews 17 separate definitions and points out that the common under-
standing is that systemic risk exists if failure poses “substantial risk” to the broader economy. Substantial
risk, however, is never clearly defined, and no metrics or benchmarks are forwarded by the literature to
measure it.
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in a highly uncertain environment. Even an idealized social planner is unlikely to be able to
perform a cost-benefit analysis beforehand with a high degree of confidence. Stakeholders
across the economy, however, are likely to have some sense of whether they stand to gain
or lose from a bailout, even if they are uncertain of the final sums. Thus the decision to
authorize a bailout is likely to be the outcome of political processes that allow varying degrees
of access to policymaking by those who are harmed by, or who benefit from, the issuance
of a lifeline. I therefore turn to political explanations of bailouts decisions next, considering
partisanship, global integration, and alternative forms of protection in turn.
2.3.2 Partisanship
I argue that one key political variable that is likely to impact the decision over which firms
receive bailouts is partisanship. As numerous authors have argued, left-leaning governments
strive to minimize unemployment and to smooth the business cycle through direct govern-
ment intervention in free market operations, while right-wing governments prefer to keep
inflation in check and to lower spending and balance budgets (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989;
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997; Boix, 1998, 2000; Cameron, 1984; Garrett, 1998; Garrett
and Lange, 1991, 1995). The primary motivation for this split in policy preferences over var-
ious macroeconomic policies is that governments of these different partisan orientations seek
to shield their core electoral constituencies, namely labor for left-wing governments and cap-
ital for right-wing governments, from their respective negative distributional consequences
(Hibbs, 1987, 1992; Tufte, 1978).
The affinity of left-wing governments and right-wing governments for certain sets of
policy prescriptions reflects the interests of the different electoral coalitions from which they
derive support, with left-wing governments reflecting the interests of labor and right-wing
governments the interests of capital. This association is reflected in a variety of spheres
of economic policy. Milner and Judkins (2004) and Dutt and Mitra (2005), for example,
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employ the Hecksher-Ohlin model of trade to derive the hypothesis that openness to trade
increases the returns to labor in labor-rich countries and decreases it in capital-rich countries.
They find that in accordance with these distributional consequences left-wing governments,
as protectors of labor, espouse or adopt more open trade policies in developing countries,
while they are instead more protectionist in the developed world. Epstein and O’Halloran
(1996) also find that historically, American tariff rates fluctuated with the identity of the
governing party with unitary Republican governments adopting significantly higher tariffs
than Democratic ones. These patterns reflect the import-competing and export-oriented
interests the Republican and Democratic parties respectively drew electoral support from at
the time. Further, Pinto (2013a) argues that left-wing governments are more open to, and
more successful at wooing, foreign direct investment flows due to their favorable impact on
labor in product and factor markets. Quinn and Inclan (1997) also consider the distributional
consequences of openness to capital flows by examining its impact on factor markets as well as
on macroeconomic policy. They find that left-wing governments, save for those in countries
with a high degree of skilled labor, tend to maintain financial closure for longer than right-
wing governments.
Partisanship further informs decisions over targeted policies by impacting the kinds of
industries governments are likely to protect. Pinto and Pinto (2008), for example, argue that
left-wing governments promote IFDI in industries where it complements labor and increases
wages and that right-wing governments instead promote IFDI in industries where it com-
pliments capital. Finally, in a set of findings closest to my own, Verdier (1995) shows that
partisanship impacts the allocation of subsidies in the OECD, with left governments subsi-
dizing labor-intensive industries and right governments subsidizing capital-intensive ones.
In the case of bailouts, which are, as previously discussed, a narrowly targeted form
of subsidy, left-wing governments will be most willing to provide assistance to firms that,
if they were to go bankrupt, would cause the most harm to labor through increases in
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unemployment and decreases in wages. Left-wing governments will therefore be more likely
to provide bailouts to firms located in labor-intensive industries as the failure of any given
firm in such an industry is likely to have a large impact on unemployment and may drive
down wages. Further, as the threat of counterparty contagion implies that the failure of one
large firm in a labor-intensive industry may cause other, similar firms in the same industry
to also fail, left-wing governments have a further incentive to avoid a domino effect that
could cause widespread damage to the labor market.
Hypothesis 1. Left-wing governments will be more likely to authorize bailouts in labor-
intensive sectors than in sectors that are not labor-intensive, ceteris paribus.
Right-wing governments, on the other hand, will be most interested in protecting firms
and industries that are vital to the interests of capital, their core group of support. Thus
rather than focussing on labor market impacts, these governments are likely to be concerned
with how the failure of a firm will hurt investors. I therefore hypothesize that right-wing
governments should be particularly concerned with providing assistance to firms operating
in industries that are highly capital-intensive, as the failure of these firms is likely to destroy
large amounts of investors’ wealth given their liquidation directly and through the impact
of counterpary contagion on other, similarly capital-intensive firms operating in the same
industry.
Hypothesis 2. Right-wing governments will be more likely to authorize bailouts in capital-
intensive sectors than in sectors that are not capital-intensive, ceteris paribus.
The partisanship explanation here has a different implication than a purely ideological
explanation would. While the partisanship explanation holds that policymakers adopt po-
sitions that positively impact their core electoral constituencies, an ideological explanation
would instead hold that policymakers choose whether or not to authorize bailouts out of a
consideration for whether this policy corresponds to their beliefs about the proper role of
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the government in managing the economy. Thus, in so far as ideologically right-leaning pol-
icymakers are opposed to intervening in free market operations, they will be more averse to
authorizing bailouts, and in so far as left-leaning policymakers are ideologically supportive of
government management of the economy, they will be more supportive.15 If aggregate bailout
counts did differ under governments of different partisan orientations, with left governments
authorizing more, on average, than right governments, as they are found to in Chapter 1,
this would be consistent with this ideological explanation. It would also be consistent with
the partisanship explanation, however, as the medium-term dislocation costs associated with
bankruptcies are likely to fall disproportionately upon the less human-capital endowed voters
left-wing governments rely upon for electoral support.
The key difference in expectations between these two approaches is then over their pre-
diction regarding the sectoral distribution of bailouts: from an ideological perspective, there
is no reason for left governments to favor some sectors over others when choosing whether or
not to provide lifelines, or for right governments to be inconsistent in their unwillingness to
save firms across industries. Ideologically, a bailout is a bailout is a bailout. From a partisan
perspective, however, the predictions over the distribution of bailouts are that right-wing
governments are more likely to authorize bailouts for capital-intensive sectors and that left-
wing governments are more likely to authorize bailouts for capital-scarce ones. The results
shown below imply that there is a meaningful split in which kinds of sectors governments of
different partisan orientations choose. No split is found in terms of average levels of bailouts,
however, between left- and right-wing governments.
15This argument has been employed in prior analyses of Congressional roll-call votes on bailout bills in
the United States, including TARP (Dorsch, 2013; Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010) and the Auto Industry
Financing and Restructuring Act of 2008 (Nunnari, 2011). More ideologically conservative representatives
as measured by their DW-Nominate scores are shown in these papers to be less likely to vote in favor of





An alternative explanation of the provision of bailouts is that varying levels and forms of
global economic integration make them more or less likely. A number of authors have argued
that the high economic volatility associated with increased economic openness can lead to
increased government spending to insulate citizens from risk (Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein,
1985; Rodrik, 1998) while others claim that the increased global mobility of capital allowed
by economic openness saps the ability of governments to maintain the tax revenues necessary
to finance spending (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Rodrik, 1997; Strange,
1996). Tanzi (2011) dubs these two competing explanations the “compensation hypothesis”
and the “efficiency hypothesis.” The empirical results, however, are so far mixed.16 Re-
gardless of the net effect of globalization, it certainly increases the degree to which domestic
economies are exposed to global shocks, creating the potential for much higher degrees of
short-term domestic economic dislocation. I consider in turn how financial integration, free
trade, and flows of foreign direct investment, all elements of globalization, may make bailouts
more or less likely.
In so far as global financial integration increases the likelihood of large-scale financial
crises, it increases the number of bailouts that countries are likely to authorize. Though
a heated debate exists over the aggregate, long-term costs and benefits of global financial
integration, most authors agree that eliminating capital controls and allowing for the free
flow of hot money across borders decreases the stability of domestic financial markets and
increases the frequency and intensity of financial crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache,
1998; Frieden, 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Thus opening up the economy to global
flows of capital may lead to a higher frequency of banking failures, in turn increasing the
16See Ha (2008) for an overview.
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number of opportunities governments have to bail out domestic firms. In so far as financial
crises exacerbate or even cause broader recessions, they are still likely to increase the number
of firms that are in distress at a given point in time, potentially increasing the number of
bailouts that occur on average across sectors.
Hypothesis 3. Increased financial openness increases the frequency of bailouts ceteris paribus.
Trade flows may also impact the frequency of bailouts by generating public pressure for
new forms of compensatory support given the decline in the use of tariffs. Increases in
trade penetration cause the least productive firms in a given sector to contract and often
exit (Aw, Chung and Roberts, 2000; Melitz, 2003; Olley and Pakes, 1996; Pavcnik, 2002;
Roberts and Tybout, 1996). Sectors characterized by high or increasing levels of import
penetration tend to have traditionally had higher barriers to trade put in place (Gawande
and Krishna, 2003; Rodrik, 1995) in order to delay or avoid this damage. However, successive
rounds of global trade negotiations have led to significant decreases in tariffs rates and the
WTO’s robust dispute settlement mechanism has made reintroducing them politically costly
for member states. Thus though industries that are harmed by inflows of trade may have a
first-order preference for the imposition of tariffs, it has become very difficult for sympathetic
governments to respond by providing this form of targeted policy. However, states have not
abandoned protectionism altogether, and they have instead turned to alternative measures.
For example, states have often opted to provide NTBs (Mansfield and Busch, 1995) and
increased subsidies to industries formerly shielded from international competition by explicit
tariffs as they can act as a substitute to traditional forms of protection (Blais, 1986; Cao,
Prakash and Ward, 2007; UNCTAD, 2013; Zahariadis, 1995, 1997). In so far as bailouts
can be considered narrowly focussed subsidies,17 they can also be used as a targeted policy
employed to protect sectors from foreign competition.
17See the discussion in section 2.2.
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Hypothesis 4. Sectors that are subject to greater degrees of import penetration experience
more bailouts, ceteris paribus.
While financial integration and openness to trade flows are hypothesized as increasing the
probability of bailouts, inflows of foreign direct investment may instead lower it by serving
as a substitute to liquidation. Foreign direct investment comes in two forms: greenfield FDI,
where a foreign firm establishes a new business entity that acts as its subsidiary in a host
country, or brownfield FDI, where a foreign firm acquires or merges with an extant domestic
firm in the country (UNCTAD, 2000). As acquisition can act as substitute to bankruptcy
(Pastena and Ruland, 1986), brownfield FDI can be a means of saving a domestic firm from
liquidation. This substitution effect between failure and foreign acquisition has often been
seen during financial crises where foreign firms acquire large numbers of ailing firms in the
crisis-stricken host country due to the foreign firms’ superior cash position. Sectors that
are subject to greater inflows of FDI may therefore see fewer bailouts as the portion of the
IFDI that is brownfield may be used to save firms from bankruptcy, obviating the need for
government intervention (UNCTAD, 2000; Zhan and Ozawa, 2000).
Hypothesis 5. Sectors that receive more IFDI experience fewer bailouts, ceteris paribus.
Alternative Forms of Protection
Bailouts may also be less necessary when industries receive alternative forms of protection.
If, for example, employees in ailing firms have access to a robust safety net in the case of
job loss, they may be less concerned about the fate of their employer, and therefore may be
less strident in pushing for a bailout. Similarly, firms operating in sectors that receive high
levels of subsidies may never face the threat of bankruptcy as their losses are underwritten
by the state. Bailouts might therefore be be considered a substitute for alternative forms
of protection in so far as the absence of these programs makes the costs associated with
bankruptcy greater, or makes bankruptcy more likely in the first place. In this section I
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consider in turn the impact of these two alternative forms of protection, social protection
and subsidization, on the likelihood of bailouts occurring.
An alternative explanatory factor of the incidence of bailouts is the extent to which in-
dividuals face labor market risks, including unemployment and lost income (Cusack, Iversen
and Rehm, 2006), given the failure of their employer. Varying levels of social protection,
including programs such as state-guaranteed health benefits and old age insurance, can insu-
late employees from these risks (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Iversen and Cusack,
2000), potentially limiting demands for a bailout. As different elements of social protection
mitigate different sources of economic risk (Burgoon, 2001; Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Sos-
kice, 2001), I opt to consider the implications of one relevant form of social protection: the
generosity of unemployment protection.
I hypothesize that countries with more generous payments to unemployed individuals
will be less likely to see bailouts.18 Unemployment protection refers to protection from in-
come reduction caused by unemployment. I opt not to consider other labor market policies
including employment protection, which institutionalizes employment security, and wage
protection, which protects wage levels from market fluctuations (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and
Soskice, 2001). As employment and wage protection mitigate risks associated with fluctua-
tions in the market that might slacken demand for labor, causing businesses to lay off some
employees or to lower wages, it’s unlikely that they have an impact on the livelihood of
workers when their employer fails. Unemployment protection, on the other hand, directly
supports individuals who lose their jobs through income replacement. Thus in its absence,
individuals are more likely to demand measures by the government that keep their employer
18Though these individuals might instead lobby for unemployment protection to be shored up, such a
policy change is likely to face widespread political opposition due to the complexity of such a reform and the
broad costs associated with it, including a higher tax burden and increased labor costs. Further, employees
of ailing firms operating in countries with weak unemployment protection are likely to find it easier to act
collectively in support of the specific benefit of a bailout for their firm, while they might find it more difficult
to agitate for the broader benefit of social protection reform that might only come in to effect after the
liquidation of their employer.
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operating, including bailouts. The absence of the other protections do not have the same
impact.
Hypothesis 6. More generous unemployment protection reduces the likelihood of bailouts
ceteris paribus.
The second alternative form of protection I consider is industrial subsidization; however,
its impact is theoretically ambiguous. As industrial subsidies protect politically sensitive
sectors from financial distress by providing them with a constant flow of financing, they might
lower the probability that recipient firms in the sector require bailouts at all by maintaining
their bottom line regardless of their performance. From this perspective, subsidies may
operate as a substitute for bailouts in so far as their presence lowers the number of firms in
a sector that approach failure and subsequently demand bailouts. Conversely, subsidies may
be complementary to bailouts for two reasons: first, the extant literature on the determinants
of subsidies highlights a number of the factors identified here as being causes of bailouts,
including left-wing governance (Blais, 1986; Cao, Prakash and Ward, 2007) and globalization
(Cao, Prakash and Ward, 2007; Zahariadis, 1995, 1997). Second, as discussed in section 2.2,
bailouts are essentially narrowly targeted subsidies with a specific aim. It is therefore possible
that the political factors hypothesized as causing bailouts instead are causes of industrial
subsidization, of which bailouts are but one form. I therefore present two opposite hypotheses
regarding the impact of subsidies on bailouts:
Hypothesis 7.
• Industrial subsidies increase the likelihood of bailouts, ceteris paribus.
• Industrial subsidies decrease the likelihood of bailouts, ceteris paribus.
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2.4 Research Design
In order to examine the political causes of corporate bailouts, I construct a new dataset
comprised of annual bailout counts at the country-sector level for EEA member states be-
tween the years of 1999 and 2011. By combining this new dataset with a variety of country
and sector level political and economic variables, I am able to estimate a series of negative
binomial models using country-sector-year bailout counts as the dependent variable.
The collection of this data is possible due to strict reporting rules on the distribution
of state aid, a subset of which is analogous to bailout aid, by EEA members. State aid
is considered to be “any transfer of state resource that conveys an economic advantage on
selected firms, and affects trade between [EEA] Member States and distorts competition, or
has the potential to do so” (Office of Fair Trading, 2005: 9). As a result of the passage of EU
Procedural Regulation 659/1999, EU member states “accepted their obligation not to grant
state aid without prior [European Commission] consent and acknowledged the Commission’s
competence to order recovery of illegal aid” (Blauberger, 2009: 721). Responsibility for
the execution of the ruling for non-EU EEA states was given to the European Free Trade
Area Surveillance Authority as part of the EEA Agreement. Under both the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (European Commission, 2012) and the EEA Agreement
(European Commission, 1994), state aid is generally prohibited in order to prevent distortions
to competition and to intra-EEA trade.19 As numerous exceptions20 to the prohibition
exist, however, all EEA member states must report any administered state aid valued above
19Article 107 (1) of the TFEU prohibits any state aid that “distorts or threatens to distort competition
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.” See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E107:EN:NOT. The same prohibition is listed as Article 61
(1) of the EEA Agreement. See http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement.aspx.
20See Articles 107 (2) and (3) of the TFEU and Articles 61 (2) and (3) of the EEA Agreement.
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a minimum threshold21 to the relevant authorities and the authorities’ decisions over the
legality of the aid measures are publicly reported. Both the EU Commission and the EFTA
Surveillance Authority provide online access to registers of all state aid decisions.22
I collect data on three categories of state aid, two of which, rescue aid and restructuring
aid, have been identified as being analogous to bailout aid (Chindooroy, Muller and Notaro,
2007; G lowicka, 2008; Schweiger, 2011). These two forms of aid are given to firms that face
bankruptcy or must restructure in order to remain viable. While the two forms of aid are
conceptually different, they are generally part of the same process; rescue aid is given to
a firm in difficulty23 in order to keep it operating until a restructuring or liquidation plan
can be put in place, while restructuring aid is the long-term assistance used to implement
a restructuring plan that aims at restoring the viability of a firm’s operations (Chindooroy,
Muller and Notaro, 2007; G lowicka, 2008).
I also include in my dataset a third category of state aid: the subset of cases that fall
under the EEA’s temporary rules regarding the financial crisis that have as an explicit
goal the prevention of financial institution failure. Beginning in December of 2008, the
European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority relaxed certain strictures over
the distribution of state aid by way of guarantees and recapitalizations in order to protect
systemically relevant financial institutions and broader national economies from the impact
21The threshold is €100, 000 of aid to any firm over a three-year period (Office of Fair Trading, 2004).
22The EU Commissions reports all decisions in the Official Journal of the European Union and records
them in a database located at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/. The EFTA
Surveillance Authority reports its own state aid decisions in a separate register located at http://www.
eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/.
23According to the European Commission’s Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescue and Restruc-
turing Firms in Difficulty, a firm is considered to be in difficulty “where it is unable, whether through its
own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owner/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses
which, without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly condemn it to going out
of business in the short or medium term” (European Commission, 2004).
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of the Great Recession through four sets of Guidelines.24 These measures are justified using
TFEU Article 107 (3) (b) (EEA Agreement Article 61 (3) (b)) that exempts state aid that
“remedies a serious disturbance in the national economy of a Member State” from the general
prohibition. As this exemption allows for the distribution of state aid to financial institutions
with macroeconomic goals in mind, such as ensuring the availability of credit in the domestic
economy, I only consider cases that fall under the Guidelines that were implemented in order
to protect financial institutions from insolvency.25
2.4.1 Dependent Variable
In order to construct annual counts of bailouts by country-sector, I first examined all decisions
made between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2012 stored in the EU and EFTA state aid
registries and recorded every firm that received aid of any of these three categories between
January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2011.26 The EC State Aid Register can be searched for
decisions made from 2000 onwards that involve particular justifications, including rescuing
and restructuring firms in difficulty and remedying serious disturbances in the economy. For
EC decisions made in 1999, and for all EEA decisions between 1999 and 2012, I instead read
through all recorded decisions and recorded every firm that received a bailout.
As rescue and restructuring aid are often given to the same firm, with an injection of
24The Guidelines cover the application of state aid rules to measures taken to support financial in-
stitutions in the context of the financial crisis; the recapitalization of financial institutions; the limi-
tation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards put in place to avoid distortions of competi-
tion; the treatment of impaired assets in the EEA banking sector; and the return to viability and the
assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector under the state aid rules (EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority, 2012). The Guidelines are stored by the EC Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/state_aid/legislation/temporary.html and the EFTA Surveillance Authority at http:
//www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/.
25As many cases are justified on both grounds – shielding the broader economy from damage and pre-
serving the operations of specific banks – I require that avoiding the bankruptcy of a financial institution is
at least one of the stated goals of the state aid.
26Decisions are often made after state aid has been distributed.
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rescue aid to avoid immediate dissolution and a later injection of restructuring aid once a
viable, long-term plan for the survival of the firm has been drafted, I consider such a process
for a given firm to be a single case of a bailout. Receipt of either form of aid independently
is also considered to be a single bailout case. Individual firms appear multiple times in
the dataset if they experience multiple spells of bailout financing, where a spell is either the
receipt of rescue aid followed by restructuring aid, or the receipt of either form independent of
the other. Further, I record all cases regardless of the ultimate decision made by the relevant
authority over the legality of the state aid. As I am interested in recording all instances of
bailouts, whether or not each case is ultimately considered to be in accordance with state
aid rules and regulations is irrelevant. I also exclude all decisions on schemes rather than
on individual instances of state aid, as decisions over schemes authorize particular member
state programs that establish criteria by which firms can be given subsequent aid and do not
identify actual cases of bailouts. This process yields 383 cases of individual firms receiving
bailouts.
Due to the difficulty in finding firm-level data and the lack of a valid comparison group
of ailing firms within the EEA that do not receive bailouts, I opt to aggregate this count
of bailed out firms up to the sectoral level in order to construct a measure of bailouts by
country-sector-year. This measure is similar to the coverage ratios that are commonly used
in studies of NTBs which are calculated for a given industry by counting the number of such
barriers applied to all traded goods within an industry, and then dividing this value by the
total number of tradable goods (Nogués, Olechowski and Winters, 1986). The EC State Aid
Register reports the sector of operation of firms using the NACE Rev. 2 coding scheme at
the section level (Eurostat, 2008), the highest level of aggregation that is equivalent to the
1-digit level in other industrial classification schemes such as NAICS or ISIC. I code the
sector of bailed out firms found using the EFTA State Aid Register by locating the NACE
section that best matches the description of the firm’s operations in each decision. The
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distributions of bailouts by sector and year are shown in Figure 2.3 and by country, sector,
and year in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The underlying values are reported as Tables B.1, B.2
and B.3 in Appendix B.1.
Bailouts are clustered largely within particular industries, countries, and years. While
manufacturing (NACE Rev. 2 section C), financial and insurance activities (K), and trans-
porting and storage (H) received 150, 135, and 46 bailouts respectively over the 13 years that
the panel spans, most other sectors saw less than 10. Further, while Germany and Poland
saw 60 and 63 bailouts respectively, and Italy, Spain, Iceland, and France 45, 30, 28, and 27,
most other countries saw between 0 and 15 bailouts. Finally, 2008 and 2009 saw 74 and 70
bailouts, while 1999 through 2003 saw at most 15 per year, implying that bailouts are largely
countercyclical. This countercyclical dynamic is largely confined to finance, however, as is
shown by the large spike in bailouts in panel K of Figure 2.3 during the Great Recession.
One assumption employed in this approach is that governments undertaking bailouts do
so with the express aim of assisting particular firms. It is possible, however, that governments
might elect to authorize bailouts in order to curry favor with the recipient groups with the
knowledge that the EU Commission or the EFTA Surveillance Authority will decide that the
bailouts are in contravention with state aid rules and demand that the government recover
the provided assistance. This would allow officials to take credit in the short term for saving
a firm, while allowing them to blame the relevant international authority when they are
eventually forced to abandon the bailout in the future. Fortunately, the state aid decisions
made by both the EU Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority report whether
or not the aid is deemed to be compatible with the relevant regulations, or whether the
aid is illegal and recovery is required. To control for the possibility that governments give
bailouts with the knowledge that they will be blocked by the EU Commission or the EFTA
Surveillance Authority, models are estimated using an alternative version of the dependent
variable that excludes the 62 cases (16%) of state aid in the dataset that are deemed to be
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incompatible with state aid laws as a robustness check.
2.4.2 Independent Variables
In order to test the hypotheses outline in Section 2.3.2, data at the country-year and country-
sector-year level is combined with the dependent variable. Summary statistics for country-
level variables are shown in Table 2.1 and for country-sector-level variables in Table 2.2.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Country
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bailouts 1.19 2.32 0 16 322
Left 0.36 0.48 0 1 288
Right 0.42 0.49 0 1 288
Left (Potrafke) 0.4 0.49 0 1 187
Right (Potrafke) 0.41 0.49 0 1 187
Ideology 2.98 0.9 2 4 187
Financial Integration 12.9 38.59 1.02 243.8 193
Unemployment Growth (%) 0.04 0.24 -0.33 1.51 303
Polcon III 0.47 0.12 0.13 0.72 301
GDP Growth (%) 2.24 3.81 -17.95 12.23 320
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Sector
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bailouts 0.06 0.49 0 16 6118
K/L (ln(Capital to Labor Ratio)) 0.81 0.77 -0.03 4.27 3504
Import Penetration (%) 3.86 14.72 0 98.16 5277
Net IFDI/Sector Output (%) 79.08 687.80 0 14923.03 1786
Subsidies/Sector Output (%) 1.25 5.04 0 51.93 3003
To test the impact of partisanship on bailouts, I use two measures. First, I construct a
measure of the partisan orientation of the party in power using the Database of Political In-
stitutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001). Following common practice,27 I use the the EXECRLC
27See, for example, Dutt and Mitra (2005); Gourevitch, Pinto and Weymouth (2010); Pinto and Pinto
(2008); Pinto (2013a).
75
variable, which measures the partisanship of the executive, for countries with directly-elected
or assembly-elected Presidents, and the GOV1RLC variable, which measures the partisan-
ship of the largest government party, for purely Parliamentary countries to construct two
dummy variables, Left and Right, that are equal to 1 if the relevant part of the government is
of left or right partisan orientation. I also employ Potrafke’s (2009) index of the ideological
orientation of governing cabinets as an alternative measure, Ideology. The variable ranges
from 1 to 5, with increasing values indicating a more left-wing orientation. I also construct
Left (Potrafke) and Right (Potrafke) as dummies for governments with ideology scores of
4 and 5 and 1 and 2, respectively. While numerous other measures of partisanship exist,
both variables have the advantage of measuring changes in partisanship within countries over
time, eliminating the potential problem that what is considered to be a left-wing party in
one national context might not in another. Further, both measures are available for recent
years, with the DPI data ending in 2011, and the Potrafke data in 2009.
In order to examine the interactive effects of partisanship and the labor and capital in-
tensity of particular sectors, I employ a measures from the OECD’s STAN database (OECD,
2013b), K/L. K/L is calculated as follows:
ln
(




Gross Fixed Capital Share is the share of the national economy’s gross fixed capital stock
held by a given sector. Employment Share is the share of the national economy’s total
number of employees held by a given sector. 1 is added after the former is divided by the
latter in order to avoid zero values after taking the natural logarithm.
Two interaction terms are constructed: Left × K/L and Right × K/L. As left-wing
governments are expected to favor labor-intensive sectors, the coefficient on the interaction
term is expected to be negative, as lowering values on K/L imply more labor-intensive sectors.
As right-wing governments are expected to favor capital-intensive sectors, the coefficient on
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the second interaction term is expected to be positive. As robustness checks, I construct
three further interaction terms, Left (P) × K/L, Right (P) × K/L, and Ideology × K/L
which use the Potrafke partisanship measures instead.
To examine the impact of the three facets of globalization that might impact bailouts,
including flows of trade, capital, and FDI, I employ de facto rather than de jure measures.
De jure measures, or explicit barriers such as tariffs, capital controls, and regulatory barriers
to IFDI, may be of little meaning if in their absence the country or sector that they are
designed to protect isn’t actually subject to sizable factor flows.28 To measure the de facto
impact of trade flows at the sectoral level, I use Import Penetration from the OECD’s STAN
database (OECD, 2013b). The variable shows imports as a percentage of total domestic
demand, and is calculated as 100 × IMi
(PRODi−XMi+IMi) , where XM and IM are imports and
exports, PROD is production, and the subscript i indicates the sector.
I use Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s (2007) External Wealth of Nations database to construct
a de facto measure of financial openness. Following the recommendations of Kose et al.
(2009), Financial Integration is constructed as the sum of gross stocks of foreign assets and
liabilities as a ratio of GDP. Unfortunately this dataset only extends to 2007 is only available
at the country-year, and not sectoral, level, so its coverage is limited.
Effective FDI inflows are measured as net flows of FDI for a given sector29 over sec-
toral GDP. The FDI data come from the OECD’s International Direct Investment Statistics
(OECD, 2013a), and the sectoral production data from the OECD’s STAN dataset (OECD,
2013b). Unfortunately the FDI data are measured using the NACE Revision 1 format, mean-
ing that a number of sectors that are not equivalent between NACE Revisions 1 and 2 could
28See Trefler (1993), Kose et al. (2009), and Pinto (2013a) for this discussion as it relates to trade, financial
globalization, and FDI respectively.




In order to test the relationship between social protection and bailouts, I employ two
sets of variables, one that measures the generosity of unemployment benefits, and another
that measures the extent of industrial subsidization. In order to measure the robustness
of the national safety net in the case of job loss, I use Unemployment Compensation from
the OECD’s Social Expenditures Databse (SOCX) (Adema, Fron and Ladaique, 2011). The
variable is constructed as the sum of public and mandatory private social expenditures com-
pensating individuals for unemployment, including early retirement caused by redundancy
or labor market policy, expressed in constant 2000 US dollars per capita. The variable is at
the country-year level.
Subsidies/Sector Y, annual subsidies by country-sectory-year as a percentage of sectoral
production, is used to examine the impact of industrial subsidization. The subsidies values,
which come from the European Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard,31 are only available for
the manufacturing, transportation, and agricultural sectors. The sectoral production values
comes from the OECD’s STAN database (OECD, 2013b).
2.4.3 Control Variables
In addition to the primary and alternative explanatory factors, veto players and underly-
ing economic conditions are considered as potential causes of the underlying frequency of
bailouts.
Veto players, or the individual or collective actors who have to agree in order to change the
legislative status quo (Tsebelis, 2002: 2), are likely to impact the authorization of bailouts,
though the direction of the impact is contested. On the one hand, higher numbers of veto
30These sectors include NACE Revision 2 sections D, E, J, and M through S.
31See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/expenditure.html.
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players, and greater ideological differences between them, prevent policy change and ensure
policy stability, potentially making bailouts less likely (Keefer, 2002, 2007). As a bailout
is a relatively rare event that the government generally must authorize through legislative
activity,32 institutional features that make political action more difficult could make bailouts
less likely to occur.33 On the other hand, veto players can act as access points in the
policymaking process (Ehrlich, 2007; Henisz and Mansfield, 2006), and so as they increase
in number, groups that benefit from a particular bailout may become more relevant to the
bailout decision.
Henisz’s (2000) Polcon III is employed to measure veto players. The variable is con-
structed first by counting the number of independent branches of government with veto
power in a given country and then by adjusting this value to take in to account partisan
misalignment both across and within these branches. Final values range from 0 to 1. Higher
values represent more and more heterogenous veto points; as previously discussed, however,
the direction of the coefficient on this variable is theoretically indeterminate.
Furthermore, the concentration of bailouts during the Great Recession implies that they
may be a countercyclical policy. When the economy is contracting, resources employed in a
failing firm might have a more difficult time finding new uses given bankruptcy than they
would during good times. Further, during extremely sharp downturns, lack of access to credit
can make the bankruptcy process particularly painful.34 Prevailing economic conditions
32Certain exceptions include instances where bailouts are authorized by other parts of the government,
such as a central bank.
33Rosas (2006, 2009) argues that democratic institutions also limit the likelihood and generosity of
bailouts. As the sample of countries analyzed here is largely comprised of stable democracies, the time
invariant nature of this variable renders it incompatible with a within-country statistical approach.
34As Rattner (2010) describes in his recounting of the decision by the Obama administration to provide
GM and Chrysler with bailouts, the frozen credit market at the time made access to the debtor-in-possession
financing that is generally used to keep firms in operation during bankruptcy proceedings extremely difficult.
In the absence of government resources to compensate for the lack of debtor-in-possession financing, the
firms would likely have ceased operations and been forced to liquidate rather than restructure, creating a
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are therefore likely to drive bailout decisions. To measure underlying national economic
conditions, GDP Growth, the annual percentage growth in GDP, from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) is also used.
2.5 Data Analysis
2.5.1 Estimation Strategy
The structure of the data, annual counts of bailouts by country-sector, poses a number
of statistical challenges. First, as ordinary least squares produces inefficient, inconsistent,
and biased estimates when it is used to model count data (Long, 1997), an alternative
must be used here. Second, as the data are time-series in nature, observations are likely
to be dependent within county-sectors, violating the assumption of likelihood-based models
that observations are independent (Hilbe, 2011). Third, and relatedly, the clustering of
years within sectors within countries further exacerbates problems caused by the lack of
independence across observations.
In order to address these issues, I estimate two sets of models: a core set of negative
binomial models, followed by a set of multilevel Poisson models as a robustness check. The
first set are estimated as unconditional negative binomial models with two-way fixed effects
by country-industry and year. Negative binomial models expressly allow for count data
while relaxing the limiting assumption of equidispersion employed by Poisson count data
estimators by parameterizing overdispersion (Hilbe, 2011).35 While the conditional negative
binomial fixed effects model proposed by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) approximates a
within-unit estimator for time-series count data, Allison and Waterman (2002) show that this
particularly costly outcome.
35Overdispersion means that the conditional variance of a dataset exceeds the conditional mean.
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approach does not fully account for unit heterogeneity, and so they suggest the unconditional
negative binomial fixed effects model as an alternative. This model, which is estimated as a
standard negative binomial model that includes unit dummies, produces results that can be
interpreted in the same vein as OLS fixed-effects panel models where the coefficients represent
the effects of covariates within units over time. In order to control for contemporaneous
shocks across units, I include year fixed-effects in addition to the country-industry (unit)
fixed-effects that are essential to the model. In order to partially address the clustered
nature of the data, I estimate robust standard errors clustered by country.
As the negative binomial approach only allows for clustering at one level, it fails to
fully account for the multilevel structure of the data, potentially leading to a downward
bias in estimated standard errors (Primo, Jacobsmeier and Milyo, 2007). Further, cluster-
robust standard errors tend to be biased downwards, especially given few clusters (Cameron,
Gelbach and Miller, 2008) and multilevel interaction terms (Leoni, 2009). Therefore as a
specification check I also estimate a set of multilevel Poisson models with random intercepts
that vary by country and industry. While these results, reported in Appendix B.2.2, better
address the clustering of the data, the imposition of the equidispersion assumption implied
by Poisson models means that they don’t address overdispersion in the data as well.
The coefficients in negative binomial models can easily be transformed in to a format
that allows for the interpretation of substantive effects. The incidence rate ratio (IRR), for
example, can be calculated for coefficient β associated with variable X as exp(β × δ). The
result indicates the factor change in the dependent variable given a unit shift of value δ on
X. IRR values above one therefore indicate an increase in the number of bailouts associated
with a shift in in the dependent variable, while values less than one indicate a decrease.
Statistical significance of an IRR requires that it be distinguishable from one rather than
zero. Further, the percentage change in the dependent variable associated with the unit shift
δ can be subsequently calculated as 100 × (IRR − 1).
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2.5.2 Unconditional Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Models
The results of the unconditional fixed effects models are shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. While
Table 2.3 examines the interactive impact of partisanship on bailouts by sector, Table 2.4
examines the impact of globalization and social protection. I opt to estimate these models
separately for two reasons: first, the inconsistency in coverage across countries, sectors,
and years of the various independent variables implies that the estimating sample will not
be the same between models that use different sets of covariates. Second, as the alternative
explanations of bailouts seem not to be borne out in the data when considered independently,
there is little virtue in considering them in tandem with the the somewhat stronger predictors
of bailouts associated with the partisanship explanation.
Table 2.3 reports the results of a series of unconditional negative binomial fixed effects
models that examine the interactive effect of partisanship and sector-specific characteristics
on bailout counts while controlling for political constraints and economic growth. Models
1 and 2 estimate the impact of left-wing governance and capital intensity on bailouts. The
theoretical prediction here is that the coefficient on Left × K/L should be negative, as
left governments want to provide more labor-intensive (less capital-intensive) sectors with
more bailouts. Model 1 includes Left and K/L independently. As we see, neither left-
wing governance nor the capital intensity of a given sector has an impact on bailout counts
independently. Moving to Model 2, we see that the interaction between these two variables
is negative as expected, though statistically insignificant, providing some very weak evidence
that left-wing governments provide more bailouts to sectors that are more labor-intensive.
Notably, however, the lower AIC value in model 2 (805.8) versus model 1 (847.3) implies
that model 2 better fits the data.
Models 3 and 4 examine the impact of right-wing governance and capital intensity. Again,
right-wing governments do not appear to exert an independent impact on bailout counts,
and neither does K/L. In Model 4, however, we see that the interaction term Right × K/L is
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Table 2.3: Partisan Preferences Models
1 2 3 4
Left 0.28 0.84∗
(0.33) (0.34)




Right x K/L 1.41∗
(0.65)
K/L -1.16 -0.62 -1.07 -1.86
(1.55) (1.57) (1.49) (1.33)
Polcon III 1.67 1.57 0.78 0.88
(1.93) (1.91) (1.66) (1.51)
GDP Growth -0.20∗ -0.19∗ -0.23∗ -0.21∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Constant -19.23∗ -19.81∗ -18.88∗ -18.88∗
(1.82) (1.74) (1.69) (1.61)
ln(α) -0.76∗ -0.81∗ -0.74∗ -0.84∗
(0.32) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35)
Observations 3373 3373 3373 3373
Countries 22 22 22 22
Prob > χ2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AIC 847.3 805.8 836.5 796.5
Country-Sector F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unconditional fixed effects negative binomial models. Dependent
variable is the annual count of bailouts by country-sector.
Sector is defined by NACE Revision 2 codes. Robust standard
errors, clustered by country, reported in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests: p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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statistically significant and positive. Again, the lower AIC in model 4 versus model 3 (796.5
versus 836.5) implies that the model that includes the interaction term fits the data better.
This supports the hypothesis that right-wing governments seek to protect sectors that are
more capital intense.
In terms of controls, GDP Growth has a negative and statistically significant coefficient
across specifications, implying that bailouts are a countercyclical policy. Polcon III has a
positive coefficient across specifications, though it is statistically insignificant. This appears
to contradict the findings of Keefer (2002, 2007) that veto players limit the capacity of special
interests to obtain the bailouts they seek, instead supporting the alternative perspective
(Ehrlich, 2007; Henisz and Mansfield, 2006) that veto players provide special interest groups
access to the decision making process.
Substantive Effects
Following Hilbe (2011: Appendix A), I calculate the incidence rate ratio of the interaction
terms Left × K/L ad Right × K/L, holding Left and Right at 1 while moving K/L from
the first percentile in its distribution in the sample (0.1) to its mean (0.8), and then to
its maximum (4.2). These values are estimated using the results from models 2 and 4
respectively.
For left-wing governments, the coefficient on the interaction term moves from 2.13 (1.52,
2.73) to 1.16 (0.43, 1.89) to 0.06 (-4.50, 4.62). As the IRR implies a factor change in the
dependent variable, estimated coefficients that include 1 in their 95% confidence intervals
mean that the effect is statistically insignificant. We see here that the presence of left-wing
governance leads to a statistically significant increase the number of bailouts given to those
sectors at the lowest values of capital intensity. As capital intensity increases, the coefficient
on the interaction term decreases, though it becomes statistically insignificant. For the
least capital-intensive sectors in the sample, left-wing governments provide 2.13 times more
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bailouts than do governments of other partisan orientations.
For right-wing governments, the coefficient on the interaction term moves from 0.46 (-
0.08, 0.99) to 1.23 (0.48, 1.98) to 148.27 (143.30, 153.24) as we move from the first percentile
to the mean and then to the maximum of K/L. Right-wing governments provide an increas-
ingly greater number of bailouts than do non-right-wing governments as the capital intensity
of the sector increases. For the most capital-intensive sectors in the sample, right-wing gov-






















Note: values above or below 1 (horizontal bar) indicate a significant effect.





















Note: values above or below 1 (horizontal bar) indicate a significant effect.
(b) Right × K/L
Figure 2.4: Plot of the IRRs of the Interaction Terms by K/L
The IRR for the two interaction terms are further calculated for all positive values of
K/L.36 The results are plotted for left-wing governments in the left panel and for right-wing
governments in the right panel of Figure 2.4. As the left-hand panel shows, the IRR of the
Left × K/L interaction term is statistically significant from the lowest values of K/L up
until K/L is equal to 0.4. This represents 34.67% of the country-sector-years in the dataset.
Notably, the interaction term’s IRR is decreasing in K/L, supporting the hypothesis that
left governments are more concerned with labor-intensive sectors, and less concerned with
36There is one country-sector-year with a negative value of K/L.
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capital-intensive ones. For sectors with a value of 0.4 on K/L, the point at which the IRR
of the interaction terms becomes statistically significant, left-wing governments are found to
provide 1.64 (1.13, 2.16) times as may bailouts as non-left-wing governments.
As the right-hand panel shows, the IRR of the Right × K/L interaction term is increasing
in K/L and is statistically significant for values higher than 1.3, representing 15.78% of all
country-sector-years. For sectors with a K/L value of 1.3, the point at which the interaction
term becomes statistically significant, right-wing governments provide 2.49 (1.17, 3.81) times
as many bailouts as do non-right-wing governments. This further supports the hypothesis
that right-wing governments are particularly willing to provide bailouts to capital-intensive
sectors.
Alternative Explanations
Next I examine the impact of the globalization and social protection variables independently
and then assess their impact on right-wing governance. The results are shown in table 2.4.
Models 1 through 3 employ the three globalization measures independently due to their
varying degrees of missingness. As we see in Model 1, Import Penetration has a statistically
significant and negative impact on bailouts, implying that sectors that are subject to greater
foreign competition via trade in fact receive fewer bailouts. This result appears to contradict
the hypothesis that the dislocating effect of trade competition drives bailouts. Similarly, the
impact of FDI inflows at the sectoral level appears to be positive and statistically significant,
though substantively small. This again contradicts the hypothesis that FDI can act as a
substitute to a bailout. Further, model 3 finds that effective financial integration has no
significant impact on bailout counts.
Models 4 and 5 employ the two measure of social protection, Unemployment Compensa-
tion and Subsidies/Sector Y. As neither variable appears to have any impact on the provision
of bailouts, the theorized links between alternative forms of protection and bailouts do not
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Table 2.4: Globalization and Social Protection Models
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IM Penetration -0.17∗ -0.16
(0.08) (0.11)














Polcon III 1.80 1.14 -1.56 0.93 0.81 1.95 -0.01
(1.30) (1.12) (1.62) (1.41) (1.32) (1.79) (1.51)
GDP Growth -0.26∗ -0.31∗ -0.54∗ -0.38∗ -0.26∗ -0.33∗ -0.16+
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09)
Constant -20.79∗ -18.51∗ -16.53∗ -19.76∗ -21.01∗ -17.59∗ -15.11∗
(1.16) (1.23) (2.83) (1.49) (1.24) (1.63) (2.85)
ln(α) -0.27 -0.53 -12.89 -0.14 -0.47 -1.19 -1.12∗
(0.35) (0.38) (15.64) (0.31) (0.39) (1.37) (0.43)
Observations 4962 1786 3591 4047 3003 2993 1479
Countries 28 23 26 21 21 22 22
Prob > χ2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AIC 923.4 837.8 641.4 996.7 849.3 608.8 662.0
Country-Sector F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unconditional fixed effects negative binomial models. Dependent variable is the
annual count of bailouts by country-sector. Robust standard errors, clustered by
country, are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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seem to hold water when faced with the data.
Models 5 and 6 reexamine the previous finding of an interaction between right-wing gov-
ernance and capital intensity while controlling for the two measure of globalization that were
found to have some impact, IM Penetration and Net IFDI/Sector Y. The interaction term
remains statistically significant and positive even while controlling for import penetration,
but not while controlling for IFDI. As the number of observations shrinks significantly when
Net IFDI/Sector Y is included in the model specification, it’s unclear whether the erosion
of the significance of Right × K/L is the result of a smaller sample or a loss of predictive
power.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
The strength of these findings is corroborated by three means: first, Tables B.5 and Ta-
bles B.6 in Appendix B.2.2 re-estimate the models reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 as multi-
level Poisson models with random intercepts varying at the country and sector level. While
these models better account for the clustered nature of the data, they may not adequately
address overdispersion in the data. Regardless, the results again mirror the original ones,
with left-wing governments providing fewer bailouts to capital-intensive sectors and with
right-wing governments providing more.
Second, Table B.7 in Appendix B.2.3 reports results from unconditional fixed effects
negative binomial models that exclude state aid cases that were deemed to be inconsistent
with EEA rules by the relevant legal authority. Interestingly, the coefficient on Left × K/L
remains negative, but now becomes statistically significant. The results remain unchanged
for right-wing governments. The implication is that the results hold even if we exclude
bailouts that were potentially employed for short-term political gains.
Third, table B.4 in Appendix B.2.1 shows models identical to those estimated above in
table 2.3 but with Potrafke’s (2009) measures of partisanship. Dummy indicators for govern-
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ments at the extreme left and right ends of Potrafke’s ideology spectrum have no statistically
significant effect on bailouts, and the coefficient on the right-wing governance interaction is
now negative. However, when the interaction between the continuous Ideology measure and
K/L is employed, it again has a negative, though insignificant coefficient, implying that
as governments move to the left, they provide fewer bailouts to capital-intensive sectors.
Though the results in this exercise are certainly weaker than the primary results, they aren’t
completely inconsistent. Further, the notably smaller number of countries included in these
specifications (17 versus 22) might partially explain this discrepancy.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that corporate bailouts may be driven by partisan preferences,
economic dislocation caused by global integration, and by limited social social protection.
By using a novel data set of annual counts of bailouts at the sectoral level across the EEA,
I have only found a role for partisanship. Right-wing governments are clearly more willing
to authorize bailouts for capital-intensive sectors. Left-wing governments are also shown
to favor labor-intensive sectors, though these findings are not as robust. Regardless, the
impact of partisanship is robust to different econometric specifications, alternative measures
of partisanship, and the inclusion of measures of global integration and social protection.
Given the widespread controversy of bailouts, both within the US and abroad, they
are a topic of much debate in the media and in the popular press.37 As financial crises
continue to elicit banking rescues in the Eurozone, public interest in bailouts in unlikely to
wane. The findings of this study add a valuable contribution to the public discourse on the
causes of bailouts by moving beyond analyses of single bailouts by systematically considering
their causes across sectors and, by considering the many cases where bailouts do not occur,
37See, for example, Barofsky (2012); Rattner (2010); Reich and Donahue (1985).
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avoiding methodological issues associated with selection on the dependent variable. Further,
understanding the causes of bailouts speaks to a broader puzzle of the apparently inexorable
growth of the role of the government in the economy (Lindert, 2004; Tanzi, 2011).
The findings also show that by focusing largely on the case of finance, the extant literature
that explores the determinants and generosity of bailouts completely overlooks the political
dynamics that occur in other sectors. While governments across the EEA appear to have
universally opted to assist their financial sectors during the Great Recession, we see that
over the longer term, governments of different partisan stripes have exhibited a much greater
degree of variation over their willingness to assist other sectors in the economy. Thus while
Keefer (2002, 2007) and Rosas (2006, 2009) claim that institutional features such as elections
and veto players impact bailout decisions in the financial sector, their failure to consider the
many bailouts that occur across the economy limits their perspective on the matter, and
only tells one part of the bailout story.
Furthermore, by identifying a role for left-wing governance in explaining the sectoral
allocation of bailouts, the chapter broadens our understanding of the politics of targeted
protection. While a vast body of research has explored why particular firms and industries
are protected by tariffs, it has also shown that as these traditional barriers are removed,
new ones are often erected in their place. The implication is that fully understanding the
politics of protection requires exploring all of the mechanisms governments have to protect
favored economic sectors. As bailouts are a targeted form of protection governments give to
favored firms to prevent them from going bankrupt, they can serve this purpose well. Thus
by examining whether a set of factors traditionally used to explain extant patterns of protec-
tion, including partisanship, factor flows, and alternative, substitutable forms of protection,
also explain the distribution of bailouts, the chapter serves to expand our understanding of
protection by incorporating a relatively understudied form.
One lingering question that the results pose is as to why some similar sectors receive vastly
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different numbers of bailouts. Manufacturing firms, for example, are consistently provided
with lifelines, while those operating in the similarly employee-intense wholesale and retail
trade sector are not. This disjuncture became very apparent, for example, when Germany
decided to bail out Opel, an automaker, but not Arcandor, a retailing and travel group, in
2009. Despite Arcandor’s aggressive lobbying of the German government to provide it with
state aid and the fact that the Social Democratic Party spoke in favor of protecting the
company and its 43, 000 employees, Chancellor Merkel refused to provide assistance and the
firm entered liquidation.38 One potential response is developed below in chapter 3: perhaps
some firms are more popular targets than others. As the survey evidence there shows, for
example, the German public was much more sympathetic to the plight of Opel than they
were to Arcandor at the time.
38See Betts (2009) and Bryant and Wiesmann (2009a).
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Chapter 3
Predicting Public Support for
Corporate Bailouts
3.1 Introduction
To what extent does the public support bailouts, and why? That bailouts are vastly unpop-
ular is an opinion commonly held by the media as witnessed by news reports that associate
bailout plans with high degrees of public skepticism, distrust, and resentment. The New York
Times, for example, reports that the Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2008 faced widespread
public resistance due to its common labeling as a bailout (Baker, 2008). Similarly, the Wall
Street Journal describes the public as holding “simmering resentment” towards the finan-
cial bailouts (Hitt, Stoll and Kelogg, 2008). Further, in describing the development of the
Obama administration’s bailout of GM and Chrysler, the Times notes that the adminis-
tration had to been mindful of “the public’s growing outrage” over bailouts (Stolberg and
Vlasic, 2009). Abroad, Reuters reports that tax-payer funded bailouts across the EU “have
prompted public outrage” (O’Donnell and Emmott, 2013). Policymakers often share the
perception of widespread public loathing. For example, Rattner (2010: 68) reports that
David Axelrod held that the public hated bailouts during the debate on how the Obama
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administration should handle the impending bankruptcies of General Motors and Chysler in
early 2009. The existing research on the political determinants of the likelihood and generos-
ity of bailouts is of the same opinion. It employs a common assumption that the majority
of taxpayers are opposed to bailouts as they resent funding a transfer payment to a narrow
group of firm and industry specific beneficiaries.1
Despite these claims, no prior effort has been made to systematically analyze whether
the public supports or opposes bailouts, and why. The fact that support for bailouts ap-
pears considerably different across national contexts seems to undermine the assumption of
universal unpopularity. While some extreme cases of total opposition to bailouts exist, they
must be balanced against other instances of outright public support: on the one hand 90% of
Japanese respondents reportedly opposed a bailout of housing-loan companies in 1996 (The
Wall Street Journal Europe, 10 June, 1996); on the other hand, the Swiss canton of Zurich
opted to publicly assist Crossair in its bailout of Swissair in 2002 by the passage of a popular
referendum (Olson, 2002).
Understanding whether and why the public supports bailouts is vital if we are to under-
stand the costs and benefits policymakers face when deciding whether or not to authorize
them. Such an understanding can further help in the development of reasonable assump-
tions about their electoral appeal, a critical step in formulating a fully specified model of
the political economy of corporate bailouts (Rodrik, 1995). As the policy responsiveness
literature argues, elected officials have strong incentives to abide by public opinion lest they
be punished at the ballot box (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Stimson, MacKuen
and Erikson, 1995; Wlezien, 1995), a logic that has been shown to hold across a variety of
1See, for example, Keefer (2002, 2007) and Rosas (2006, 2009) on cross-national determinants of financial
bailouts and Dorsch (2013); Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010); Nunnari (2011) on Congressional roll call voting
on bailout bills.
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national contexts2 and issue areas.3 When an election is pending, do incumbents therefore
seek to avoid authorizing bailouts, as some have argued,4 because the resulting notoriety
is likely to drag them down in the polls? Or is public resentment less severe than popular
accounts would have us believe? Or is the picture more nuanced, with different electoral
constituencies viewing bailouts differently, and with some firms or industries more popular
targets than others?
The chapter therefore first seeks to theorize about who in the public might be more sup-
portive of bailouts, the characteristics of bailouts themselves that might give them a greater
electoral appeal, and how the former and the latter interact. I outline four explanations of
support for bailouts that are derived from the literature. The first explanation, centered
around culpability, claims that voters may be less sympathetic towards bailouts that save
firms that are responsible for their own distress. The second explanation highlights economic
self-interest: voters who expect to pay the most for bailouts, or to suffer the fewest financial
consequences in the case of bankruptcy, will be the least supportive. The third claims that
sociotropic preferences may motivate voters to prefer bailouts they see as avoiding harm to
the broader national economy. The fourth, and final explanation explores the roll of par-
tisanship and ideology, arguing that left-of-center voters are likely to be more sympathetic
towards any bailout, and they will be most sympathetic towards bailouts that prevent the
widespread loss of jobs.
The chapter next seeks to discredit the overriding assumption that bailouts are always
unpopular. By combining and exploring a host of surveys that ask about support for a
2For example, the impact of public opinion on policy has been shown to hold in Canada (Petry, 1999),
Germany Brooks (1990), Britain (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005; Soroka and Wlezien, 2005), and Denmark
(Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005).
3See, for example, Brooks and Manza (2007) on welfare spending and Lax and Phillips (2009) on pro-gay
policies.
4See Brown and Dinç (2005).
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variety of bailouts in the United States and Germany, the chapter next makes a valuable
first step in understanding the extent to which voters support bailouts. While it is true that,
on average, a plurality oppose bailouts, the difference in opinion is not always vast: averaged
across 16 surveys of the American public, for example, 44.3% of respondents opposed the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008 while 44.2% supported it. Similarly,
the difference in the average levels of opposition and support for Congressional efforts at
assisting Detroit in 2008 stands at roughly 8%, certainly not a stinging rebuke to the failed
bill. Though support is lower for assisting Opel and Arcandor, two German firms, it averages
31% across two polls and five questions and ranges from 21% to 37%, implying that opposition
is not absolute.
Next, in order to describe who favors bailouts, the previously developed explanations are
used to model individual support using the same US and German surveys. As wealthier
respondents, who are presumably more exposed to the costs of financial bailouts, share-
holders, and residents of areas with a high level of activity by the financial industry are
more supportive of TARP, material self-interest appears to drive support for this bailout.
Further, self-identified Democrats and liberals profess lower opposition to the majority of
the American bailouts, giving credence to the partisanship and ideology explanations. The
evidence for the impact of this explanation is less compelling in the German case, however:
ideologically liberal respondents are only slightly more supportive of the bailouts, and the
impact of partisanship is mixed.5 Finally, voters who blame the banks and automakers for
their own plight are unsupportive of their bailouts, as are voters who believe that bailouts are
ineffective and only help the target firms. Though this appears to support the sociotropic
and culpability explanations, given the observational nature of the data reverse causality
might be strongly at play here: those who support a particular bailout, for example, are less
likely to hold the recipient firm responsible for its financial situation.
5Data limitations only allow for an examination of the role of this set of explanations in Germany.
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This evidence, however, does not allow us to say whether the specific features of bailouts
are the primary drivers of public support, or whether voters’ general dispositions towards
bailouts are the key factor. In order to identify the causal effect of the four explanations, and
to determine whether the characteristics of bailout-seeking firms are more important than
voters’ extant predispositions, the chapter finally describes two new survey experiments, one
performed upon a nationally representative sample of 2,000 Americans collected by YouGov,
and another upon a sample of convenience of 497 American Mechanical Turk users. The first
experiment presents respondents with a vignette describing an ailing airplane manufacturer
that is seeking assistance. The plight of the firm for its own distress, the geographic scope
of its failure, its size, and its primary impact in terms of stock or labor market damage are
varied. The second experiment instead presents respondents with either an automaker or a
bank of varying size that seeks a bailout.
The experiments indicate that individuals’ dispositions towards bailouts are the more
relevant factor. In the airplane manufacturer experiment, only the sociotropic explanation
finds support: respondents are more sympathetic to assisting the firm when the impact of
its bankruptcy is national, rather than regional, in scope. The culpability of the firm for its
own distress has no impact on support, and neither does varying the impact of the firm’s
failure between damage to the stock and job markets. Surprisingly, the size of the firm has
no impact on public support either: respondents are unmoved when the firms is described
has having 125,000, rather than 50,000, employees. Furthermore, none of treatment effects
associated with the different experimental conditions vary with respondent’s partisanship or
income. In the auto maker or bank experiment, respondents are much more likely to favor
assisting the automaker, though this result is likely driven by the contemporaneous success
of the US auto bailout. Again, respondents are no more supportive of assisting the larger
firms in terms of employees in this experiment and there are no heterogenous treatment
effects by partisanship.
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3.2 What Explains Variation in Support for Bailouts?
Are there systematic patterns in the kinds of voters who support bailouts? Do particular
kinds of firms make more appealing targets than others? And how do the characteristics of
voters and distressed firms interact in determining public support for corporate lifelines? This
section develops four sets of explanations of bailout support that are centered around how
economic self-interest, partisanship and ideology, sociotropic preferences, and the culpability
of distressed firms determine which kinds of voters support which kinds of bailouts. The
explanations are largely derived from existing literature that studies the sources of public
opinion on economic policy.
3.2.1 Economic Self-Interest
Support for bailouts might vary with the degree to which they impact individuals’ economic
well-being. That preferences over economic policies are a function of how they affect individ-
uals’ income, and that this relationship is determined by individuals’ position in the economy,
is an assertion commonly employed in the political economy literature.6 For the case at hand,
the net impact of bailouts on an individual’s economic well-being is the difference between
their costs and benefits. The costs of bailouts the average individual experiences is largely
defined in terms of their liability as taxpayers. As bailouts insulate individuals from the
costs associated with the bankruptcy of the target firm, the benefits individuals receive are
the inverse of the costs they would experience in the case of bankruptcy. These costs and
benefits vary both with the nature of the bailout and with individual characteristics.
One channel through which the benefits of bailouts accrue is the labor market. Individuals
directly employed in the ailing firm are likely to prefer for it to be saved in order to maintain
6See, for example, Mayda and Rodrik (2005), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and Scheve and Slaughter
(2001), on preferences over trade policy and Pandya (2010) and Scheve and Slaughter (2004) on preferences
over foreign direct investment.
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their position. As the failure of a given firm can impact the livelihood of other linked firms
through a number of contagion channels,7 individuals working in the same industry as the
distressed firm may also prefer for it to be saved in order to ensure the viability of their
own employer and the security of their own job. Finally, individuals residing in areas that
contain high amounts of activity by the industry of the affected firm may be more likely to
support assisting it out of concern for the value of their own assets8 or, given limited labor
mobility, out of concern over wages or employment.
The destruction of wealth held as stocks or other financial instruments, either directly
tied to the failure of a distressed firm or indirectly tied through the economy-wide impact of
the failure of large firms,9 is also a cost that is unevenly borne by individuals in the face of a
firm’s bankruptcy. Thus voters with significant stock holdings are likely to benefit more from
bailouts than individuals with smaller or nonexistent holdings.10 Further, in so far as voters
with higher incomes tend to have more savings and investments that could be wiped out
in the case of bankruptcy and financial contagion, they stand to gain more from a bailout,
particularly in the financial sector, than do voters with lower incomes.11
7The bankruptcy of one firm can harm others through counterparty contagion, whereby the failure of
a given firm impacts other firms that are its counterparties either because they are owed payments by the
failed firm or because they depend upon future business, now cancelled, with the failed firm, and through
informational contagion, whereby a firm’s failure causes market actors to update their beliefs regarding the
health and financial viability of other, similar firms, making it more costly for these other firms to secure
financing and to conduct transactions (Levitin, 2011).
8Scheve and Slaughter (2001), for example, find that individuals are more opposed to free trade when
they own homes in counties subject to high degrees of import competition.
9See Graham, Litan and Sukhtankar (2002) for a discussion of the impact of the bankruptcy of extremely
large businesses.
10Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014), for example, find that individuals with stock holdings profess
greater support for international bailouts, though this effect only holds for respondents with moderate levels
of income.
11Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010), for example, hypothesize that individuals with the highest incomes are
the most likely to have significant stock holdings are so are the most likely to be exposed to the costs of
economic crises. They find that the larger the fraction of residents in a US Congressional district earning
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3.2.2 Partisanship and Ideology
Individual self-placement along the left-right ideological spectrum as well as partisan self-
identification are likely to impact preferences for bailouts. Ideology has been shown to have
an impact on individual’s preferences over a number of other economic policies: left-wing
respondents tend to be more supportive of higher barriers to trade (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005;
O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001) and of higher levels of redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004;
Funk, 2000; Jacoby, 1994; Jaeger, 2008). Further, elite ideology has been shown by prior
studies to have an impact on Congressional voting patterns on bailouts in this manner: liberal
representatives are more likely to vote in support of international (Broz, 2005) and domestic
bailouts (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010; Nunnari, 2011) than conservative ones. For the case at
hand, individuals who self-identify as being on the left of the ideological spectrum are likely
to be supportive of bailouts as they are like to support a stronger role for the government
in the economy. As bailouts represent a direct intervention in the market aimed at avoiding
short-term economic dislocation, they are line line with these preferences. Those who are on
the right and are ideologically opposed to government interference in free market operations
are instead likely to be opposed.
Partisanship may also drive support for bailouts for two reasons: first, when facing
complex policy areas, voters, particularly those with limited interest in or information about
politics, often rely on the partisanship of those who espouse particular positions in the debate
as an information shortcut to form their own opinion (Druckman, 2001; Lupia, 1994; Zaller,
1992). Thus in situations where policymakers of a clear partisan orientation have taken
stances for or against particular bailouts, co-partisan voters may simply opt to adopt these
positions themselves. The extent to which an individual’s opinion can be swayed by the
position taken by co-partisan elites is not unlimited, however. Voters are likely to be more
more than $200,000 annually, the more likely is the district’s representative to have voted in support of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008.
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receptive to party cues when these cues align with voters’ pre-existing opinion or beliefs
(Chong and Druckman, 2007; Slothuus, 2010). Thus if right-wing politicians stake out a
position opposed to a bailout, their co-partisan constituents may be inclined to adopt a
similar position on the issue themselves.
Second, the association of the interests of social classes with particular political parties
implies a split in differences of opinion over bailouts by partisan self-identification. A common
assumption in political economy is that the core constituency of left-wing parties is labor,
and that of right-wing parties is capital (Cameron, 1984; Dutt and Mitra, 2005; Garrett,
1998; Hibbs, 1977; Milner and Judkins, 2004; Pinto, 2013a). Indeed, studies frequently find
in the United States that those with higher incomes are, on average, more likely to be
Republican voters (Bartels, 2009; Brooks and Brady, 1999; Gelman, 2009; Stonecash, 2000).
Furthermore, Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) argue that partisan identification, both
in the US and abroad, is a genuine and stable form of social identification. Partisans, from
this perspective, tend to “absorb the doctrinal position that the group advocates” (Green,
Palmquist and Schickler, 2002: 4). Thus left-wing partisans may be more supportive of
bailouts that are in the interest of labor, for instance those that save many jobs, both
because they are more likely to be members of the working class and because they have
internalized the pro-labor position of their affiliated party. Similarly, right-wing partisans
may be more supportive of pro-business bailouts, for instance those that prevent damage to
capital markets, both because of their own class and because they espouse the pro-business
perspective of their political group.
3.2.3 Sociotropic Preferences
Individuals’ self-interest may be subsumed with a concern for collective, national-level out-
comes (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). Prior research has shown that individuals are more likely
to hold an opinion that is a function of their evaluation of its impact on society rather than
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how they believe it will impact their own material self-interest (Citrin and Green, 1990; Sears
and Funk, 1991). This is not to say that material self-interest is irrelevant to the formation
of political opinions, but instead that self-interest is subsumed by sociotropic concerns in
particular circumstances. Specifically, self-interest tends to play a stronger role on opinions
over policy when the policy has a clear benefit or cost, when individuals have an immediate
stake in the issue, and when individuals have been primed to consider the impact of the issue
on their own material well-being (Chong, Citrin and Conley, 2001).
Sociotropic preferences have been shown to be relevant in opinion formation over other
aspects of economic policy. Mansfield and Mutz (2009), for example, show that the extent to
which individuals believe that trade has a negative impact on the economy in the aggregate
has a greater impact on their desire to maintain tariffs than does their relative, individual-
level exposure to the costs of globalization.12 Further, Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit
(2014) show that support amongst Germans for the Greek bailout is higher for hypothetical
bailout packages that are less costly for Germany as a whole.
Thus rather than considering how bailouts limit the impact of potential bankruptcies
on their own wellbeing, individuals may instead be concerned with how bailouts impact
the nation as a whole. From this perspective, respondents who believe that bailouts have
a positive impact on the national economy are more likely to support them, and bailouts
themselves that are framed as such are likely to be more popular than those that are narrower
in scope. Furthermore, the extent to which individuals perceive bailouts to be efficacious
may drive support. If respondents are concerned about getting the most national bang for
the taxpayer’s buck, they will be more likely to support the use of government funds to assist
ailing firms if they think doing so will actually save the firms in need and prevent greater
12On the other hand, Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto (2013) build upon the idea that the relevant importance
of sociotropic concerns as opposed to material self-interest is a function of the extent to which the relevant
policy directly impacts respondents in a clear and coherent manner. They show that Argentines directly
impacted by imports are less supportive of trade and less sensitive to question framing that highlights its
national consequences.
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damage to the economy. Given the prior discussion of the factors that cause respondents
to place more weight on social as oppose to personal material concerns, concerns over the
impact of a bailout on the economy as a whole are likely to be the strongest for respondents
who are more distant from the bailout in question.
3.2.4 Culpability
The final explanation for varying support for bailouts comes from the degree to which individ-
uals think target firms are responsible for their own poor financial standing. As individuals
have been shown to be much more likely to support redistribution to those who are poor
by no fault of their own (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Pager and
Freese, 2004), they may also be more likely to support the bailout of firms that are in distress
due to exogenous shocks rather than due to mismanagement.
In the case of the US, for example, respondents might blame the poor behavior of financial
companies, including excessive risk taking and questionable loan practices, for their own
failure and therefore find little reason to support them through public means. Similarly,
individual support for assistance to US automakers may hinge on whether respondents think
that the automakers came cap in hand to Washington due to their own poor management
practices, or that the automakers’ plight is at least in the immediate sense due to market
forces outside of their control. Furthermore, respondents weighing whether or not to support
a bailout might consider whether those who stand to lose from bankruptcy are responsible
for their plight. Even if, for example, the poor management of domestic automakers in the
United States was cause for their financial distress, it’s not clear that the employees on the
factory floor who stand to lose their jobs are responsible for the situation.
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3.3 Does the Public Support Bailouts? Evidence from
American and German Surveys
Existing studies of the causes and generosity of bailouts employ the assumption that, as
a narrow transfer to firm-specific beneficiaries at the expense of the taxpayer, they are an
unpopular policy (Keefer, 2002, 2007; Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010; Rosas, 2006, 2009). This
section instead establishes that a meaningful portion of the public does support bailouts.
By analyzing a broad range of survey questions that deal with the US financial and (failed)
auto sector bailout bills of late 2008 in addition to several German survey questions from
2008 and 2009, public opposition is shown to be not as stark as is commonly assumed. In
the case of the US financial bailout, for example, the public appeared evenly divided in the
time immediately preceding and following its implementation. Support is also shown to vary
by context, as it is lower in the case of the US auto bailout, and much lower for some of the
German bailouts.
3.3.1 Public Support for US Bailouts
In the fall of 2008, the US Congress voted on several pieces of legislation aimed at propping
up ailing automakers and financial firms. On the financial side, the economic problems
that had become apparent beginning in August of 2007 came to a head in September of
2008 with the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the failure of Lehman
Brothers. As a result of financial market turmoil and drastically tightening credit markets,
the federal government was reported to have begun to plan a response by September 19,
2008 (Herszenhorn, 2008). Though Congress initially voted down the resulting legislation
on September 29, 2008, leading to an enormous decline in the stock market, it voted again
in favor of the Emergency Economic and Stabilization Act of 2008 on October 3rd (Mian,
Sufi and Trebbi, 2010). The bill authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
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allowing the US Treasury to acquire distressed assets at a value of up to $700 billion USD.
As the plan as initially realized failed to calm the stock market, a revised version, put in to
place on October 13, 2008, involved directly injecting $125 billion USD of equity in to the 9
largest US commercial banks as well as providing a three-year government guarantee for new
issues of unsecured bank debt (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010). Congress therefore authorized
actions aimed at bailing out the banking sector by ensuring its solvency.
The automakers began to seek assistance shortly afterwards. Facing declining sales,
a dwindling cash position, and a precipitous decline in the value of its stocks, General
Motors undertook a series of layoffs and benefits cuts throughout 2008. As Chrysler faced a
similar plight, the two automakers entered merger talks in late 2008. After initially asking
Washington for assistance to complete the deal, the Treasury turned them down (Vlasic
and Maynard, 2008). Abandoning the idea of a merger, the automakers instead turned to
Congress for help, leading to the passage of the Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring
Act (AIFRA) of 2008 on December 10, 2008. The bill, which was to provide $14 billion USD
in emergency loans to eligible automakers on the condition of restructuring under government
oversight, did not make it past the Senate, however (Nunnari, 2011). President Bush used his
executive authority to redirect sufficient money from the EESA on December 19 to keep GM
and Chrysler afloat until the incoming Obama administration could address their perilous
financial situation.
To assess the extent to which the public supported these efforts, I combine the results
reported by Bowman and Rugg (2010) of surveys undertaken by a number of national news
organization in conjunction with an additional survey. They report the results of 17 sur-
veys asking about support for the financial bailout and 10 asking about the auto bailout
undertaken between September and December of 2008. I also include the results from a
survey undertaken by the Los Angeles Times in conjunction with Bloomberg News between
December 6 and December 8, 2008 that included questions about both bailouts. The results
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are shown for the financial bailouts in Table 3.1 and for the auto bailout in Table 3.2. Ap-
pendix C.2 reports the full wording for questions about the financial bailout in Table C.3
and for questions about the auto bailouts in Table C.4. As the original questions frequently
ask respondents whether they agree or disagree with particular bailouts, think the activ-
ity is right or wrong, or think they are a good or bad thing, I standardize responses in to
“support,” “oppose,” and “don’t know” categories.
Table 3.1: Support for Financial Bailouts in 2008
Pollster Dates Support Oppose DK
PSRA/Pew Sep. 19-22, 2008 57% 30% 13%
Fox/OD Sep. 22-23, 2008 41% 45% 14%
PSRA/Pew Sep. 27-29, 2008 45% 38% 17%
CBS/NYT Sep. 27-30, 2008 43% 43% 14%
ABC/Washington Post Sep. 27-29, 2008 43% 50% 6%
CBS Oct. 3-5, 2008 36% 52% 11%
CNN/ORC Oct. 3-5, 2008 46% 53% 1%
Gallup/USA Today Oct. 3-5, 2008 50% 41% 9%
NBC/WSJ Oct. 4-5, 2008 41% 36% 18%
Fox/OD Oct. 8-9, 2008 34% 53% 13%
CBS/NYT Oct. 10-13, 2008 38% 48% 14%
PSRA/Pew Oct. 16-19, 2008 47% 37% 16%
Gallup/USA Today Nov. 13-16, 2008 47% 45% 8%
PSRA/Pew Nov. 14-17,2008 40% 43% 17%
PSRA/Pew Dec. 3-7, 2008 47% 43% 10%
Gallup/USA Today Dec. 4-7, 2008 46% 47% 7%
CBS News Dec. 4-8, 2008 46% 44% 10%
LA Times/Bloomberg Dec. 6-8, 2008 34% 47% 18%
Mean Sep. 19-Dec. 8, 2008 43.4% 44.2% 12%
Mean, pre-passage Sep. 19-29, 2008 45.8% 41.2% 12.8%
Mean, post-passage Oct. 3-Dec. 8, 2008 42.5% 45.3% 11.7%
The tables show average levels of support and opposition for the measures considered or
taken to assist the financial and auto industries. As the original polls were conducted over
a window of time that includes the period during which the various bills were considered, as
well the period after Congressional activity, the tables also report average levels of support
and opposition before and after the passage of EESA and the Congressional vote on AIFRA.
As Table 3.1 shows, the public held almost matching levels of support and opposition for
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Table 3.2: Support for US Auto Bailouts in 2008
Pollster Dates Support Oppose DK
Gallup Nov. 13-16, 2008 47% 49% 4%
ABC/Washington Post Nov. 19-23, 2008 35% 57% 8%
CNN/ORC Dec. 1-2, 2008 36% 61% 3%
ABC/Washington Post Dec. 3-7, 2008 37% 54% 9%
CBS News Dec. 4-7, 2008 45% 44% 11%
Gallup Dec. 4-7, 2008 43% 51% 6%
NBC/WSJ Dec. 5-8, 2008 46% 42% 12%
LA Times/Bloomberg Dec. 6-8, 2008 42% 47% 11%
Fox/OD Dec. 9-10, 2008 37% 58% 5%
ABC/Washington Post Dec. 11-14, 2008 42% 55% 3%
CNN/ORC Dec. 19-21, 2008 63% 37% 0%
Mean values Nov. 13-Dec. 21, 2008 43% 50.5% 6.5%
Mean, pre-vote Nov. 13-Dec. 10, 2008 40.9% 51.4% 7.7%
Mean, post-vote Dec. 11-21, 2008 52.5% 46% 1.5%
the financial bailout, with 43.4% in favor and 44.2% opposed across the 17 reported survey
questions. The figures are virtually unchanged when considering surveys taken before or
after passage of the bill. For the case of the automakers, the public does not seem quite
so supportive, but the opposition is certainly not overwhelming. As Table 3.2 reports, the
average value of support across the 11 reported surveys clocks in at 43%, while average
opposition is 50.5%. While the difference in support before and after the Congressional vote
appears starker in this case (40.9% in support and 51.4% opposed before the vote, and 52.5%
in support and 46% opposed afterwards), this may simply be a result of the smaller sample
size of surveys after the vote (2 versus 9), and the fact that one of these surveys did not
allow respondents to indicate that they had no opinion.
Thus it would appear that a sizable portion of the American public supported both the
auto and financial bailouts of 2008, calling in to question the assumption that bailouts are
despised by the public. Even though a larger segment of the public opposed than supported
the auto bailouts prior to Congressional activity on the matter in 2008, the difference was
not a huge one. Given the notoriety of these bailouts, it is surprising that they appeared so
popular prior to their enactment.
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3.3.2 Public Support for German Bailouts
Is the moderate degree of support for bailouts also found in other national contexts? To
answer this question, and to increase the generalizability of these findings, a similar exercise
is undertaken by examining public opinion on bailouts in Germany. The surveys used ask
about two particular companies in search of bailouts in 2008 and 2009, Opel, a large car
maker owned by GM, and Arcandor, a large holding company that operates retail and
tourism businesses, as well as whether respondents support assistance to major German
companies, or to other automakers.
Opel’s financial difficulties began to arise in late 2008 as the financial situation of GM,
its parent company, deteriorated rapidly. In November of 2008, Chancellor Merkel publicly
announced that the German federal government was considering providing the car maker with
a €1 billion credit guarantee to protect it from insolvency. With the threat of bankruptcy
looming, GM developed restructuring plans for its subsidiary in early 2009 that involved
ceding control over it to an outside investor and receiving €3.3 billion in government funds.
Under pressure from union members for assistance, threats by GM to sack 10,000 employees,
and an impending national election in September 2009, a rift grew amongst members of the
governing coalition on how to handle the crisis. While Merkel and her conservative Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) sought to support the sale of 55% of Opel to a Canadian-Russian
conglomerate lead by Magna International with a bridge loan, the Christian Social Union
(CSU) instead developed a bankruptcy-based restructuring plan while the left-leaning Social
Democrats (SPD) pushing for the government to buy a stake in the company if necessary.
Though the bridge loan was ultimately adopted, and GM tentatively agreed to the sale
of Opel to Magna in September 2009, improved business conditions led it to abandon its
efforts at selling the subsidiary in November of that year. A further request for state aid
by was denied by Berlin in June of 2010, leading GM to ultimately shoulder the costs of
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restructuring Opel on its own.13
Arcandor sought €650 million in credit guarantees in mid-2009 as the global financial
crisis led to a consumer spending freeze, creating pressing liquidity problems in the midst
of an extremely tight credit market. The company, which owned the Karstadt department
store chain and Thomas Cook, a travel group, employed roughly 50,000 in Germany. While
rival Metro pushed for a merger as a solution, Arcandor instead opted to lobby Berlin for
assistance. Again, divisions arose within the German governing coalition, with Chancellor
Merkel and the CDU signaling strong resistance to the plea for aid, while the SPD expressed
a desire to save the firm in order to protect jobs. Berlin opted to pass on the opportunity
to help, and Arcandor filed for insolvency on June 10, 2009.14
The public opinion data I employ to examine these cases come from Politbarometer, a
monthly telephone survey that is nationally representative of the German voting population.
The survey is undertaken by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. for ZDF, a public Germany tele-
vision network.15 In November of 2008 and March, May, and November of 2009, respondents
were asked whether the government should provide Opel with financial assistance. I exclude
November 2009 from the analysis as by this point the initial bridge loan had been put in to
place and the nature of the bailout in question had changed. In June and July 2009, respon-
dents were further asked whether Arcandor was deserving of financial support. Note that by
the time the question was fielded, Arcandor had already declared insolvency. Respondents
were further asked in November of 2008 whether the government should assist other car
manufacturers requiring help and in March and June 2009 whether major companies are in
general deserving of financial support from the government when they are in need. The full
13See Benoit (2008); Walker (2009); Gartzke (2009) and The Wall Street Journal, 17 June, 2010.
14See Bryant and Wiesmann (2009b); Betts (2009); Bryant and Wiesmann (2009a).
15For more information, see http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/. The data
are available to the public at http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.
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wording for the questions used is shown in Table C.5 in Appendix C.2. Again, responses
are recoded in to “support,” “oppose,” and “don’t know” categories though the original
questions ask whether the state should or should not help various firms, or whether the use
of state resources is right or wrong.
Table 3.3: Support for Bailouts in Germany, 2008 and 2009
Target Pollster Year Support Oppose DK N
Opel Politbarometer 2008 37% 58% 6% 1731
Any Automaker Politbarometer 2008 31% 62% 6% 1731
Opel Politbarometer 2009 31% 65% 3% 5113
Arcandor Politbarometer 2009 21% 76% 3% 3394
Major Companies Politbarometer 2009 34% 61% 5% 3430
Mean 30.8% 64.4% 4.6%
Table 3.3 reports the response rates for each question as well as the average of these
response rates. The results are adjusted for the survey weights. As we see, support for these
bailouts seems lower than what was found in the case of the United States. Assisting Opel
finds support amongst 37% of respondents in 2008 and 31% in 2009, while it is opposed by
majorities of 58% and 65%. Arcandor receives even less support in 2009: only 21% support
providing the firm with help, while 76% are opposed. Given that this question was asked
in the days following its failure, however, it’s possible that respondents’ opinions are skewed
downward given the minimal collateral damage this event caused to the broader German
economy. Regardless, it is worth noting that Opel received assistance while Arcandor did
not, and it is plausible that this difference in opinion could have been relevant in informing
the near-simultaneous decisions over the fate of the two firms.
In regards to the more general questions, support for other automakers and major com-
panies is similar, clocking in at 31% and 34% respectively, while the majority again expresses
opposition, with levels of 62% and 61%. The average level of support across questions, 30.8%,
is notably lower than the mean support found for the US auto and financial bailouts (around
43%) while the average level of opposition, 64%, is much higher than the levels of opposition
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reported in the US cases (44% for finance and 51% for automakers).
3.3.3 The Determinants of Support for Bailouts
Resentment towards bailouts is not so universal as conventional wisdom would hold; how-
ever, it also appears that opposition to bailouts varies quite a bit on a case-by-case basis.
Having established that a non-negligible, and in some times sizable, fraction of the public
supports bailouts, I next turn to empirically examining whether or not the variation in public
support follows any of the explanations described above. In this section I explore whether
individual-level support in the American and German surveys follows the predictions of the
four explanations. In the American case, the material explanation holds: wealthier respon-
dents, and those with stockholding, are shown to be more supportive of the financial bailout.
Left-leaning respondents partisans support both American bailouts, though the evidence for
the partisanship and ideology explanation is somewhat weaker in the German case.
While the results in this section serve to describe who supports bailouts, they do not
accurately depict why some bailouts are more popular than others, nor do they speak to
whether voters’ predispositions towards bailouts in general are the primary determinant of
support, as opposed to the characteristics of the target firms themselves. Though voters
who believe that bailouts are effective are shown to be more supportive of bailouts, as are
those who don’t hold the recipient firms accountable for their plight, this may be simply an
intervening effect – respondents who support bailouts due to partisan or material reasons
are likely to also likely to hold these positions.
While this section largely reports results from multivariate analyses of bailout support
across the American and German cases, Appendix C.3 reports descriptive analyses and a
large set of cross-tabulations should the reader prefer to look at the raw data.
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American Bailouts: Measures and Analysis
On the American side, I employ two surveys that ask about support for the auto bailouts
in 2008, one undertaken by ABC News/Washington Post on December 11-14, 2008, and
another undertaken by Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg News on December 6-8, 2008. The
full wording of the questions is shown in Table 3.2, Appendix C.2. I further employ four
surveys that ask about support for the financial bailouts in 2008: the same Los Angeles
Times/Bloomberg News survey previously mentioned, an ABC News/Washington Post poll
undertaken during September 27-29, 2008, a CBS News poll undertaken during October
3-5, 2008, and an NBC News/The Wall Street Journal poll undertaken during October 4-5,
2008. The questions used are again shown in Appendix C.2 as Table 3.1. I also use the 2008
Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) (Ansolabehere, 2011) as the pre-election
component asked respondents whether they supported or opposed the financial bailout bill
in principle.16 All questions are recoded such that 1 implies support for a bailout and 0
implies opposition.
To measure partisanship, I construct the Party ID variable, coded as 1 for Democrats, 2
for Independents, and 3 for Republicans in all surveys, excluding those who report another
affiliation, or no affiliation at all.17 The Ideology variable is a three-level categorical variable
ranging from liberal to conservative for each survey,18 save for CCES where it spans five
16The full question wording is as follows: “Congress considered many important bills over the past two
years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle: U. S.
Government’s $700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan.” 54% of respondents are opposed, 20% are supportive, and
26% are unsure out of 32, 173 respondents.
17The ABC News/Washington Post and CBS News polls asks “Generally speaking, do you usually think
of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or What?” The LA Times/Bloomerg News poll
asks “Regardless of your party registration or how you have voted in the past, do you think of yourself today
as a Democrat, or a Republican, or an independent, or as something else?” The CCES asks “Generally
speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other, or Not Sure?”
18The ABC News/Washington Post poll asks respondents the following question: “Would you say your
views on most political matters are liberal, moderate, or conservative?” The Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg
News poll asks “How would you describe your views on most matters having to do with politics? Do you
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categories due to the inclusion of very liberal and very conservative values at either end of
the scale.19
To measure economic self-interest, Income, a measure of self-reported household annual
income, is used across all surveys. As each survey has its own underlying ordinal measure
of household income, however, the measurement of this variable is inconsistent across the
surveys20 though it always operates in the same direction.
Further, in the model estimated using the NBC News/Wall Street Journal, a dichotomous
indicator of stock ownership, Owns Stocks, is used to see if those who are exposed to stock
market risk are more supportive of financial bailouts.21 The CCES also allows for a dummy
measurement of home ownership, Homeowner, to see if respondents with this asset are more
supportive of saving banks.22 As the CCES includes information on the respondents’ county
generally think of yourself as very liberal, or somewhat liberal, or moderate, or somewhat conservative, or
very conservative?” I recode the LA Times variable in to a 3-level categorical variable pooling very and
somewhat liberal and conservative respondents in to single liberal and conservative categories. The CBS
News poll asks “How would you describe your views on most political matters? Generally do you think of
yourself as liberal, moderate, or conservative?”
19The CCES asks “Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political view-
point?”
20Both ABC News/Washington Post surveys have 6 household annual income categories: less than
$20, 000, $20–$35, 000, $35–$50, 000, $50–$75, 000, $75–$100, 000, and above $100, 000 dollars per year. The
Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg News and NBC News/Wall Street Journal surveys have the following cate-
gories: less than $10, 000, $10–$19, 999, $20–$29, 999, $30–$39, 999, $40–$49, 999, $50–$59, 999, $60–$74, 999,
$75–$100, 000, and more than $100, 000. The CBS News survey codes household income in the following
categories: less than $15, 000, $15–$30, 000, $30–$50, 000, $50–$75, 000, $75–$100, 000, and above $100, 000
dollars per year. The 2008 CCES records family income in the following categories: less than $10, 000, $10–
$14, 999, $15–$19, 999, $20–$24, 999, $25–$29, 999, $30–$39, 999, $40–$49, 999, $50–$59, 999, $60–$69, 999,
$70–$79, 999, $80–$99, 999, $100, 000–$119, 999, $120, 000–$149, 999 and more than $150, 000.
21The wording of the question in the poll is as follows: “Do you have money invested in the stock market
and mutual funds?”
22The wording of the question is as follows: “Which of the following best describes your current housing
arrangement? I rent, I own my apartment or house, I live with someone else (such as a parent or grandparent)
but do not rent, I live in institutional housing, such as a dormitory or nursing home, Skipped, Not Asked.”
I recode the variable such that individuals who own their apartment or house are coded as 1 while all others
are coded as 0.
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of residence, local levels of employment in the financial services industry can be incorpo-
rated in to the analysis to see whether individuals residing in areas where finance is a more
important part of the economy are more supportive of the financial bailout. To do so, I
calculate the percentage of county-level employment in financial activities as a percentage
of total country employment using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages database (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). The values are
annual averages for 2008.
Next, I examine whether public support for bailouts is mitigated by the extent to which
respondents view the recipients as culpable for their own plight. To do so, I use one question
about the auto bailouts from the ABC News/Washington Post survey of December 2008 that
asks whether the plight of the automakers is due to poor management or the bad economy.23
I further use two questions about the financial bailouts from the ABC News/Washington Post
survey of September 2008 and the NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey of October 2008
that ask respondents who is most to blame for the economic crisis.24 I construct two dummies:
Management’s Fault?, coded as 1 if respondents blame the automakers’ management for their
plight and 0 otherwise, and Banks’ Fault?, again equal to 1 if respondents consider banks or
investment firms to be primarily responsible for the crisis, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, to measure sociotropic concerns, I use two questions about the auto bailouts,
and two about the financial bailouts. On the auto side, the ABC News/Washington Post
23The exact question is “Do you think the automakers’ problems are mainly the fault of (the bad economy)
or mainly the fault of (their own management)?” The order of the phrases in parentheses was assigned
randomly.
24The question in the ABC News/Washington Post survey is “Who do you think deserves the most blame
for the current financial situation?” Respondents were prompted to answer as they chose without reference
to a prepared list. The NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll asks respondents “Which of the following do
you think is MOST to blame for the current financial crisis? If you do not know enough about this to have
an opinion, just say so. Homeowners who took out loans they could not afford, banks who made loans to
people with bad credit, investment firms who sold bad loans as investments, the Bush administration, which
did not provide enough oversight, Congress, which did not provide enough oversight of banks, all to blame
(voluntary), do not know enough to have an opinion, not sure.”
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survey of December 2008 asks respondents whether they think that if no bailout was put in
to place and one of the automakers that sought a bailout were to fail, would this be good
or bad for the economy.25 I recode this variable in to a dummy that is equal to 1 if the
respondent thinks that the failure of an automaker would have a negative effect. Further,
the Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg News asks a similar question about whether the failure of
the automakers would be a problem for the national economy.26 I also recode this variable
in to a dummy equal to 1 if respondents believe that it would pose a major problem. I name
both variables Bankruptcy Bad?
On the finance side, the ABC News/Washington Post survey of September 2008 asks
respondents the extent to which they think that the government’s efforts to address the
financial crisis will prevent the situation from deteriorating.27 I recode this question as
Bailouts Effective?, a dummy indicator equal to 1 if respondents are confident that the
government’s actions will be worthwhile and 0 otherwise. Finally, the CBS News poll of
October 2008 asks respondents whether they think that only Wall Street will benefit from the
bailout, or whether the benefits will spread to people throughout the country.28 I construct
a third dummy, Only Banks Benefit? that is equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that the
bailouts’ benefits will be concentrated in the financial sector.
25The wording of the question is as follows: “Say the loan plan is not approved and one or more of the
automakers has to go under protection of bankruptcy laws while they try to restructure themselves. Do you
think that would be good for the economy, bad for the economy, or would not make much difference either
way?”
26The wording of the question is “If the federal government does not provide assistance to the three
automakers and the American automobile companies go out of business, would that be a major problem, or
a minor problem or not a problem at all for the country?”
27The question reads: “How confident are you that the federal government’s efforts will prevent the
country’s current financial situation from getting worse - very confident, somewhat confident, not so confident
or not confident at all?”
28The exact question wording is as follows: “Who do you think will benefit from the government money
used in the [bailout] plan – mostly just a few big investors and people who work on Wall Street, or homeowners
and people throughout the country as well?”
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I include a number of demographic controls as well. Age measures respondent age,
Education measures respondent educational attainment, and Male is a gender dummy. As
was the case for the income measure, it is not possible to standardize Age across the surveys
due to its inconsistent coding,29 so the survey-specific measures, generally ordinal scales, are
employed. Education is coded as a three-point ordinal scale that categorizes respondents as
having a high school degree or less; some college; or a college degree or more. I also include
state fixed-effects in the models, save for those using the Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg
News surveys where respondents’ states are not reported, in order to control for regional
heterogeneity in opinions.
Table 3.4 reports logit models estimating support for the American auto and financial
bailouts using the the ABC News/Washington Post survey (labelled ABC) and the LA
Times/Bloomberg News survey (labelled LAT), both of December 2008, in the two columns
under the “Auto” header. Under the “Finance” header, the models are estimated using
the ABC News/Washington Post survey of September 2008 (labelled ABC), the CBS News
(labelled CBS) and NBC News/Wall Street Journal (labelled NBC) surveys of October
2008, the LA Times/Bloomberg News survey of December 2008 (labelled LAT), and the
2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (labelled CCES).
The results show that each explanation is plausibly supported by the data. In terms of
economic self-interest, higher-earning respondents tend to be more supportive of the financial
bailout, but not of the auto bailouts. The coefficients are positive in all models, though
only statistically significant in the models that use the ABC News/Washington Post, NBC
News/Wall Street Journal, and CCES surveys to examine support for the financial bailout.
This supports the assertion that wealthier respondents who are assumed to be more exposed
29The ABC News/Washington Post surveys categorize respondents as 18 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to
64, and 65 or older. The Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg News and CBS News surveys allow respondents to
provide their exact age. The NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey categorizes respondents as being 18-24,
25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, and 75 or older. The CCES categorizes
individuals as being 18-34, 35-54, or 55 or older.
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to the costs of a financial meltdown are more supportive of saving the distressed banks.
The assets variables, however, operate in the opposite direction as expected (both Owns
Stocks and Homeowner are negative), and only the home ownership dummy is statistically
significant. This would seem to imply that individuals with greater exposure to the collapse
of stock market and housing prices are less supportive of the financial bailout, contradicting
the expectations of this economic self-interest hypothesis. Individuals, however, who reside
in counties with higher levels of financial employment as a percentage of all employment
do appear more likely to support the financial bailout (the coefficient on Financial Emp.
Share is positive and statistically significant), implying that concerns about local economic
conditions may drive bailout support.
The findings regarding partisanship and ideology are more consistent: across essentially
every model, moving along the Party ID variable from Democrat to Republican decreases
support for bailouts. The finding is the same for Ideology : more conservative respondents
are less supportive of either bailout. Though the two variables are statistically significant
in less than half of the models, the fact that they both are in the CCES model that has by
far the most observations (an n of 19, 693) implies that the lack of statistical significance in
the other models may be a function of small sample sizes. Further, as tables C.9 and C.10
in Appendx C show, 56% of Democrats and 57% of liberal respondents support the auto
bailout, and 44% of Democrats and 42% of Liberals, both pluralities, support the financial
bailout across the media surveys.
The sociotropic preferences explanation finds strong support in the models as well. That
respondents who believe that bankruptcy of the automakers would be bad for the national
economy, as well as those who think that the financial bailout will be effective at addressing
the financial crisis, are more supportive of bailouts is shown by the positive and statistically
significant coefficient for both variables. Furthermore, respondents who believe that only
banks stand to benefit from the financial bailout, and not the country in the aggregate, are
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Table 3.4: Support for Auto and Financial Bailouts
Auto Finance
ABC LAT ABC CBS NBC LAT CCES
Party ID -0.49∗ -0.04 0.05 -0.17 -0.38∗ -0.25 -0.28∗
(0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18) (0.02)
Ideology -0.46∗ -0.66∗ -0.19 -0.19 -0.25 -0.27∗
(0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.20) (0.02)
Income 0.08 0.08 0.12+ 0.06 0.12+ 0.13 0.03∗
(0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.01)
Education -0.31∗ -0.07 0.30∗ 0.13 0.30+ 0.21 0.08∗
(0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.22) (0.17) (0.18) (0.02)
Male 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.63∗ 0.21 0.15 0.02
(0.22) (0.32) (0.21) (0.32) (0.25) (0.30) (0.03)
Age 0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 0.16 -0.04 0.19∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.02)
Management’s Fault? -1.85∗
(0.30)




Banks’ Fault? 0.35+ -0.32
(0.20) (0.26)






Financial Emp. Share 0.06∗
(0.01)
Constant 2.10∗ 0.89 -1.68∗ 1.64 -2.13+ -0.20 -1.12∗
(0.86) (0.88) (0.73) (1.20) (1.20) (0.79) (0.50)
Observations 668 559 782 634 368 540 19693
Prob > χ2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Pseudo R2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
Logit models using dichotomous bailout support indicator as dependent variable. All
models, save for the one using the CCES data, are adjusted for survey weights. State
fixed effects included in all models save for those using the L.A. Times/Bloomberg
News data labelled as LAT in the table. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
117
notably less supportive.
Finally, the culpability explanation find strong support in the case of the automakers,
but limited support in the case of finance. The coefficient on Management’s Fault? is
negative and statistically significant, implying that respondents who view the automakers
as responsible for their own plight are less supportive of assisting them. In the finance case,
however, the coefficient on Bank’s Fault? is positive and only significant at the p < 0.10
level in the model that uses the ABC News/Washington Post survey, while the coefficient on
the same variable is negative and insignificant in the model that uses the NBC News/Wall
Street Journal survey.
Of course, it’s entirely possible that conservatives and Republicans both oppose bailouts
and at the same time believe that bailouts are ineffective and that the failure of a major
automaker wouldn’t be disastrous for the national economy. Thus rather than operating as
independent explanatory factors, ideological orientation and sociotropic concerns are likely
to be directly linked. As concerns over the efficacy of bailouts are likely to be driven by ide-
ological concerns, they may act as an intervening variable between ideological predisposition
and support for bailouts. Conservatives, for example, are likely to think that bailouts are
ineffective, and that the market-based alternative of bankruptcy leads to better outcomes.
Therefore, they may be less supportive of bailouts. Further, partisanship and ideology could
also be what is driving respondents’ opinions on both the culpability of particular companies
as well as whether they are deserving of a bailout. Conservative respondents, for example,
who are opposed to providing assistance to ailing automakers might justify this position
by blaming the automakers for their own plight, while liberal respondents who are more
sympathetic to their cause might view them as being victims of exogenous circumstances.
These possibilities are explored in some depth in Appendix C.3. To give a brief overview
of the results, both are found to hold in the data. For example, while 40% of liberals
view bankruptcy by one of the distressed automakers as bad for the economy, only 31% of
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conservatives do, implying that sociotropic concerns over the bailouts are partially driven
by respondents’ ideology. Ideology and partisanship appear to play an even stronger role in
impacting respondents’ assessments of whether the target firms are culpable for their own
plight: while 69% of liberals view management as responsible for the automakers’ financial
position, 79% of conservatives do. Similarly, 74% of Democrats blame management, while
84% of Republicans do. While liberals and conservatives are equally likely to view banks as
to blame for the financial crisis (24% and 23% respectively), the gap is much wider along
partisan lines: only 18% of Democrats place the onus on financial companies, while 30% of
Republicans do.
German Bailouts: Measures and Analysis
On the German side, I use the five Politbarometer survey questions previously described
in Section 3.3.2 as dependent variables, covering the Opel bailout in 2008 and 2009, the
Arcandor bailout in 2009, any major bailout in 2009, and any automaker in 2008. Table 3.5
reports estimates from similar multivariate logit regression models using the German survey
data. All models are adjusted for survey weights and include state fixed-effects. Unfortu-
nately, the surveys do not have any questions that could be used to examine the culpability,
economic self-interest, and sociotropic preferences explanations, though they do allow for an
examination of the role of partisanship and ideology in the German context.
To measure ideology, I use the surveys’ 10-point scale of left-right self-placement.30 While
the scale ranges from 0 to 10, the distribution is roughly bell shaped, with the bulk of
30The original question reads “Wenn von Politik die Rede ist, hört man immer wieder die Begriffe “links”
und “rechts”. Wir hätten gerne von Ihnen gewusst, ob Sie sich selbst eher links oder eher rechts einstufen.
Stellen Sie sich dazu bitte noch einmal ein Thermometer vor, das diesmal aber nur von 0 bis 10 geht. 0
bedeutet sehr links, 10 bedeutet sehr rechts. Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Meinung abgestuft
sagen. Wo wrden Sie sich einstufen?” This translates to the following: “When there is talk of politics, you
always hear the terms “left” and “right.” We would like to know if you consider yourself more on the left or
more on the right. Imagine this as a thermometer that ranges from 0 to 10. 0 means very far left, 10 means
very far right. Where would you classify yourself?”
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respondents placing themselves in the middle category (36% in 2008 and 38% in 2009). I
therefore recode this scale in to a three-point categorical index as liberal (0-4 on the left-right
scale), moderate (5), and conservative (6-10) and label it Ideology.
To measure partisanship, I transform the surveys’ self-reported, open-ended party sym-
pathy question31 in to four dummies: SPD, for supporters of the SPD party, CDU/CSU, for
supporters of either or both of these parties, Other, for supporters of all other parties, and
No Party for those who do not support any particular party. I use Other as the baseline
party support category in the models.
In terms of demographic controls, Male is a gender dummy equal to 1 if the respondent
is male, Age is an ordinal measure of the respondent’s age,32 and Education is an ordinal
scale of degree attainment.33
The results of this exercise are mixed. Ideology is statistically insignificant in all models,
and has an inconsistent sign, implying that German respondents’ left-right self-placement
appears to have little impact on their support for a number of bailouts. Further, as table C.17
in Appendix C shows, while liberal respondents are always more supportive in percentage
terms than moderate and conservative respondents across all of the bailout questions, the
highest level of support amongst liberals for any of the bailouts is 35% in favor of assistance
31The surveys ask “In Deutschland neigen viele Leute längere Zeit einer bestimmten politischen Partei
zu, obwohl sie auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen Sie - ganz allgemein
gesprochen - einer bestimmten Partei zu? Wenn ja: Welcher?” This translates to “In Germany, many people
tend to have a long-term association with a political party, although they occasionally vote for another party.
Do you lean towards any particular party? If yes, which one?” The respondents are not prompted with a
list of potential parties.
32The variable is coded as the following groups: 18 to 20 years old; 21 to 24 years old; 25 to 29 years old;
30 to 34 years old; 35 to 39 years old; 40 to 44 years old; 45 to 49 years old; 50 to 59 years old; 60 to 69
years old, and 70 or older.
33The categories are Hauptschulabschluss (4 years of primary and 5 years of secondary), Mittlere Reife or
Realschulabschluss (4 years of primary and 6 years of secondary), Abitur, Hochschulreife or Fachhochschul-
reife (passage of university entrance exam or graduation from a vocational high school), and a degree from
a Universität, Hochschule or Fachhochschule (university, college, or technical college). Respondents who are
still in school are excluded.
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Table 3.5: Support for Bailouts in Germany
2009 2008
Opel Arcandor Major Opel Auto
Male -0.09 -0.29∗ -0.33∗ -0.06 -0.08
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
Age -0.09∗ -0.10∗ -0.17∗ -0.01 -0.11∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Education -0.13∗ -0.17∗ -0.17∗ -0.15∗ -0.21∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Ideology 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
SPD 0.31∗ 0.07 0.40∗ 0.35 0.59∗
(0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23)
CDU/CSU -0.11 -0.28+ -0.13 0.23 0.30
(0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.23)
No Party 0.14 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.23
(0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20)
Constant 0.42 -0.61+ 1.16∗ 0.65 0.78+
(0.26) (0.34) (0.33) (0.45) (0.47)
Observations 4524 3048 2994 1490 1475
Prob > χ2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pseudo R2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Logit models adjusted for survey weights. State fixed effects included
in all models. Dependent variable is dichotomous bailout support
indicator. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests:
+ p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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to major German companies.
The results do provide more support for the impact of partisanship, however. Supporters
of the SPD are generally more supportive of the bailouts. The coefficient on the SPD dummy
indicator is positive in all of the specifications, and statistically significant in the case of
Opel and of any major company in 2009 and of any automaker in 2008. The CDU/CSU
dummy is less consistent however: respondents who support the conservative coalition are less
supportive of all of the bailout questions in 2009, though the coefficients are not statistically
significant. The coefficient on the dummy has a positive sign for both of the 2008 questions,
though it is not statistically significant. Those who do not align themselves with any party
do not consistently support or oppose any of the bailouts in question. Thus Germans who
support the largest left-leaning party are generally more supportive of the bailouts, a finding
that is reinforced in Tables C.18, C.19 and C.20 in Appendix C which report raw frequencies
of support by partisan self-identification.
3.4 Evidence from Survey Experiments
This section serves to both explain why voters support some bailouts rather than others,
and to answer the question of whether bailout support is primarily driven by voters’ generic
positions on bailouts, or the characteristics of particular bailouts themselves. As the previous
section discussed, using extant survey data to explore why respondents support bailouts
poses a serious issues. In order to isolate the causal effect of each theoretical explanation,
this section presents results from two survey experiments. The survey experiments randomly
expose respondents to different versions of vignettes that describe a hypothetical firm that
needs a bailout. As the vignettes vary over the size, industry, and culpability of the firm for
its plight, as well as the extent to which its failure would impact the whole economy, they
allow for an isolation of the impact that each of these characteristics has on bailout support.
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Of the four potential explanations, a causal effect is only found for the sociotropric
preferences explanations: bailouts that serve to prevent national economic fallback elicit more
support than those that prevent a more geographically concentrated spillover. Surprisingly,
voters express no greater concern over the fate of larger firms, nor do they seek to protect
firms that are culpable for their own distress or firms that pose the greatest risk to the job
market if they were to fail. Further, given that only this one characteristic of the target
firms amongst six experimental conditions across two separate experiments drives support,
it appears safe to say that it is what voters think about bailouts in general that matters,
not the particular features of the bailout. Moreover, the treatment effects of the different
experimental conditions do not vary with the partisanship or income of respondents.
Two survey experiments were performed. The first survey experiment (the “Airplane
Manufacturer Experiment”) came as a series of randomized vignettes given to a nationally
representative sample of 2,000 Americans aged 18 and older collected by YouGov during the
period of September 28, 2013 to September 29, 2013. The vignette reads as follows:
“Policymakers are considering providing assistance to a major American man-
ufacturer of commercial airplanes that is in financial distress. The company
had been profitable until recently, but [a downturn in the market/poor manage-
ment/a downturn in the market combined with poor management] has pushed it
to the brink of bankruptcy. The company[, which has 50,000 employees and is
the 60th largest in the United States by market capitalization,/which has 125,000
employees and is the 30th largest in the United States by market capitaliza-
tion,/no mention of size] has been unable to secure private loans to stay afloat.
Economists studying the issue found in a report that bankruptcy by the company
would cause [a major loss of jobs/a major decline in the stock market/a major
loss of jobs and a major decline in the stock market][, and that the impact would
be felt largely in the state where the company is based/, and that the impact
would be felt across the country/. (no mention of impact)]. Would you support
or oppose efforts by the government to bail out the company, preventing it from
going bankrupt?”
The vignette contained four experimental conditions randomly assigned to respondents:
first, the culpability of the firm for its own distress was varied by claiming that it was
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either caused by an exogenous market downturn or poor management, or, as a control, both.
Second, the size of the firm was varied between having 50,000 employees and being the 60th
largest firm in the United States or having 125,000 employees and being the 30th largest or,
as a control, no mention being made of its size. Third, the impact of the bankruptcy of the
firms was varied between three conditions, the first stating that it would primarily cause job
loss, the second stating that it would primarily damage the stock market, and the third, a
control, stating that its failure would cause both. Fourth, the scope of the impact of the
bankruptcy of the firm was also varied between being purely state-level and between being
national, with a third control having no mention of the geographic impact of its failure.
Support is measured using a five-point feeling thermometer ranging from “Strongly Oppose”
to “Strongly Support.” Table 3.6 presents response rates by experimental condition. For
each set of experimental conditions, roughly 50% of respondents were exposed to the control,
while roughly 25% of respondents were exposed to each of the two possible treatments.









All Respondents 2000 20% 20% 24% 25% 11%
Reason for Distress: Downturn 496 21% 21% 22% 25% 11%
Reason for Distress: Poor Management 504 20% 21% 21% 25% 12%
Impact of Bankruptcy: Statewide 488 22% 24% 21% 20% 12%
Impact of Bankruptcy: Countrywide 512 20% 18% 22% 30% 11%
50,000 Employees 468 20% 19% 31% 22% 9%
125,000 Employees 532 20% 18% 23% 27% 13%
Impact of Bankruptcy: Job Loss 500 19% 17% 28% 26% 11%
Impact of Bankruptcy: Stock Decline 500 21% 20% 26% 23% 11%
The first experiments allow for an estimate of the independent effect of several of the
explanations on support for bailouts. The impact of culpability can be assessed by examining
whether or not respondents express lower levels of support for the bailout described in the
first vignette when the plight of the distressed firm is a result of poor management, something
it is responsible for, rather than a market downturn, an event that is presumably outside of
its control. Further, sociotropic concerns can be said to be of relevance if respondents are
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more likely to support the bailout if its impact is national, rather than regional, in scope.
The partisanship explanations will be shown to hold if respondents who are left of center are
more sympathetic towards the bailout if the airplane manufacturer has more employees, or
if its failure is stated as primarily having an impact on the labor market.
The second survey experiment (the “Bank and Automaker Experiment”) came again in
the form of a vignette embedded within a survey of a sample of convenience of 497 Americans
collected using Mechanical Turk during the period of January 28, 2013 to January 30, 2013.
The vignette reads as follows:
“Please consider the situation of [a bank/an auto parts manufacturer] in severe
financial distress. The [bank/auto parts manufacturer] has [250/5,000] employees
and has been profitable until recently. However, a downturn in the market has
pushed the [bank/business] to the brink of bankruptcy and it has been unable to
secure private loans to stay afloat. Would you support or oppose efforts by the
government to bail it out?”
Four different versions of the vignette were randomly assigned to respondents, with the
experimental conditions being the industry of the firm (a bank or an auto parts manufacturer)
and its number of employees (250 or 5,000). Support was once again measured using a five-
point feeling thermometer. Table 3.7 shows the frequency of responses in total and by
experimental condition.









All Respondents 497 21% 24% 20% 29% 6%
Bank, 250 Emp. 133 29% 23% 22% 22% 5%
Bank, 5,000 Emp. 95 27% 28% 19% 21% 4%
Auto Mfr., 250 Emp. 147 17% 21% 20% 34% 7%
Auto Mfr., 5,000 Emp. 122 11% 26% 18% 37% 8%
Auto or Bank, 250 Emp. 280 22% 22% 21% 28% 6%
Auto or Bank, 5,000 Emp. 217 18% 27% 18% 30% 6%
Bank, 250 or 5,000 Emp. 228 28% 25% 21% 21% 5%
Auto, 250 or 5,000 Emp. 269 14% 23% 19% 35% 8%
By varying the industry of the distressed firm, the second experiment tests whether
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resentment towards bailouts varies by context, implying that it is not quite so uniform and
universal as conventional wisdom holds. Unfortunately, however, as this experiment was
performed well after both the auto and financial bailouts occurred in the US, it’s likely
that responses are skewed by how the two bailouts have been framed in the media and by
politicians in their aftermath, as well as by their relative successes,34 and so the industry
results are to be taken with a grain of salt. Further, by varying the number of employees in
the firm, the experiment can again be used to test the partisanship explanation if left-wing
respondents are particularly more supportive of assisting firms the failure of which would
have a larger impact on the labor market.
Putting aside their links to the explanations of the patterns in support for bailouts, the
results from both experiments are also helpful if we are to understand the context within
which policymakers decide whether or not to authorize lifelines. If respondents profess greater
support for assisting firms with more employees regardless of their partisan orientation, for
example, policymakers would be wise to take this in to consideration as it would imply some
public support for the too-big-to-fail doctrine.
3.4.1 Findings from the Airplane Manufacturer Experiment
The primary result of the first experiment is that sociotropic concerns appear to be the
only independently relevant factor in driving bailout support. Most of the experimental
conditions have virtually no impact on average levels of support for bailing out the airplane
manufacturer. Table 3.6, which reports the frequencies of each response category by the
experimental conditions, shows that the degree of support appears to be quite consistent
regardless of the phrasing of the vignette. Figure 3.1, which graphically depicts the mean
values of support seen by each experimental condition, similarly shows that the impact of
34For example, the auto bailouts appears to have become increasingly popular with time, while the
financial bailouts have experienced the opposite trend. See Pew Research Center (2012).
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each on average levels of support is substantively quite small.
Table 3.8: Differences in Means Tests by Treatment Versus Control
Difference in Support P-Value
Poor Management 0.03 0.70
Market Downturn -0.06 0.41
National Impact 0.12 0.10
State Impact -0.15 0.04
Causes Job Loss 0.07 0.33
Causes Stock Decline -0.04 0.61
50,000 Employees -0.05 0.45
125,000 Employees 0.08 0.25
Table 3.8, which reports the difference in the mean values of support reported when each
experimental condition is present, compared with all other responses when the experimental
condition is absent, presents a slightly different story. First, two results stand out: firm that
are in distress due to poor management see slightly more support, and firms that are in
distress due to a market downturn see slightly less support, than firms which are in distress
for both reasons, though the difference are statistically insignificant. Further, while the
firm with 50,000 employees actually receives less sympathy compared to a description of the
firm that lacks any specification of its size, the firm with 125,000 employees receives more
support in comparison. Neither finding, however, is statistically significant. Finally, when
the vignette states that the firm’s failure will primarily hurt those in its state of operation,
support is lower by 0.15 points compared to when it lacks a specification of the geographic
scope of the impact of failure, a statistically significant finding. If the firm’s failure is
instead presented in terms of its national impact, support is 0.12 points higher, a finding
that is significant at the p < 0.10 level. Thus looking at the raw results we can say that
sociotropic concerns do independently drive bailout support.
I next move to a multivariate regression framework as the inclusion of covariates can
increase the precision of causal estimands (Gerber and Green, 2012: Chapter 4). The co-
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Bankruptcy Causes Job Loss and/or Stock Decline
variates include demographic characteristics, such as Education,35 Income,36 gender (Male,
a dummy variable) and race (White, a self-reported dummy indicator), as well as politi-
cal attentiveness measured using News Interest,37 partisan self-identification (Party ID, a
35Education is measured as a six-point categorical variable with the following values: no high school, high
school graduate, some college, 2-year college degree, 4-year college degree, and post-graduate degree.
36Income is a categorical measure of family income with 11 values: less than $10, 000, $10–$19, 999, $20–
$29, 999, $30–$39, 999, $40–$49, 999, $50–$59, 999, $60–$69, 999, $70–$79, 999, $80–$89, 999, $100–$119, 999,
and more than $119, 999.
37The original question asks respondents how interested they are in news and public affairs. The recoded,
categorical control variable employed here has the following values: hardly at all, only now and then, some
of the time, and most of the time.
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3-point scale coded as Democrat, Independent, and Republican) and Ideology, a five-point
scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Table C.2 in Appendix C reports the
summary statistics.
Table 3.9 presents regression results from a series of standard OLS models, adjusted for
survey weights, that use the 5-point bailout support feeling thermometer as the dependent
variable. Positive coefficients here on the treatment variables imply increasing support for the
bailout. Models 1 through 4 report the impact of altering the wording of the vignette. Again,
as Models 1 and 3 show, altering whether or not the airplane manufacturer is responsible
for its own distress has no impact on support, and neither does altering its size. As Model
3 indicates, however, when the impact of the failure of the firm is depicted as having only
state-level ramifications, as opposed to making no mention of the regional scope, support
decreases by 0.26 points, a statistically significant coefficient at the p < 0.05 level. When
bankruptcy is instead depicted as having a national impact, support increases, but not by a
statistically significant amount. In Model 5, we see that when the bankruptcy of the airplane
manufacturer is framed as causing primarily job loss, as opposed to both job loss and a decline
in the stock market, support for a bailout increases, though the coefficient is only significant
at the p < 0.10 level. Thus the results found from the differences-in-means tests largely hold
while controlling for various demographic characteristics: sociotropic concerns seem to be
the only explanation of bailout support confirmed by the experiment.
Next, I explore the possibility that these treatment effects may vary across relevant
subgroups. According to the the partisanship explanation of bailout support, those on the
left are likely to be more sympathetic towards the bailouts that save the most jobs. Further,
as the wealthiest respondents are considered by the material self-interest explanation to be
more exposed to decreases in stock wealth, they might be more supportive of the bailout
when it is framed as preserving shareholder value.
I therefore first examine whether the causal effects of the 125,000 Employees and Causes
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Table 3.9: OLS Regressions Estimating Bailout Support in the First Experiment













Causes Job Loss 0.16+
(0.09)
Causes Stock Decline 0.03
(0.09)
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Income 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Male -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
White -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
News Interest -0.07 -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Washington Resident -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.25
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Party ID -0.32∗ -0.31∗ -0.32∗ -0.31∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ideology -0.22∗ -0.23∗ -0.22∗ -0.22∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 4.50∗ 4.52∗ 4.41∗ 4.41∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Observations 1480 1480 1480 1480
R2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Prob > F 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OLS models adjusted for survey weights. Dependent variable is a
five point index of bailout support. Party ID is coded as follows:
1 = Dem., 2 = Ind., 3 = Rep. Standard errors reported in paren-
theses. Two-tailed tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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Job Loss treatments are greatest amongst self-described Democrats. To do so, I follow Green
and Kern (2012) and estimate the conditional average causal effects of the two treatments
by partisanship while controlling for all of the covariates in Figure 3.9 using Bayesian Ad-
ditive Regression Trees. In order to determine whether heterogeneity exists, I then perform
two-sided Wald tests using the estimated conditional average treatment effects and their
covariance matrices.


































































As heterogenous treatment effects are not found by partisan identification, this aspect
of the partisanship explanation does not hold in the data. Figure 3.2 plots the estimated
conditional average treatment effects and 90% confidence intervals of the 125,000 Employees
treatment by partisan orientation in the left-most panel and the Causes Job Loss treatment
by partisan orientation in the middle panel. The pattern in the left-most panel is consistent
with the partisanship explanation: the estimated conditional average treatment effect of
the 125,000 Employees treatment is positive for Democrats but negative for Republicans.
However, with a p-value of 0.37, the two-sided Wald test of the null hypothesis that the
CATEs are identical can not be rejected. Furthermore, while the pattern in the middle
panel is inconsistent with the partisanship explanation (the estimated CATE is higher for
Republicans than for Democrats), the p-value of 0.78 on the Wald test again implies that
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partisanship does not mediate the impact of the Causes Job Loss treatment.
I next examine whether the impact of the Causes Stock Decline treatment is greater for
those with higher incomes to test this component of the material self-interest explanation.
The right-most panel of Figure 3.2 plots the conditional average treatment effect of the
Causes Stock Decline treatment by income. While this CATE appears to be increasing with
income, consistent with the material self-interest explanation, the p-value of 1 on the two-
sided Wald test of the null hypothesis that the CATEs estimated different incomes can not
be rejected, implying that this trend is not statistically significant.
To summarize, the first experiments finds that respondents are less sympathetic towards
bailouts that prevent geographically narrow economic fallout, supporting the sociotropic
preferences explanation. Partisanship and ideology drive bailout support in general, with
left-wing respondents professing greater sympathy regardless of how the bailout is framed,
but the experimental evidence does not support the more precise hypotheses about the
kinds of bailouts respondents of different partisan stripes should support: while Democrats
are slightly more supportive of assisting the firm when it has many employees, they slightly
less supportive if bailing it out primarily prevents job loss. Neither culpability nor material
self-interest are shown to have an impact on support.
3.4.2 Findings from the Bank and Automaker Experiment
Scrutinizing Table 3.7 provides preliminary support for the core finding of the second exper-
iment: while the industry of the firm has a large impact on levels of support for its bailout,
its number of employees does not. Levels of support are higher for auto manufacturers than
for banks, but there is no difference between both banks and auto parts manufacturers with
5,000 and 250 employees. While 34% of respondents somewhat support assistance to an auto
manufacturer of 250 employees and 7% strongly support it (the figures are 37% and 7% from
an auto maker of 5,000 employees), only 22% of respondents support a bailout for a bank of
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250 employees and 5% strongly support it (the figures are 21% and 4% for a bank of 5,000
employees). Further, when we compare either form of auto manufacturer with either form of
bank, we see levels of support that are much higher for the auto manufacturer (35% some-
what support it and 8% strongly do, compared to 21% and 5% for both banks). Comparing
across either a bank or an auto manufacturer with 5,000 or 250 employees, however, we see
that there is virtually no difference in support.
The plurality of opposition to a generic bank of any size receiving aid (53% opposed
and 26% in support), and the plurality of support for a generic automaker of any size (37%
opposed and 43% in support), are the opposite of what was found when survey questions
that asked about the financial and auto bailouts of 2008 were examined. This switch is
likely a product of the dynamic described above whereby American public opinion on the
two bailouts has moved more in favor of the auto bailouts and more in opposition to the
financial bailouts after their passage.
The finding that the level of employment has no impact on support but the industry of
the firm is supported by a number of other tests. Figure 3.3 plots means levels of support
for bailouts by the four different treatments. Again we see that levels of support are virtu-
ally identical within an industry, but levels of support are quite different across industries.
Support is higher for the auto parts manufacturer than for the bank, regardless of the num-
ber of employees, while support is constant within the bank and auto parts manufacturer
treatments. Further, Tables 3.10 reports difference-in-means tests of levels of support by the
industry of the firm and the number of its employees. Mean levels of support are higher
for both auto parts manufacturers than for both banks (a difference of -0.490 significant at
the 99.9% confidence level), while there is no significant difference in support for firms with
5,000 employees versus those with 250 employees.
Table 3.11 reports the results of a series of OLS regressions of support on the experimental
treatments as well as a series of covariates. To control for demographic characteristics,
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Table 3.10: Differences in Means Tests by Treatment
Difference in Support P-Value
Bank Versus Auto -0.49 0.00
5,000 Emp. Versus 250 Emp. -0.06 0.63
Education, a three-point ordinal scale,38 Age, a for-point ordinal scale,39 and Male, a male
gender dummy, are included. To control for partisanship, Party ID, coded as 1 for Democrat,
2 for Independent, and 3 for Republican), is included. Summary statistics are shown in
Table C.2 in Appendix C.1.
Model 1 includes all of the treatment categories, with Bank, 250 Emp. acting as a base-
line, as well as the covariates. Here we see that both auto parts manufacturing treatments
38The groupings are secondary education or less; some tertiary education; or a tertiary degree or more.
39The groupings are as follows: age 19 to 34, age 35 to 50, age 51 to 66, and age 67 to 74
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Table 3.11: OLS Regressions Estimating Bailout Support in the Second Experiment
1 2
Bank, 5,000 Emp. -0.02 (0.16)
Auto Mfr., 250 Emp. 0.49∗ (0.14)
Auto Mfr., 5,000 Emp. 0.60∗ (0.16)
Bank -0.55∗ (0.11)
5,000 Emp. 0.05 (0.11)
Education -0.07 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08)
Age -0.16∗ (0.08) -0.16∗ (0.08)
Male -0.55∗ (0.12) -0.55∗ (0.12)
White -0.35∗ (0.13) -0.35∗ (0.13)
Party ID -0.33∗ (0.08) -0.33∗ (0.08)
Constant 4.09∗ (0.31) 4.61∗ (0.30)
Observations 456 456
R2 0.16 0.16
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
OLS models. Dependent variable is a five point index of bailout
support. Party ID is coded as follows: 1 = Dem., 2 = Ind.,
3 = Rep. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Two-tailed
tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
increase support for bailouts. Model 2 examines the impact of the pooled industry and
employee treatments. Here we see that respondents who were assigned either bank vignette
are less supportive of bailouts, while being assigned either higher employment vignette has
no impact. Thus while the industrial difference holds, the employee difference does not.
Once again, heterogenous treatment effects by partisanship are explored. Here the con-
ditional average causal effect of the Bank and 5,000 Employees treatments are estimated by
partisanship. The included covariates are those used in Table 3.11. The first panel of Fig-
ure 3.4 plots the estimated CACE of the Bank treatment by partisanship. While Republicans
appear more supportive of assisting a bank, as opposed to an auto parts manufacturer, the
p-value of 0.95 on a two-sided Wald test implies that partisanship does not in fact mediate
this treatment effect. The second panel plots the estimated CACE of the 5,000 Employees
treatment by partisanship. Again, Republicans appear more sympathetic to the fate of the
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larger firm than do Democrats; however, the p-value of 0.33 on a two-sided Wald test indi-
cates that there is no evidence that partisanship moderates this treatment effect, conditional
upon age, gender, race, and education.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored the questions of whether the public supports bailouts, and
why. Using existing American and German survey data, I have found that public opinion
varies significantly from one bailout to the next, and is in some cases supportive. I further
developed a set of explanations for why some voters might be more supportive of bailouts
than others, as well as why some bailouts are popular while others are not. The explanations
involve four factors: the culpability of the firm for its own distress, the economic self-interest
of voters, sociotropic preferences, and partisanship and ideology. Using the same set of
surveys, I find that respondents who have a material stake in the fate of the target firm are
more supportive of bailing it out, and that voters who support left-wing political parties, or
espouse an ideologically liberal perspective, are as well. Those who blame the target firm for
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its own plight tend to be opposed to assisting it, as do those who think that bailouts fail to
benefit society as a whole. Finally, using two new survey experiments, I have attempted to
identify the causal impact of these four explanations. I have found that sociotropic concerns
are relevant as respondents support assisting a firm that, if it were to go bankrupt, would
cause national, as opposed to regional, economic distress. None of the other explanations
have a causal impact on bailout support, and I find no evidence that the treatment effects
of the explanations are heterogenous across partisanship and income.
These findings are consistent with a historical record that shows some bailouts passing by
popular decree and others facing near-universal public opposition. Taken together, however,
the results present a very different picture of the politics of bailouts than the one that is
commonly presented in the literature. As scholars usually consider bailouts to be narrow
transfers to firm and industry specific beneficiaries that come at the expense of diffuse
taxpayers (Keefer, 2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009), they assume that the public is opposed.
As I have shown, however, bailouts are not universally unpopular, and some groups in society
support them. Political economists would therefore be wise to reconsider this assumption
when developing future models exploring the likelihood and targeting of corporate lifelines.
This assumption of the universal unpopularity of bailouts should therefore be replaced with
a more nuanced understanding of support for bailouts that sees some sizable groups of voters
as supportive.
Further, I have found that voters’ predisposition towards bailouts in general are a more
relevant factor in determining their support for a specific bailout than are the characteristics
of the firm in need. While the experiments find that support is largely constant across
descriptions of hypothetical distressed firms, respondent characteristics, including income,
partisanship, and ideology, appear to operate strongly in the same direction across cases.
Thus re-election seeking politicians should strongly consider how the characteristics of their
electoral constituencies would inform their degree of support for any bailout, regardless of
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its specific features, when choosing whether or not to authorize one. If a key electoral
constituency approves of bailouts, it may be in these politicians’ self-interest to authorize
them, regardless of whether or not the recipient firm can be seen in sympathetic terms.
These findings also undermine the centrality of special interests in driving bailouts, calling
in to question a second assumption commonly employed in the literature. Existing analyses
of the politics of bailouts generally conceive of them almost exclusively as targeted transfers
to special interest groups (Keefer, 2002, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009), potentially in exchange
for campaign contributions (Dorsch, 2013) and lobbying expenditures (Blau, Brough and
Thomas, 2013). In so far as policymakers are able to curry favor with key electoral con-
stituencies through the authorization of bailouts, they will be less concerned with with their
impact on lobbying groups. This isn’t to say that lobbying is irrelevant, but instead that in
situations where a re-election seeking politician can use a bailout to secure a bump in the
polls, she may be less concerned about its impact on special interest groups. If politicians
of particular partisan orientations stand to gain votes from authorizing bailouts, whether
or not the target firm and its counterparties have enlisted lobbyists may be irrelevant. A
resulting question is whether politicians operating in different institutional contexts place
more or less weight on public opinion over bailouts. In countries with strong parties and
proportional electoral laws, for example, elected officials may be particularly likely to au-
thorize bailouts supported by their traditional electoral constituencies in order to maximize
their vote share. Politicians instead operating in institutional contexts where campaign con-
tributions are critical to ensuring re-election, or where electoral geography is of particular
relevance, may disregard aggregate public opinion, instead seeking to authorize bailouts that
their lobbyists favor, or bailouts that ensure the enduring employment of their constituents,
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Appendix to “Who Gets a Lifeline?”
A.1 Descriptive Tables
Table A.1 reports counts of distressed firms and bailouts by country; Table A.2 by industry;
and Table A.3 by year.
Table A.1: Distressed Firms and Bailouts by Country
Country Distressed Bailouts Ratio
USA 207 30 0.14
UK 64 12 0.19
Japan 49 13 0.27
FRG/Germany 41 11 0.27
ROK 37 11 0.30
France 27 13 0.48
Mexico 20 4 0.20
Canada 20 3 0.15
Italy 19 8 0.42
Russia 16 7 0.44
Poland 9 1 0.11
Belgium 8 5 0.62
Indonesia 7 3 0.43
Netherlands 7 3 0.43
Norway 7 3 0.43
PRC 6 3 0.50
Spain 6 2 0.33
Brazil 6 1 0.17
Switzerland 6 1 0.17
Ireland 5 2 0.40
Thailand 5 2 0.40
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Country Distressed Bailouts Ratio
Czech Rep. 4 1 0.25
Denmark 4 1 0.25
Argentina 4 0 0.00
Taiwan 4 0 0.00
Greece 3 2 0.67
Malaysia 3 2 0.67
India 3 1 0.33
Israel 3 1 0.33
Australia 3 0 0.00
Sweden 3 0 0.00
New Zealand 2 2 1.00
Kazakhstan 2 1 0.50
Philippines 2 1 0.50
Luxembourg 2 0 0.00
Singapore 2 0 0.00
Slovakia 2 0 0.00
Finland 1 1 1.00
Hungary 1 1 1.00
Latvia 1 1 1.00
Nigeria 1 1 1.00
Portugal 1 1 1.00
Romania 1 1 1.00
UAE 1 1 1.00
Austria 1 0 0.00
Bosnia-Herz 1 0 0.00
Bulgaria 1 0 0.00
Chile 1 0 0.00
Ghana 1 0 0.00
S. Africa 1 0 0.00
A.2 Robustness Checks
A.2.1 Partisan Cycles and the Macroeconomy
While the data show a strong relationship between left-wing governance and the issuance of
bailouts, a possible counter-argument is that this reflects the influence of broader macroe-
conomic conditions that have both pushed the left-wing party in to power and created
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Table A.2: Distressed Firms and Bailouts by Industry
NAICS Industry Distressed Bailouts Ratio
31 Manufacturing 159 36 0.23
52 Finance & Insurance 112 52 0.46
48 Transportation 94 33 0.35
51 Information 60 5 0.08
44 Retail Trade 34 1 0.03
23 Construction 32 5 0.16
42 Wholesale Trade 25 6 0.24
22 Utilities 19 6 0.32
53 Real Estate 19 2 0.11
81 Other Services 15 2 0.13
54 Professional Services 13 3 0.23
71 Arts, Recreation 13 2 0.15
21 Natural Resources 12 1 0.08
99 Other 12 1 0.08
72 Hospitality 8 0 0.00
62 Health Care 3 0 0.00
61 Educational Services 1 0 0.00
conditions requiring bailouts. In order to examine this possibility, I measure the difference
in means between a number of country-level variables between years in the sample under
left-wing governance and years that are not under left-wing governance. To produce these
results, I aggregate the data up to the country-year level. As a result, the sample size used
for the difference-in-means tests reflects the total number of unique country-years in the
data, not all of the firm-level observations. Failure to perform this operation would lead to
biased results in so far as the values are clustered by country-year. The idea is that if this
partisan financial cycle is the cause of both left-wing governance and bailouts, we should see
left-wing governments presiding over county-years that are significantly worse in terms of
macroeconomic indicators. The results, shown in Table A.4, do not support this assertion.
Left-wing governments preside over higher GDP per capita, higher GDP per capita growth,
lower unemployment growth, and lower inflation.
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Table A.3: Distressed Firms and Bailouts by Year
Year Distressed Bailouts Ratio
1987 15 4 0.27
1988 4 1 0.25
1989 4 1 0.25
1990 12 3 0.25
1991 17 5 0.29
1992 19 2 0.11
1993 16 2 0.12
1994 15 7 0.47
1995 12 2 0.17
1996 29 10 0.34
1997 29 11 0.38
1998 30 11 0.37
1999 32 5 0.16
2000 25 8 0.32
2001 56 14 0.25
2002 60 13 0.22
2003 38 7 0.18
2004 30 6 0.20
2005 19 0 0.00
2006 5 1 0.20
2007 19 1 0.05
2008 52 20 0.38
2009 55 20 0.36
2010 13 0 0.00
2011 25 1 0.04
A.2.2 Robustness Check: Alternative Partisanship Measure, Coun-
try Dummies, and Press Freedom
I next examine whether the results are sensitive to alternative measures of partisanship. To
do so, I construct L Gov. Share using the DPI data. This variable records the share of
total legislative seats in a country-year that are held by left-wing parties. I then interact
this term with Employees. Models 1 and 2 in Table A.5 report multilevel logit models with
random intercepts varying by country and year that estimate the impact of these variables
on bailout probabilities. While L Gov. Share has a positive but insignificant impact on
bailouts in isolation, the interaction term L Gov. Share x Employees has a positive and
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Table A.4: Differences in Means Tests by Government Partisanship
Variable Left-Wing Not Difference P. Value
GDP pc 26671.31 23463.33 3207.98 0.03
GDP pc Growth 2.03 0.98 1.05 0.02
Unemployment 7.38 7.47 -0.09 0.88
Unemp. Growth 0.34 7.09 -6.75 0.04
Inflation 4.00 14.46 -10.46 0.09
Inflation Growth -5.57 19.85 -25.42 0.46
Number of Observations 80 173 - -
significant impact on bailout probabilities.
Models 3 and 4 include country dummies for the four largest contributors of firms to the
data set, the USA, the UK, Germany, and Japan, in order to examine whether the results
are driven by factors specific to these countries. Even when these dummies are included,
Left and L x Employees remain positive and significant.
Finally, to control for whether varying degrees of press freedoms across countries im-
pact the results, Freedom House’s (2013) annual cross-national data is employed as Media
Freedom. The measure of press freedom is constructed by a panel of analysts who gather
information from professional contacts, travel, international visitors, reports issues by human
rights and press freedom organizations, governments, and multinationals organizations, and
domestic and international news media. Freedom House assigns countries a score that is
based on whether the legal, political and economic environment limits press freedoms. See
the methodology section of Freedom House (2013) for a full account. Since Freedom House
does not report the raw scores it assigns countries in every year, the variable is instead
constructed using the three-point scheme developed by Freedom House that classifies the
media in a given country-year as “Not Free” (0), “Partly Free” (1), or “Free” (2) as this
information is available for the entire sample. Note that in 1987 Freedom House reported
values for print and broadcast media independently; since the methodology used in this
paper exploited print media only, the print scores are used for this year.
Models 5 and 6 include Media Freedom. The results remain virtually unchanged.
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Table A.5: Multilevel Logit Models With Alternative Partisanships Measures and Additional
Controls
1 2 3 4 5 6
Assets 1.23∗ 1.00∗ 1.29∗ 1.14∗ 1.29∗ 1.10∗
(0.32) (0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.35) (0.37)
Employees -2.04 -5.28+ -1.60 -3.68 -1.84 -4.02
(1.78) (3.11) (1.86) (3.14) (1.84) (3.20)
Finance -0.15 0.18 0.10 0.23 0.03 0.20
(0.54) (0.56) (0.61) (0.62) (0.59) (0.60)
Election, t+1 -0.63+ -0.72+ -0.75+ -0.84∗ -0.67+ -0.78+
(0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40)
Polity -0.24∗ -0.27∗ -0.17∗ -0.20∗ -0.09 -0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Polcon III 5.11∗ 5.55∗ 3.11 3.49 5.64∗ 6.09∗
(1.85) (1.87) (2.21) (2.30) (1.91) (1.94)
L Gov. Share 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
L Gov. Share x Employees 0.16∗
(0.07)
Left 0.89∗ 0.55 0.86∗ 0.50
(0.36) (0.40) (0.33) (0.37)










Media Freedom -1.10+ -1.20∗
(0.58) (0.59)
Constant -1.71∗ -1.45∗ -1.58∗ -1.39+ -1.42+ -1.18
(0.72) (0.73) (0.80) (0.81) (0.80) (0.81)
Observations 321 321 318 318 318 318
Countries 28 28 26 26 26 26
AIC 313.28 308.52 310.84 308.14 305.03 301.31
BIC 351.00 350.01 363.51 364.57 346.42 346.45
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multilevel logit models. Random intercepts vary by country and year. Standard
errors reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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A.2.3 Robustness Check: Bootstrap Clustered Standard Errors
As a second robustness check, these result are re-estimated using logit models with boot-
strap clustered standard errors by country. All models include year fixed-effects. Note that
including the year fixed effects causes the exclusion of some further observations due to the
fact that some years hold only firms that are not bailed out, causing perfect prediction of
failure.
Table A.6 reproduces Table 1.3 with this alternative estimation mechanism. As we see
in Model 1, the simple systemic risk argument again finds partial support, with Assets hold-
ing a positive and significant coefficient, and Employees and Finance holding negative but
insignificant coefficients. In the second model that includes the special interest lobbying
variables, we see that both Election, t+1 and Polity have negative but insignificant relation-
ships with the probability of a bailout occurring. Polcon III again has a strongly positive
impact. The third model includes Left, which we see still has a statistically significant and
positive coefficient. Model 4 repeats this exercise but with the Right dummy, and model 6
with Center. We find that right governments are less likely to bail out any firm, on average,
and that centrist government again have no impact. Model 6 includes the interaction of
Employees and Left. The impact of left-wing governance is again increasing in the num-
ber of employees in the firm, though the coefficient is statistically insignificant, potentially
due to the previously described loss of observations associated with the inclusion of year
fixed-effects.
Table A.7 is a replica of Table A.6 but with the control variables added. The results are
broadly consistent across specifications as previously reported. As we see in Model 1, the
simple systemic risk argument again finds partial support, with Assets holding a positive
and significant coefficient, and Employees and Finance holding negative but insignificant
coefficients. In the second model that includes the special interest lobbying variables, we
see that both Election, t+1 and Polity have negative but insignificant relationships with the
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Table A.6: BCSE Logit Models Estimating Bailout Probability Without Controls
1 2 3 4 5 6
Assets 1.09* 0.96* 1.39* 1.38* 1.26* 1.24*
(0.34) (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) (0.32) (0.27)
Employees -1.18 -1.66 -2.21 -2.24 -1.88 -4.30
(2.42) (2.69) (2.81) (2.70) (3.01) (2.66)
Finance -0.48 -0.24 -0.64+ -0.61+ -0.45 -0.47
(0.42) (0.38) (0.36) (0.34) (0.41) (0.32)
Election, t+1 -0.67 -0.63 -0.61 -0.52 -0.74
(0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.50) (0.56)
Polity -0.21 -0.25 -0.23 -0.24 -0.27
(0.15) (0.31) (0.30) (0.37) (0.34)
Polcon III 4.46* 5.61* 5.67* 4.39* 5.88*







L x Employees 11.40
(9.59)
Constant -2.98* -0.64 -1.37 -0.65 -0.50 -1.09
(0.48) (1.55) (3.45) (3.20) (4.00) (3.75)
Observations 289 272 263 263 263 263
Countries 31 29 24 24 24 24
Replications 1080 1840 3001 3001 2204 3001
Pseudo-R2 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.19
AIC 326.24 313.52 293.20 292.08 300.00 290.35
BIC 392.23 385.64 364.64 363.52 371.44 365.37
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bootstrap clustered standard errors (by country) reported in parentheses.
All models include year fixed effects. Two-tailed tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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probability of a bailout occurring. Polcon III again has a positive impact, though it is now
only statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level. The third model includes Left, which we
see still has a positive coefficient, though it is now only significant at the p < 0.10 level.
Model 4 repeats this exercise but with the Right dummy, and model 6 with Center. We
find that right governments are less likely to bail out any firm, on average, and that centrist
government again have no impact. Model 6 includes the interaction of Employees and Left.
The impact of left-wing governance is again increasing in the number of employees in the
firm, though the coefficient is statistically insignificant.
A.2.4 Robustness Check: Multiple Imputation
As was discussed in the descriptive statistics section of the paper, the dataset has a significant
amount of missing data, particularly at the firm level. Some variables, such as Employees
and Z-score, are missing as many as 50% of their observations. To account for the possibility
that the findings in the prior model specifications, estimated by listwise deletion, could have
biased results, I generate fifty separate versions of the dataset via multiple imputation and
then reestimate the multilevel logit models across these imputed datasets.1 Note that in
order for the following results to hold, we must assume that the missing data is missing at
random, an ultimately untestable assumption. This assumption implies that the probability
that a particular cell is missing can depend on the observed data, but once the observed data
is controlled for, it must not depend on the values of the missing data (Allison, 2002; King
et al., 2001). As the values of the missing data are not known, it is impossible to compare
the values on the variable with missingness across those firms that do or do not have missing
data. Multiple imputation is possible as long as the pattern of missingness is ignorable –
“the parameters that govern the missing data process are unrelated to the parameters to be
1If data is not missing completely at random but is instead missing at random, listwise deletion can lead
to biased results. See Allison (2002); King et al. (2001).
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Table A.7: BCSE Logit Models Estimating Bailout Probability With Controls
1 2 3 4 5 6
Assets 1.41* 1.25* 1.43* 1.37* 1.36* 1.30*
(0.41) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.40)
Employees -2.43 -3.17 -2.92 -2.82 -2.82 -7.08
(3.28) (3.29) (3.67) (3.61) (4.06) (4.84)
Finance -0.52 -0.24 -0.40 -0.34 -0.31 -0.24
(0.45) (0.41) (0.38) (0.37) (0.41) (0.38)
Election, t+1 -0.82 -0.85 -0.86 -0.76 -0.96
(0.69) (0.80) (0.75) (0.68) (0.85)
Polity -0.29 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.38
(0.25) (0.72) (0.71) (0.64) (0.73)
Polcon III 4.42+ 5.00 4.94 4.21 5.09







L x Employees 14.84
(12.28)
Z-score -0.38+ -0.40+ -0.33+ -0.35+ -0.36 -0.32
(0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22)
GDP pc Growth 0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06
(0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Unemp. Growth 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
WTO Member -30.87* -30.88* -15.25* -14.31* -14.26 -12.70*
(1.81) (1.76) (4.69) (4.57) (9.15) (4.79)
EU Member 0.38 0.74 0.38 0.39 0.68 0.64
(0.49) (0.49) (0.77) (0.78) (0.70) (0.84)
Constant 27.60* 30.91* 14.91* 14.78* 14.76+ 12.79*
(2.07) (3.01) (3.37) (3.32) (8.34) (3.47)
Observations 275 259 251 251 251 251
Countries 29 27 23 23 23 23
Replications 1114 1846 1784 1780 1522 1782
Pseudo-R2 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.22
AIC 301.01 288.56 279.36 279.63 283.34 274.43
BIC 384.20 377.48 367.50 367.77 371.47 366.09
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bootstrap clustered standard errors (by country) reported in parentheses.
All models include year fixed effects. Two-tailed tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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estimated” (Allison, 2002: 5).
To perform multiple imputation, I use Honaker and King’s Amelia II package for R
(King et al., 2001; Honaker and King, 2010). The imputed datasets are generated using all
of the variables employed in the previous estimations, the current values and one-year lags of
these variables, and country, industry and year dummies. Further, current and lagged values
of measures of firm collateral and leverage are included. Leverage is measured as the ratio of
a firm’s debt to its total assets and collateral as the ratio of the firm’s property, plant, and
equipment to its total assets, per Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006). These variables
are excluded from the main analysis as they have an even greater degree of missingness than
the variables used in the estimations
I specify that the dichotomous variables in the dataset are nominal and set bounds on
Assets as between 0 and 3, on Employees as between 0 and 1, on Z-score as between 0 and
5, on Polcon III as between 0 and 1, and on Polity as between −10 and 10. Once the 50
multiply imputed datasets are generated, they are read in to Stata 12 for analysis. Using
Stata’s set of mi features designed to operate on multiply imputed data, multilevel logit
models with random intercepts varying by country2 are estimated for all 50 datasets and
then coefficients are calculated by taking the mean across the estimations and standard errors
by Rubin (1978)’s rules, which involves combining the average of the the squared standard
errors across the 50 imputations (the within variance) with the variance of the estimated
coefficients across the imputations (the between variance).
Table A.8 reproduces the results shown in Table 1.4 which were estimated by multilevel
logit and which included all independent and control variables. The results are broadly
consistent with those estimated upon the original data that included missing observations.
We see in Model 1 that Assets still has a positive and statistically significant relationships
2Unfortunately, the models would not converge when random intercepts varying by year or year fixed-
effects were included.
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Table A.8: Multilevel Logit Models Using Multiply Imputed Data
1 2 3 4 5 6
Assets 1.38∗ 1.38∗ 1.43∗ 1.35∗ 1.39∗ 1.42∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27)
Employees -2.35+ -2.51+ -2.82+ -2.54+ -2.54+ -3.50
(1.43) (1.46) (1.50) (1.49) (1.48) (2.14)
Finance 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.18
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Election, t+1 -0.58∗ -0.67∗ -0.62∗ -0.58∗ -0.67∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Polity -0.10∗ -0.09+ -0.07 -0.10∗ -0.10+
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Polcon III 1.29 1.54 1.31 1.32 1.57







L x Employees 1.25
(2.42)
Z Score -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21 -0.19 -0.20
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
GDP pc Growth -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Unemp. Growth 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
WTO -0.32 -0.40 -0.48 -0.41 -0.40 -0.48
(0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30)
EU Member 0.36 0.56+ 0.39 0.41 0.56+ 0.40
(0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.36) (0.32) (0.36)
Constant -1.45∗ -0.90+ -1.16∗ -0.83 -0.90+ -1.11∗
(0.31) (0.49) (0.52) (0.52) (0.49) (0.53)
Observations 631 631 631 631 631 631
Countries 50 50 50 50 50 50
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multilevel logit models estimating using 50 multiply imputed datasets.
Random intercepts vary by country. Standard errors reported in paren-
theses. Two-tailed tests: + p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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with bailouts, while Employees and Finance have negative and insignificant coefficients.
The results for the special interests measures appear somewhat different in these specifica-
tions, however, likely due to the fact that the number of countries has increased significantly
(from a maximum of 32 in prior specifications to 50), potentially allowing for more precise
estimation of the country-level variables. For example, while Polcon III has become statisti-
cally insignificant, Polity and Election, t+1 now have a stronger negative relationship with
bailouts. In terms of the impact of partisanship, left-wing governments, are shown in Model
3, are more likely to authorize bailouts, and as is shown in Model 4, right-wing governments
remain less likely to authorize bailouts. The interaction between left-wing governance and
the number of employees remains positive, though it has lost statistical significance.
A.2.5 Robustness Check: Industry-Level Random Intercept
In order to control for industry-level heterogeneity, the models shown in Table A.9 report
estimates of multilevel logit models with random intercepts that vary by country, year, and
industry. The models take the following form:
Pr(yi = 1) = logit






γt = εt (A.3)
ψk = εk (A.4)
In these equations, firms are indexed by i, countries by j, time by t and industry by k.
Industry is measured using NAICS 2007 2-digit codes of which there are 17 in the dataset.
Equations 5, 6, and 7 show how the country, year, and industry intercepts are modeled,
respectively. The dependent variable, yi, is a dummy indicator for whether or not firm i
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receives a bailout. X[i] represents a vector of firm-level independent and control variables
and β a vector of the associated coefficients, while Zj and φ act in the same way for country-
level independent and control variables. εj, εt and εk represent country, year, and industry
level error terms that are assumed to be normally distributed as εj ∼ N(0, σ2country), εt ∼
N(0, σ2year) and εk ∼ N(0, σ2industry). The results are consistent with those found in Table 1.4.
A.3 Data Sources
Table A.10 reports where information regarding sitting members of government was found
by country.
Table A.10: Data Sources By Country










































































Table A.9: Multilevel Logit Models With Random Intercepts Varying by Country, Industry,
and Year
1 2 3 4 5 6
Assets 1.21∗ 1.15∗ 1.33∗ 1.26∗ 1.19∗ 1.12∗
(0.38) (0.36) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.45)
Employees -2.14 -2.57 -2.40 -2.28 -2.09 -7.37
(2.19) (2.02) (2.20) (2.19) (2.00) (5.65)
Finance 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.16
(0.81) (0.74) (0.83) (0.82) (0.77) (0.83)
Election, t+1 -0.85∗ -0.88∗ -0.86∗ -0.75+ -0.99∗
(0.41) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.45)
Polity -0.30∗ -0.32∗ -0.31∗ -0.32∗ -0.36∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Polcon III 4.68∗ 5.58∗ 5.19∗ 4.40∗ 5.47∗







L x Employees 16.69∗
(6.78)
Z-score -0.15 -0.21 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18
(0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
GDP pc Growth -0.04 -0.15∗ -0.18∗ -0.18∗ -0.16∗ -0.18∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Unemp. Growth 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
WTO Member 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 0.16 0.18 0.03
(0.57) (0.55) (0.60) (0.62) (0.60) (0.61)
EU Member -0.05 0.54 0.23 0.21 0.48 0.43
(0.60) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.42)
Constant -1.78∗ -0.49 -1.13 -0.44 -0.50 -0.38
(0.65) (0.94) (1.06) (1.04) (1.02) (1.04)
Observations 328 312 306 306 306 306
Countries 30 29 25 25 25 25
AIC 315.11 302.36 289.34 290.09 295.29 285.71
BIC 360.63 358.50 348.92 349.67 354.87 345.29
Prob > χ2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multilevel logit models. Random intercepts vary by country, year, and industry.




Appendix to “Picking Winners by
Saving Losers”
B.1 Data Description
Table B.1 reports the number of bailouts by countries in the dataset, while Table B.2 reports
bailouts by sector and Table B.3 reports bailouts by year.
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B.2 Robustness Checks
B.2.1 Alternative Measure of Partisanship
Table B.4 shows models identical to those estimated above in Section 2.5.2, Table 2.3 but
with Potrafke’s (2009) measures of partisanship in place of the DPI measure. Dummy indica-
tors for governments at the extreme left and right ends of Potrafke’s ideology spectrum have
no statistically significant effect on bailouts, and the coefficient on the right-wing governance
interaction is now negative. However, when the interaction between the continuous Ideology
measure and K/L is employed, it again has a negative, though insignificant coefficient, im-
plying that as governments move to the left, they provide fewer bailouts to capital-intensive
sectors. Though the results in this exercise are certainly weaker than the primary results,
they aren’t completely inconsistent. Further, the notably smaller number of countries in-
cluded in these specifications (17 versus 22) might partially explain this discrepancy.
B.2.2 Multilevel Poisson Models
The multilevel Poisson models estimated in table B.5 are comprised of three levels, tji:
(1) the country-industry-year, (2) the country-industry, and (3) the country. The subscript
indexes are reversed in order to indicate the nature of clustering. The models take the
following form:
ytji ∼ Poisson(exp(Xtiβ + Ztjζ + φ(2)ji + φ
(3)
i + γt + εtji)) (B.1)
Again, Xti represents a matrix of country-year independent variables and β the associated
coefficients, while Ztj represents a matrix of country-industry-year independent variables and
ζ the associated coefficients. φ
(2)
ji , distributed as φ
(2)
ji ∼ N(0, ψ(2)) and φ
(3)
i , distributed as
φ
(3)
i ∼ N(0, ψ(3)) are random intercept that vary at the sector and country levels respectively.
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γt represents a vector of year fixed effects. I opt to include the years as a fixed effect and
not as a random intercept due to the small amount of variance expected over only 13 years.
Table B.5 reports the results from identical models estimated previously as the negative
binomial models shown in Section 2.5.2, Table 2.3. The results are virtually identical. While
the interaction of Left and K/L has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on bailout
counts, the interaction of Right and K/L has a positive and statistically significant impact.
Thus the result presented in the main paper are not an artifact of the model specification.
Table B.6 estimates replicates the models shown in section 2.5.2, table 2.4 as multi-
level poisson models. The results are virtually identical between the negative binomial and
multilevel Poisson specifications.
B.2.3 Results Excluding Negative Decisions
Table B.7 reports unconditional negative binomial estimates identical to those shown in
Section 2.5.2, Table 2.3 save for the use of a different dependent variable. Rather than
including all cases of state aid by country-sector-year reported by the EU Commission and
the EFTA Surveillance Authority, only those cases that are deemed to be in accordance
with state aid law are kept. By excluding cases of state aid that is deemed illegal by either
authority, the hope is to eliminate the possibility that the results are driven by governments
who authorize bailouts in order to gain short-term credit knowing that they will be able to
blame international authorities in the future when the aid has to be returned.
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Table B.2: Bailouts by Sector
NACE Sector Bailouts
A Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 13
B Mining and quarrying 4
C Manufacturing 150
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 4
E Water supply; sewerage; waste managment and remediation activities 2
F Construction 8
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1
H Transporting and storage 46
I Accommodation and food service activities 4
J Information and communication 9
K Financial and insurance activities 135
L Real estate activities 0
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 2
N Administrative and support service activities 1
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0
P Education 2
Q Human health and social work activities 0
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 0
S Other services activities 2
- Total 383

















Table B.4: Partisan Preferences Models Using Potrafke Data
1 2 3 4 5 6
Left (Potrafke) 0.05 0.56
(0.28) (0.38)
Left (P) x K/L -0.77
(0.63)
Right (Potrafke) 0.02 0.14
(0.29) (0.80)




Ideology x K/L -0.23
(0.47)
K/L -1.82 -1.53 -1.84 -1.75 -1.82 -1.17
(1.72) (1.76) (1.74) (1.54) (1.72) (2.48)
Polcon III -0.27 -0.13 -0.36 -0.39 -0.31 -0.22
(1.59) (1.42) (1.62) (1.53) (1.61) (1.45)
GDP Growth -0.24+ -0.22+ -0.24∗ -0.25∗ -0.24∗ -0.24∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant -17.27∗ -18.42∗ -20.48∗ -17.16∗ -17.59∗ -18.36∗
(1.74) (1.72) (1.80) (1.78) (1.89) (2.03)
ln(α) -0.39+ -0.43+ -0.38+ -0.38+ -0.38+ -0.40+
(0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Observations 2694 2694 2694 2694 2694 2694
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17
Prob > χ2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AIC 662.4 659.4 644.4 650.4 640.4 648.2
Country-Sector F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unconditional fixed effects negative binomial models. Dependent
variable is the annual count of bailouts by country-sector.
Sector is defined by NACE Revision 2 codes. Robust standard
errors, clustered by country, reported in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests: +p< 0.10, * p< 0.05
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Table B.5: Partisan Preferences Multilevel Poisson Models
Dependent variable:
Bailout Counts by Country-Sector-Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left 0.27 0.71∗
(0.20) (0.39)




Right × K/L 0.92∗
(0.52)
K/L 0.22 0.39 0.22 −0.45
(0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.54)
Polcon 1.83 1.79 0.94 0.91
(1.20) (1.20) (1.04) (1.05)
GDP Growth −0.20∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.22∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Intercept 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.29
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Observations 3,373 3,373 3,373 3,373
Log Likelihood -562.16 -561.18 -562.99 -561.18
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,162.33 1,162.37 1,163.97 1,162.35
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,278.68 1,284.84 1,280.32 1,284.82
Note: Two-tailed tests: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05
Multilevel poisson models. Random coefficients vary
by country and sector. Models include year fixed
effects. Dependent variable is the count of bail-
outs that occur in each country-sector-year. Stand-
ard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table B.6: Globalization and Social Protection Multilevel Poisson Models
Dependent variable:
Bailout Counts by Country-Sector-Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IM Penetration −0.04∗∗ −0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)














Polcon 1.88∗∗ 1.39 −0.66 1.26 1.03 2.19∗ 0.29
(0.93) (0.97) (1.45) (0.97) (0.92) (1.32) (1.13)
GDP Growth −0.19∗∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.46∗∗ −0.31∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.27∗∗ −0.21∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Intercept −6.83∗∗ −4.21∗∗ −2.85∗∗ −5.09∗∗ −5.75∗∗ −5.02∗∗ −3.65∗∗
(0.92) (0.93) (0.99) (0.83) (0.87) (1.14) (1.07)
Observations 4,962 1,786 3,591 4,047 3,003 2,993 1,479
Log Likelihood -610.96 -570.29 -384.29 -699.87 -565.63 -393.27 -458.77
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,257.92 1,176.59 796.57 1,433.73 1,167.26 828.53 959.55
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,375.09 1,275.36 883.18 1,540.93 1,275.39 954.62 1,070.83
Note: Two-tailed tests: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05
Multilevel poisson models. Random coefficients vary by country
and sector. Models include year fixed effects. Dependent
variable is the count of bailouts that occur in each country-
sector-year. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table B.7: Models Excluding Illegal Bailouts
1 2 3 4
Left 0.49 1.73∗
(0.39) (0.62)




Right x K/L 2.30∗
(0.78)
K/L -1.22 -0.05 -1.02 -2.27
(2.10) (2.15) (2.04) (1.65)
Polcon III 3.95 3.89 2.61 2.81
(2.69) (2.68) (2.23) (2.14)
GDP Growth -0.26+ -0.22+ -0.31∗ -0.25+
(0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13)
Constant -19.51∗ -21.29∗ -18.83∗ -20.08∗
(2.61) (2.55) (2.33) (2.02)
ln(α) -0.67∗ -0.79∗ -0.61∗ -0.79∗
(0.30) (0.36) (0.29) (0.35)
Observations 3030 3030 3030 3030
Countries 22 22 22 22
Prob > χ2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AIC 685.0 704.2 679.1 668.0
Country-Sector F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unconditional fixed effects negative binomial models. Dependent
variable is the annual count of bailouts deemed to be in
accordance with state aid rules by country-sector. Sector is
defined by NACE Revision 2 codes. Robust standard errors,
clustered by country, reported in parentheses. Two-tailed




Appendix to “Predicting Public
Support for Corporate Bailouts”
C.1 Summary Statistics
Table C.1: MTurk Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Support (1-5 Scale) 2.77 1.25 1 5 497
T1 (Bank, 250 Emp.) 0.27 0.44 0 1 497
T2 (Bank, 5,000 Emp.) 0.19 0.39 0 1 497
T3 (Auto Mfr., 250 Emp.) 0.3 0.46 0 1 497
T4 (Auto Mfr., 5,000 Emp.) 0.25 0.43 0 1 497
T1 and T2 (Bank) 0.46 0.5 0 1 497
T3 and T4 (Auto Mfr.) 0.54 0.5 0 1 497
T1 and T3 (250 Emp.) 0.56 0.5 0 1 497
T2 and T4 (5,000 Emp.) 0.44 0.5 0 1 497
Education 2.41 0.66 1 3 496
Age 1.47 0.73 1 4 497
Male 0.64 0.48 0 1 497
White 0.76 0.43 0 1 495
Party ID 1.68 0.72 1 3 459
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Table C.2: YouGov Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Support 2.84 1.3 1 5 2000
Reason 0.75 0.83 0 2 2000
Impact 0.76 0.83 0 2 2000
Size 0.77 0.84 0 2 2000
Cause 0.75 0.83 0 2 2000
Market Downturn 0.25 0.43 0 1 2000
Poor Management 0.25 0.43 0 1 2000
Local Impact 0.24 0.43 0 1 2000
National Impact 0.26 0.44 0 1 2000
50,000 Employees 0.23 0.42 0 1 2000
125,000 Employees 0.27 0.44 0 1 2000
Causes Job Loss 0.25 0.43 0 1 2000
Causes Stock Decline 0.25 0.43 0 1 2000
Male 0.43 0.5 0 1 2000
White 0.71 0.45 0 1 2000
Democrat 0.25 0.43 0 1 1817
Liberal 0.29 0.46 0 1 1799
C.2 Survey Question Wording
C.3 Descriptive Results of Support for Bailouts
C.3.1 American Surveys
Tables C.6 and C.7 show levels of support for the auto and financial bailouts by respondent
income using pooled data from the ABC News/Washington Post polls. While support for
the auto bailout is relatively constant across income categories, wealthier respondents are
significantly more supportive of the financial bailout than less wealthy individuals.
Table C.8 displays support and opposition for the financial bailout by stock ownership
and home ownership. The stock ownership data comes from the NBC News/The Wall Street
Journal poll and the home ownership data from the the CCES 2008. While stock-owners
appear more supportive of the financial bailouts (46% in support, as opposed to 36% for non-
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stock-owners), home ownership appears to have the opposite impact (26% of homeowners
support the bailout, while 28% of non-homeowners do).
Table C.9 shows levels of support for the US auto bailout in 2008 by ideological and
partisan placement. The table is constructed by combining the ABC News/Washington
Post and Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg News polls. Support for the auto bailouts takes on
both an ideological and partisan dimension: while conservative and Republican respondents
reporting are opposed to the the bailout (59% and 62% respectively), liberals and Democrats
are in support (57% and 56% respectively).
Table C.10 reports levels of support for the US financial bailout of 2008 again by ideol-
ogy and partisanship. The data is pooled from the ABC News/Washington Post and Los
Angeles Times/Bloomberg News polls. Conservatives and Republicans are clearly opposed
to the financial bailout (51% and 54%, respectively) while those on the left express a more
mixed opinion: liberals report 43% opposition and 42% support, while Democrats reports
42% opposition and 44% support. Thus while there is an ideological and partisan split, as
hypothesized, on support for both bailouts, it is much stronger in the case of the auto, rather
than the financial, bailouts.
Table C.11 reports support for bailouts again by ideology and partisanship, this time
using the CCES 2008 data. As we see, support declines from very liberal to very conservative
respondents (22% to 11%), though it reaches its peak of 26% amongst liberal respondents,
suggesting some moderate non-linearities. On the partisan side, Democrats are the strongest
supporters (26%), while both Independents and Republicans are only 17% in support.
Table C.12 reports the impact of sociotropic concerns on bailout support. To do so, rates
of support and opposition to the auto and finance bailouts are measured by respondents’
responses to the two questions from the ABC News/Washington Post and Los Angeles
Times/Bloomberg News polls about whether the bankruptcy of the automakers would be
bad for the broader economy, the question from the ABC News/Washington Post poll about
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whether the financial bailout would be effective and the CBS News poll of October 2008
question about whether the bailout would only benefit the banks as opposed to the rest of
the country.
We see resounding support for the idea that concern over the efficacy of the bailouts
and whether or not broader swathes of the country benefit from them impacts whether
respondents express support of opposition. Respondents, for example, who believe that
bankruptcy of one of the automakers would be bad for the US economy are 60% in support
of bailing them out. Those who think that the actions by the government in the US to assist
distressed banks will be effective at stopping the economic decline are 56% in support of
the financial bailouts, while those who think that only the banks stand to benefit are 68%
opposed.
Rather than operating as independent explanatory factors, ideological orientation and
sociotropic concerns are likely to be directly linked. As concerns over the efficacy of bailouts
are likely to be driven by ideological concerns, these concerns may act as an intervening
variable between ideological predisposition and support for bailouts. Conservatives, for ex-
ample, are likely to think that bailouts are ineffective, and that the market-based alternative
of bankruptcy leads to better outcomes. Therefore, they are less supportive of bailouts.
This possibility finds some support in the data. For example, while 40% of liberals
view the auto bankruptcy as bad for the economy, only 31% of conservatives do. More
conservatives, however (55%) believe that the financial bailout will be effective than liberals
(51%). Liberals again are more likely to think that that only banks stand to benefit from the
financial bailout, but the difference in support is quite small (67% for liberals as opposed to
65% for conservatives). The results are quite similar if instead we look at the split amongst
Democrats and Republicans.
To further examine how intertwined the ideological and sociotropic explanations are, I
next look at whether conservatives who think that bailouts are a positive force are still op-
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posed to them, as well as whether liberals who think that bailouts only benefit the recipients
remain somewhat supportive. Again, the results are mixed: ideological concerns appear to
remain relevant in the case of autos, while sociotropic concerns mitigate ideological consider-
ations in the case of finance. Conservatives who believe that the failure of a major automaker
is not bad for the national economy remain, on average, opposed to to the auto bailout (43%
in favor and 54% opposed), though this level of opposition is slightly lower than the 59%
reported amongst all conservatives, regardless of their position on this question.1
On the finance side, Table C.13 reports support levels amongst conservatives who replied
in the affirmative to the bankruptcy is bad and the bailouts are effective questions and
amongst liberals who believe that only banks benefit from bailouts. Conservatives who
view the government action on the issue as being able to stop the economic decline are in
fact supportive of the bailout (55% in support and 41% opposed). This level of support
is notably higher than the 34% reported amongst all conservatives. Further, liberals who
view the financial bailout as only benefitting banks are notably less supportive than average.
While only 28% of liberals amongst this group support the financial bailout, and 63% are
opposed, 42% of liberals, regardless of their position on this question, report support for the
financial bailout, while 43% are opposed. The results on all three questions are very similar
if we look at values amongst Democrats and Republicans instead.
Next, I examine whether public support for bailouts is mitigated by the extent to which
respondents view the recipients as culpable for their own plight. To do so, I use the question
about the auto bailouts from the ABC News/Washington Post survey of December 2008 that
asks whether the plight of the automakers is due to poor management or the bad economy. I
further use two questions about the financial bailouts from the ABC News/Washington Post
survey of September 2008 and the NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey of October 2008
that ask respondents who is most to blame for the economic crisis. I construct two dummies:
1See Table C.9.
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Management’s Fault?, coded as 1 if respondents blame the automakers’ management for their
plight and 0 otherwise, and Banks’ Fault?, again equal to 1 if respondents consider banks
or investment firms to be primarily responsible for the crisis, and 0 otherwise. Table C.14
shows bailout support based on responses to these three questions.
Individuals who blame the automakers’ management for their own situation appear much
less willing to support a bailout than those who do not (35% support versus 66%). Those
who view the economic crisis as primarily the fault of banks seem more willing to provide
assistance than those who do not, though by a smaller margin (49% in support versus 42% in
the ABC/Washing Post poll and 43% in support versus 42% in the NBC News/Wall Street
Journal poll). Thus individuals who view the recipients of bailouts as culpable for their own
predicament are less supportive of government assistance.
As was the case with sociotropic concerns, partisanship and ideology could be what is
driving respondents’ opinions on both the culpability of particular companies as well as
whether they are deserving of a bailout. Conservative respondents, for example, who are
opposed to providing assistance to ailing automakers might justify this position by blaming
the automakers for their own plight, while liberal respondents who are more sympathetic to
their cause might view them as being victims of exogenous circumstances.
Again, the data support this assertion. Tables C.15 and C.16 report levels of support for
the auto and finance bailouts amongst liberals and Democrats who view the recipients com-
panies as culpable for their own plight. While 69% of liberals in the ABC News/Washington
Post survey of December 2008 view management as responsible for the automakers’ posi-
tion, 79% of conservatives do. Similarly, 74% of Democrats blame management, while 84%
of Republicans do. While liberals and conservatives are equally likely to view banks as
to blame for the financial crisis in the ABC News/Washington Post survey of September
2008 (24% and 23% respectively), the gap is much wider along partisan lines: only 18% of
Democrats place the onus on financial companies, while 30% of Republicans do. While the
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NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey lacks information about the ideological orientation of
respondents, the gap found amongst partisans is somewhat smaller, though still noteworthy:
28% of Democrats assign blame for the crisis to banks, while 36% of Republicans do.
Do ideology and partisanship mitigate the impact of culpability? Liberals in the ABC
News/ Washington Post survey of December 2008 who blame the automaker’s management
are half in support of a bailout and half in opposition (49% in each group). The level of sup-
port espoused by these liberals is lower than the average level of support amongst the entire
group (57%). On the other hand, the proportion of liberals in the ABC News/Washington
Post survey of September 2008 who blame the banks for the crisis who support the finan-
cial bailout (47%) is higher than the overall value of support amongst liberals (42%), but
the small sample size of 47 bank-blaming liberals lowers the confidence we should have in
this finding. Again, performing this same exercise but replacing liberals with Democrats
produces the same results.
C.3.2 German Surveys
Table C.17 reports support for the Opel bailout in both 2008 and 2009, the Arcandor bailout
in 2009, and government support for major companies in general by respondent ideological
orientation. Across all three cases, liberal respondents display a higher proclivity towards
supporting government assistance, though the differences between ideological categories is
quite small. While 34% of liberals support the Opel bailout, 23% the Arcandor bailout, and
35% assistance to major companies, 31% of conservatives provide support in the Opel case,
20% in the case of Arcandor, and 32% in the case of major firms.
Tables C.18, C.19 and C.20 report support for these same three questions by party
support. In all three cases, supporters of the left-leaning SPD (37% support for Opel and
22% support for Arcandor) and Left (30% support for Opel and 29% support for Arcandor)
parties tend to be the most in favor of the bailouts while supporters of the right-leaning CDU
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(31% support for Opel and 21% support for Arcandor), CSU (26% support for Opel and
17% support for Arcandor), and FDP (34% support for Opel and 18% support for Arcandor)
parties appear the least so. A few notable exceptions exist, however, including the relatively
high degree of support for the Opel bailout by FDP supporters (34%, second highest to the
37% support reported by SPD supporters) and the very high degree of support for assistance
to major companies espoused by NPD partisans (52%, significantly greater than the second
highest rate of support, 40%, reported by Left partisans). This second anomaly might be
due to nationalist support for major German firms or random noise caused by the very small
size of this group within the overall sample.
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Table C.3: Question Wording for Financial Bailout Surveys
Pollster Dates Question
PSRA/Pew Sep. 19-22, 2008 As you may know, the government is potentially investing billions to try to
keep financial institutions and markets secure. Do you think this is the right
thing or the wrong thing for the government to be doing?
Fox/OD Sep. 22-23, 2008 In the recent financial crisis, do you approve or disapprove of the government’s
decision to bail out some financial institutions that were facing bankruptcy?
PSRA/Pew Sep. 27-29, 2008 As you may know, the government is potentially investing billions to try to
keep financial institutions and markets secure. Do you think this is the right
thing or the wrong thing for the government to be doing?
CBS/NYT Sep. 27-30, 2008 Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government providing money to
financial institutions to avoid a crisis?
ABC/Washington
Post
Sep. 27-29, 2008 The government has proposed using up to 700 billion dollars to shore up
failing financial institutions on Wall Street. Some people say it’s a bailout
that those companies don’t deserve. Other people say it’s necessary to protect
the broader economy. On balance, do you support or oppose this plan?
CBS Oct. 3-5, 2008 Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government providing money to
financial institutions to avoid a crisis?
CNN/ORC Oct. 3-5, 2008 As you may know, earlier this month Congress and President Bush approved
a government program that would spend up to seven hundred billion dollars
to provide assistance to banks and other large financial institutions. Based
on what you have read or heard about this bill, do you favor or oppose it?
Gallup/USA
Today
Oct. 3-5, 2008 As you may know, this past week the U.S. Senate and House of Represen-
tatives passed a bill to address the problems being faced by U.S. financial
institutions. All in all, do you think it is a good thing or a bad thing that
Congress passed this bill?
NBC/WSJ Oct. 4-5, 2008 The government has announced a plan to take over bad mortgages and other
troubled investments from financial firms. This plan could cost the govern-
ment as much as seven hundred billion dollars but would try to stabilize
financial markets, make credit available to business and consumers, and pro-
tect some homeowners. Do you approve or disapprove of this plan? If you do
not know enough about this to have an opinion, please just say so.
Fox/OD Oct. 8-9, 2008 Last week, Congress passed a bill that included a seven hundred billion dollar
rescue package for financial institutions. Do you approve or disapprove of
Congress passing the rescue plan?
CBS/NYT Oct. 10-13, 2008 Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government providing money to
financial institutions to avoid a crisis?
PSRA/Pew Oct. 16-19, 2008 As you may know, the government is potentially investing billions to try to
keep financial institutions and markets secure. Do you think this is the right
thing or the wrong thing for the government to be doing?
Gallup/USA
Today
Nov. 13-16, 2008 All in all do you think it is a good or a bad thing that the government passed
legislation to provide up to 700 billion of assistance to address the problems
faced by U.S. financial institutions?
PSRA/Pew Nov. 14-17, 2008 As you may know, the government is potentially investing billions to try to
keep financial institutions and markets secure. Do you think this is the right
thing or the wrong thing for the government to be doing?
PSRA/Pew Dec. 3-7, 2008 As you may know, the government is investing billions of dollars to try to
keep financial institutions and markets secure. Do you think this is the right
thing or the wrong thing for the government to be doing?
Gallup/USA
Today
Dec. 4-7, 2008 Next, as you may know, in early October (2008) Congress and the president
passed legislation to provide up to 700 billion of government assistance to
address the problems being faced by US financial institutions. All in all, do
you think it is a good thing or a bad thing that Congress and the President
passed this bill?
CBS News Dec. 4-8, 2008 Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government providing money to




Dec. 6-8, 2008 Which of the following statements comes closer to your view: “The federal
government should use taxpayers’ dollars to rescue failing financial institu-
tions,” or “The federal government should let financial institutions fail if they
cannot support themselves”?
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Table C.4: Question Wording for Auto Bailout Surveys
Pollster Dates Question
Gallup Nov. 13-16, 2008 Would you favor or oppose the federal government giving major financial
assistance to the big three U.S. automotive companies if they are close to
going broke or declaring bankruptcy?
ABC/Washington
Post
Nov. 19-23, 2008 The big three automakers in the United States have asked for a 25 billion dol-
lar loan from the government. Some people say (it’s a bailout those companies
don’t deserve, and that they’d be better off reorganizing under bankruptcy
laws). Other people say (it’s necessary to protect auto workers and save a
key part of the U.S. economy). On balance, do you support or oppose this
plan?
CNN/ORC Dec. 1-2, 2008 The major U.S. auto companies have asked the government for a program
that would provide them with several billion dollars in assistance. The auto
companies say they may go into bankruptcy without that assistance. Based
on what you have read or heard, do you favor or oppose this program?
ABC/Washington
Post
Dec. 3-7, 2008 The big three automakers in the United States have asked for up to 34 billion
dollars in loans from the government. Some people say it’s a bailout those
companies don’t deserve, and that they’d be better off reorganizing under
bankruptcy laws. Other people say it’s necessary to protect auto workers and
save a key part of the U.S. economy. On balance, do you support or oppose
this plan?
CBS News Dec. 4-7, 2008 Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government providing money to
the big three automakers if it would prevent them from going out of business
or declaring bankruptcy?
Gallup Dec. 4-7, 2008 Would you favor or oppose the federal government giving major financial
assistance to the big three U.S. automotive companies if they are close to
going broke or declaring bankruptcy?
NBC/WSJ Dec. 5-8, 2008 The American automobile manufacturers, General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler,have asked Congress for financial aid and loans to keep the com-
panies from failing and declaring bankruptcy. In exchange, the companies
say they will change how they do business by cutting costs and focusing on
producing fuel-efficient vehicles. Would you approve or disapprove of the fed-
eral government providing financial aid and loans to the U.S. automakers? If
you do not know enough about this to have an opinion, please just say so.
LA
Times/Bloomberg
Dec. 6-8, 2008 As you may know, the three U.S. automakers – General Motors, Ford and
Chrysler – appeared before Congress to say that their companies are on the
verge of bankruptcy and to ask for taxpayer-funded loans to help them sur-
vive. Do you think the government should or should not rescue the three U.S.
automakers?
Fox/OD Dec. 9-10, 2008 Do you approve or disapprove of the federal government giving the big three
U.S. automakers billions of dollars in loan money?
ABC/Washington
Post
Dec. 11-14, 2008 The federal government is considering loaning up to 14 billion dollars to the
Big Three U.S. automakers and putting in place a government board to over-
see their reconstruction. Some people say it’s a bailout those companies don’t
deserve, and that they’d be better off reorganizing under bankruptcy laws.
Other people say it’s necessary to protect auto workers and save a key part
of the U.S. economy. On balance, do you support or oppose this plan?
CNN/ORC Dec. 19-21, 2008 The federal government will provide some of the major U.S. auto companies
with more than thirteen billion dollars in loans in order to prevent them from
going into bankruptcy. In exchange for the loans, the government wants the
auto companies to produce plans by the end of March that show how they
would become viable businesses in the long run. Do you favor or oppose this
decision?
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Table C.5: Question Wording for German Bailout Surveys
Target Year Question Translation
Opel 2008 Der Autohersteller Opel hat haupt-
sachlich wegen Problemen seines
amerikanischen Mutterkonzerns die
Bundesregierung um finanzielle Hilfen
gebeten. Was meinen Sie, sollte der
Staat Opel mit Steuermitteln helfen
oder sollte sich der Staat bei Opel
raushalten?
Opel, an automaker, has asked the
federal government for financial aid
principally because of problems at its
American parent company. What do
you think? Should the state help Opel
with tax money or should the govern-
ment not get involved with Opel?
Any Automaker 2008 Und wenn andere Autohersteller in
Deutschland die Bundesregierung um
finanzielle Hilfen bitten, sollte der
Staat dann diesen Autoherstellern mit
Steuermitteln helfen oder sollte sich
der Staat da raushalten?
And if other car manufacturers in Ger-
many to ask the federal government
for financial aid, should the state then
help these car manufacturers with tax
money or should the government stay
out of it.
Opel 2009 Der Autohersteller Opel hat -
hauptschlich wegen Problemen seines
amerikanischen Mutterkonzerns - die
Bundesregierung um finanzielle Hilfen
gebeten. Was meinen Sie sollte der
Staat Opel mit Steuermitteln helfen
oder sollte sich der Staat bei Opel
raushalten?
Opel, an automaker, has asked the
federal government for financial help
principally because of problems at its
American parent company. What do
you think? Tax money for Opel or
State should stay out.
Arcandor 2009 Der Arcandor-Konzern, zu dem auch
Karstadt und Quelle gehoren, hat
die Bundesregierung wegen finanzieller
Schwierigkeiten um Hilfe gebeten.
Finden Sie eine finanzielle Unter-
sttzung von Arcandor mit Steuermit-
teln richtig, oder finden Sie das nicht
richtig?
The Arcandor group, to which
Karstadt and Quelle also belong, has
asked the federal government for help
because of financial difficulties. Would
you find financial support of Arcandor
using tax money proper, or improper?
Major Companies 2009 Und was meinen Sie ganz allge-
mein: Wenn wichtige Unternehmen
in Deutschland die Bundesregierung
um finanzielle Hilfen bitten, sollte der
Staat dann diesen Unternehmen mit
Steuermitteln helfen oder sollte sich
der Staat da raushalten?
And what do you mean in general: If
major companies ask the federal gov-
ernment to provide financial support
in Germany, the state should help with
tax money or the state should stay out.
Table C.6: Support for Auto Bailouts by Household Income
<$20k $20-35k $35-50k $50-75k $75-100k >$100k
Oppose 53% 54% 61% 58% 58% 57%
Support 43% 44% 35% 39% 39% 42%
DK 4% 2% 3% 3% 3% 1%
n 96 126 127 182 144 215
Table C.7: Support for Financial Bailouts by Household Income
<$20k $20-35k $35-50k $50-75k $75-100k >$100k
Oppose 65% 52% 56% 53% 53% 42%
Support 27% 37% 38% 40% 40% 54%
DK 8% 10% 6% 7% 7% 3%
n 83 134 163 184 164 231
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Table C.8: Support for Financial Bailouts
Own Stocks? Own Home?
No Yes No Yes
Oppose 35% 39% 50% 56%
Support 36% 46% 20% 20%
DK 29% 15% 31% 24%
n 258 372 10304 21340
Table C.9: Support for Auto Bailouts in US by Respondent Ideology and Party ID
Liberal Moderate Conservative Democrat Independent Republican
Oppose 35% 45% 59% 31% 57% 62%
Support 57% 44% 30% 56% 34% 29%
DK/NA 9% 11% 11% 13% 9% 10%
n 477 658 743 755 557 510
Table C.10: Support for Financial Bailouts in US by Respondent Ideology and Party ID
Liberal Moderate Conservative Democrat Independent Republican
Oppose 43% 48% 51% 42% 52% 54%
Support 42% 40% 34% 44% 33% 34%
DK/NA 15% 12% 15% 15% 15% 12%
n 480 724 741 826 519 549
Table C.11: Support for Financial Bailouts in US by Ideology and Party ID (Source: CCES)
V. Lib. Lib. Mod. Cons. V. Cons. Dem. Ind. Rep.
Oppose 48% 42% 50% 62% 74% 43% 61% 59%
Support 22% 26% 23% 17% 11% 26% 17% 17%
DK/NA 30% 32% 27% 21% 15% 31% 21% 24%
n 2520 5339 9932 7379 4677 11366 10563 7651
Table C.12: Support for Auto and Financial Bailouts by Sociotropic Concerns
Bankruptcy Bad? Bailouts Effective? Only Banks Benefit?
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Oppose 72% 33% 65% 39% 21% 68%
Support 23% 54% 29% 56% 68% 19%
DK 5% 13% 6% 5% 10% 13%
n 842 1074 449 589 331 524
196
Table C.13: Support for Auto and Financial Bailouts By Ideology and Sociotropic Concerns
Amongst Conservatives Amongst Liberals
Bankruptcy is Bad Bailouts are Effective Only Banks Bene.
Oppose 42% 41% 63%
Support 42% 55% 28%
DK/NA 16% 4% 9%
n 371 203 172
Table C.14: Support for Auto and Financial Bailouts by Culpability
Auto Management’s Fault? Banks’ Fault?
ABC News/Wash. Post ABC/Wash. Post NBC/WSJ
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Oppose 33% 62% 52% 47% 35% 43%
Support 66% 35% 42% 49% 42% 43%
DK 1% 3% 6% 4% 22% 14%
n 182 774 756 255 412 189
Table C.15: Support for Bailouts Due to Culpability Amongst Liberals





Table C.16: Support for Bailouts Due to Culpability Amongst Democrats
Auto Managements’ Fault Banks’ Fault
(ABC News/Wash. Post) (ABC/Wash. Post) (NBC/WSJ)
Oppose 52% 51% 34%
Support 46% 43% 49%
DK/NA 2% 5% 16%
n 254 76 73
Table C.17: Support for Bailouts in Germany by Ideology
Opel Arcandor Major Companies
Lib. Mod. Cons. Lib. Mod. Cons. Lib. Mod. Cons.
Oppose 63% 63% 66% 75% 77% 77% 60% 62% 62%
Support 34% 33% 31% 23% 20% 20% 35% 34% 32%
DK/NA 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 5% 4% 6%
n 2243 2593 1545 1148 1224 805 1112 1272 831
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Table C.18: Support for Opel Bailout by Party ID
SPD CDU CDU/CSU CSU FDP Green Left NPD Other None
Oppose 59% 65% 69% 70% 64% 63% 69% 77% 67% 63%
Support 37% 31% 25% 26% 34% 30% 30% 23% 32% 33%
DK/NA 4% 4% 6% 4% 1% 7% 1% 0% 1% 3%
n 1310 1458 64 153 317 345 379 30 24 2515
Table C.19: Support for Arcandor Bailout by Party ID
SPD CDU CDU/CSU CSU FDP Green Left NPD Other None
Oppose 76% 76% 85% 80% 79% 74% 71% 69% 61% 76%
Support 22% 21% 15% 17% 18% 22% 29% 28% 27% 21%
DK/NA 2% 3% 1% 3% 3% 4% 0% 3% 12% 4%
n 593 778 45 64 171 239 194 30 25 1145
Table C.20: Support for Financial Assistance to Major Companies by Party ID
SPD CDU CDU/CSU CSU FDP Green Left NPD Other None
Oppose 58% 66% 67% 59% 65% 64% 59% 44% 61% 59%
Support 36% 30% 26% 34% 29% 30% 40% 52% 33% 36%
DK/NA 6% 5% 8% 6% 6% 7% 2% 4% 6% 5%
n 613 777 38 81 170 207 173 27 19 1211
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